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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has distinguished the regulation of radio
spectrum from the regulation of printing presses, and applied more
lenient scrutiny to the regulation of spectrum, based on its conclusion
that the spectrum is unusually scarce. The Court has never confronted
an allegation that government actions resulted in unused or underused
frequencies, but there is good reason to believe that such government-
created idle frequencies exist. Government limits on the number of
printing presses almost assuredly would be subject to heightened
scrutiny and would not survive such scrutiny. This Article addresses
the question whether the scarcity rationale—or any other reasoning—
supports distinguishing spectrum from print such that government ac-
tions constricting the supply of spectrum would pass muster.
I argue that the scarcity rationale does not support, and instead
undercuts, government actions that limit the use of the spectrum.
Government decisions that exacerbate the problems that gave rise to
government regulation in the first place subvert the entire justification
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for lenient review. And no other rationale would distinguish spectrum
from print in a way that would support government constraints on the
former but not the latter. Commentators have not attended to this
question of the constitutional status of idle spectrum, perhaps assum-
ing that NBC v. United States and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC effectively held that all regulation of spectrum is subject to leni-
ent scrutiny. But the cases did not purport to extend so broadly, and
there is good reason to conclude that their lenient review would not
apply to government actions reducing the availability of spectrum.
The appropriate review, I contend, is the intermediate scrutiny ordi-
narily applied to content-neutral speech regulation. In order to satisfy
such scrutiny, the government must put forward an important or sub-
stantial government interest. I suggest that in most cases the only in-
terest that would justify a refusal to allocate spectrum is nontrivial in-
terference. I thus conclude that, even if one accepts the current state of
the doctrine, the government cannot exclude noninterfering uses from
the spectrum.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1927, Congress claimed control of the radio spectrum.1 In
1967, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or the Com-
mission) promulgated regulations requiring that stations airing per-
sonal attacks or political editorials give assailed parties airtime for a
response.2 And in 2000, Congress gutted a plan that would have al-
lowed low power radio broadcasters to utilize currently unused fre-
1. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, 1162. The government did not claim owner-
ship of the spectrum, but it both explicitly precluded private ownership and arrogated unto itself
broad authority to control the spectrum. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994):
It is the purpose of this Act, among other things, to maintain the control of the
United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use
of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of
time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be con-
strued to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
See also infra note 223; In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir.
1999) (“Although not owned by the federal government, the radio spectrum is subject to strict
governmental regulation.”).
The radio spectrum is the range of frequencies suitable for the propagation of radio
waves. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 362, 697–98 (16th ed. 2000)
(defining terms relevant to the discussion of radio frequencies and spectrum). It would be a bit
ungainly to refer constantly to “the range of frequencies suitable for radio waves” or “the avail-
able range of radio frequencies,” so in most places I simply refer to “the spectrum.” This short-
hand should not obscure the fact, however, that spectrum has no independent existence, but in-
stead is just the available range of frequencies. See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
2. Amendment of Part 73 of the Rules to Provide Procedures In the Event of a Personal
Attack or Where a Station Editorializes as to Political Candidates, 8 F.C.C.2d 721, ¶ 7 (1967).
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quencies.3 The Supreme Court applied fairly deferential review in ex-
plicitly upholding the personal attack and political editorial rules in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC4 and implicitly upholding the gov-
ernment’s control of the spectrum in NBC v. United States,5 based on
the same rationale: the spectrum was scarce and was subject to inter-
ference, so the regulation at issue was permissible.6 One might assume
that this justification for lenient review would apply to the 2000 deci-
sion on low power radio as well. But the 2000 decision is different,
because scarcity does not justify keeping users off the airwaves. In-
deed, the addition of new users to the spectrum would tend to miti-
gate the scarcity problem. The justifications for lenient review of gov-
ernment action thus do not apply to this decision. Accordingly,
assuming the validity of Red Lion, NBC, and the scarcity rationale,
government decisions that limit the availability of spectrum are sub-
ject to more rigorous review than was applied in those cases—and
that review will often prove fatal.
Commentators have not addressed this point, because most have
argued for a reconceptualization of spectrum regulation and the scar-
city justification on which it has been based. Some argue that neither
spectrum scarcity nor any other rationale can justify government con-
trol over spectrum, and thus push for private ownership of the spec-
trum.7 Others agree that the spectrum is not scarce in ways that dis-
tinguish it from newspapers but put forward other justifications for
regulation of spectrum—ones that often support regulation of news-
3. In January 2000, the FCC promulgated a rulemaking establishing a low power radio
service. Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205 (2000). That December, how-
ever, Congress passed (and the president signed) legislation substantially limiting the program.
Appropriations Act for the District of Columbia, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 632(a), 114 Stat. 2762
(2000); see also infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text (discussing the legislation).
4. 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
5. 319 U.S. 190, 216–17 (1943) (upholding the chain broadcasting rules, which restricted
the contractual arrangements that radio networks could have with broadcasters).
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 197–209 (1987) (debunking the six versions of the scarcity argument put forth by
different Supreme Court Justices); R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2
J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959) (arguing that spectrum is no more scarce than other commodities);
Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 991
(1989) (asserting that neither the scarcity argument nor the government property rationale justi-
fies government ownership of the broadcast spectrum); Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity,
Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 908 (1997) (arguing that “the
physical scarcity doctrine is internally inconsistent, and cannot form any cogent rationale for
public policy”).
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papers and other means of communication.8 It is hard to find any
economist or law professor who supports the differing treatment of
spectrum and print based on the scarcity rationale. The few commen-
tators who defend the markedly weaker judicial scrutiny of broad-
casters’ regulation9 than of newspapers’ regulation have justified that
distinction on grounds other than scarcity.10 But the current regula-
tory scheme does treat spectrum regulation differently from print
regulation, and the basis for that difference is the scarcity rationale.
The arguments for a new understanding of mass media regulation are
quite valuable, but it is also important to analyze the implications of
8. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons
and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 127 (arguing that the values of the First Amendment de-
mand different treatment of individuals and all media entities due to media entities’ ability to
influence public opinion); Jerome Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (1967) (arguing that regulation of newspapers by the government
may be necessary to secure the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression when
“comparatively few private hands are in a position to determine not only the content of infor-
mation, but its very availability, when the soap box yields to radio and the political pamphlet to
the monopoly newspaper”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 49–50 (1993) (putting forward a justification of regulation based on “the need to pro-
mote democratic self-government,” and arguing that this justification applies to newspapers as
well as broadcasters); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE
MANY USES OF STATE POWER 150, 154–55 (1996) [hereinafter Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED] (ar-
guing that laws aimed at increasing robust public debate should be permissible as to broadcast-
ers and newspapers); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787–90 (1987)
[hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?] (arguing that the market position of newspapers and broad-
casters is similar, and that as a result of their position both merit regulation by the state).
9. Much of the focus for commentators has been on broadcasters in particular, rather than
spectrum more generally. This makes a good deal of sense when the focus is on the treatment of
companies that have broadcast licenses versus those that print newspapers. For purposes of my
focus on unused and underused spectrum, however, this division of the spectrum seems inappo-
site. As I discuss infra, the scarcity rationale as applied to unused spectrum extends both to
broadcast and nonbroadcast uses of the spectrum, so I address spectrum regulation, rather than
broadcast more specifically. See infra Part VI.A. Indeed, as I discuss in the Article, it is hard to
understand how one could know to characterize unused spectrum as intrinsically “broadcast” or
“nonbroadcast.” See id.
10. Prominent among the few in this category are Lee Bollinger and Charles Logan. See
Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 26–37 (1976) (arguing for differing
regulatory regimes for newspaper and broadcast as a way of balancing two different constitu-
tional values); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing
the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1688–92 (1997) (arguing
that the scarcity rationale does not justify government regulation of the spectrum, but that such
regulation can be justified either as a quid pro quo for the government’s granting of spectrum
licenses or based on an affirmative vision of the First Amendment). Professor Bollinger, though,
argues not so much that broadcast should be regulated more heavily than print, but rather that
it makes sense to have one mass medium that is regulated and one that is not, and that broad-
casting might as well be in the former category and print in the latter. Bollinger, supra, at 26–37.
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the current regulatory approach to spectrum. Given that this is the
controlling regime, fleshing out its ramifications has obvious signifi-
cance. It also allows us to compare the current approach to possible
alternatives.
My argument in this Article is that government control of the
spectrum entails a concomitant obligation to make that spectrum
available, such that the government’s refusal to allow anyone to use a
given frequency must satisfy intermediate scrutiny in order to be con-
stitutional. In the main, the only government interest that will satisfy
such scrutiny is nontrivial interference with another’s signal.11 This
means that the government will be able to keep spectrum unutilizable
or underutilized only to the extent that interference justifies such
choices. The government violates the First Amendment when it keeps
more spectrum unused than is justified by concerns about interfer-
ence.
This analysis presumes the validity of the existing regulatory re-
gime, and thus does not speak to those whose starting point is the re-
jection of the current scheme. It is worth noting, however, that this is
one of the few aspects of spectrum regulation on which those who
want to free spectrum from government control and those who sup-
port a greater government role might agree. Requiring that the gov-
ernment satisfy a rigorous test in order to limit the uses of the air-
waves represents a restriction on government power. Although those
who want the spectrum to be beyond government control would of
course sweep more broadly, their analysis and mine will reach similar
conclusions on governmental limits on new spectrum users. Most
supporters of greater government control, in turn, have put forward
as a central goal (and, therefore, justification of government action)
the opening up of communications facilities to more speakers.12 Their
focus has been on forcing private companies to provide avenues for
other voices to use their spectrum, but their reasoning applies as well
to preventing the government from limiting options for those other
voices.13 Thus, even though the two camps’ reasoning places them on
opposite sides of most spectrum debates, here they would appear to
be on the same side.
11. There are other possible government interests. For instance, the government may fear
that once it allocates spectrum for a given use it will not be able to get the spectrum back for
another use, especially in light of the potential entrenchment of incumbents. I discuss the insuf-
ficiency of these other government interests in Part V.A.
12. See infra notes 155–60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 161–65 and accompanying text.
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The Article begins in Part I by discussing situations in which
there is a strong argument that government actions have resulted in
unused or underused frequencies. Part II turns to the First Amend-
ment, framing the issue by considering the constitutional objections to
a regime that licenses printing presses. Part III addresses the basis
upon which the Supreme Court has distinguished spectrum from
print—the scarcity rationale. The problem for the government is that
the scarcity rationale does not support, and instead undercuts, gov-
ernment actions that diminish the number of users of the spectrum.
And no other rationale distinguishes spectrum from printing presses
in a way that justifies the government limiting access to the former
but not the latter. One obvious objection to this argument is that it is
inconsistent with NBC and Red Lion, the two main cases articulating
and relying on the scarcity rationale. Part IV takes up those cases,
finding that nothing in them suggests that scarcity applies across the
board, and that there are good reasons to conclude that scarcity does
not apply when government limits the supply of frequencies. Part IV
then argues that, in the absence of scarcity as a justification for more
lenient scrutiny, the scrutiny applicable to government decisions that
keep potential users off the spectrum is the intermediate scrutiny ar-
ticulated in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.14 Part V applies
that scrutiny to the various interests that the government might al-
lege, concluding that, in most cases, only nontrivial interference will
constitute an important or substantial government interest. Part VI
considers how broadly the principle against government wasting of
the spectrum applies. I contend that it is not limited to broadcast
spectrum, and that it applies not only to unused but also to underused
spectrum. Finally, Part VII addresses those situations in which adding
users to the spectrum might be a less restrictive alternative to other
forms of regulation. The import of my analysis is that, if a potential
licensee challenges government actions that keep frequencies unus-
able or underused, in most cases the only legally sufficient basis for
the government’s action will be the need to prevent nontrivial inter-
ference; and the government’s argument that interference is a prob-
lem will be subject to intermediate scrutiny.
14. 512 U.S. 622 (1994). This case is known as Turner I, to distinguish it from the second
Supreme Court opinion (after the Supreme Court in Turner I remanded the case to the lower
court), which is reported at 520 U.S. 180 (1997) and is known as Turner II.
BENJAMIN 10/28/02 2:07 PM
8 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1
I.  WHEN MIGHT GOVERNMENT ACTIONS CREATE
UNUSED OR UNDERUSED SPECTRUM?
A. The Government’s Licensing Regime
The FCC is the main governmental entity that regulates the use
of spectrum.15 Its parceling of the spectrum usually entails three basic
decisions. First, the Commission determines the quantity and location
of frequencies to allocate for a given service or services—the number
of megahertz of spectrum (e.g., a total of 10 megahertz) that will be
designated for broadcast television, cellular telephony, satellite radio,
etc., and the position of that slice on the spectrum (e.g., the frequen-
cies between 100 and 110 megahertz).16 Second, it determines how the
frequencies allocated for a given service will be divided up—how big
a piece of spectrum each license will cover (e.g., 100 licenses covering
100 kilohertz each, which totals 10 megahertz); how much area each
license is authorized to cover (e.g., a portion of the United States)
and what the limits are on the power levels of the transmitters; and
whether and how it will create buffers between users or between
services to avoid interference.17 Third, the Commission assigns the li-
censes to particular entities. Until fairly recently, the FCC chose li-
censees by evaluating the applicants for a given license in a compara-
tive hearing.18 Under current law, however, the Commission is
required to assign most licenses via auction.19
15. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), located
within the Commerce Department, manages the portions of the spectrum that are reserved for
government use, and it shares authority with the FCC to determine which portions are so re-
served. 47 U.S.C. § 902 (2000). When spectrum allocated to the federal government is unused or
underused, the NTIA thus may bear some responsibility for that wasting. The arguments in this
Article would apply to such wasting. They are not limited to any one portion of the radio spec-
trum, and instead apply to the portions allocated to governmental and private actors. See infra
Part VI.A. In light of the fact that the FCC makes most of the decisions regarding spectrum, and
the cumbersomeness of referring to “the FCC and for some purposes the NTIA,” however, I
will refer to “the FCC” as a convenient shorthand for government actors that control the use of
the spectrum.
16. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 62–63
(2001).
17. Id.
18. Id. Congress gave the FCC the authority to distribute licenses via lottery in 1982, and it
chose this method for distributing some licenses (e.g., licenses for cellular telephony in markets
other than the thirty largest), but continued to use comparative hearings for other licenses (e.g.,
broadcast radio and television licenses). See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(1) (2000) (providing authority to
choose licenses via lottery); Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Allow the Selection
From Among Competing Applicant for New AM, FM, and Television Stations by Random Se-
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With respect to the first two categories of decisions, the FCC can
choose to exert significantly less control than this discussion might
suggest. Rather than specify a single permissible service on a particu-
lar band of spectrum, the Commission might give potential licensees
more flexibility to choose to provide one (or more) services from
among a variety of authorized services. Indeed, the FCC could simply
state that licensees can offer any service(s) they deem desirable.
Similarly, rather than specify the permissible level of power and the
size of a buffer zone, the FCC could just prohibit uses that interfere
with existing uses, and leave it to the new users to avoid interference
(whether by modifying their own activities or reimbursing an existing
user for the cost of changing its use to prevent the interference). The
FCC might even decide not to restrict interference, and to leave the
resolution of interference disputes to common law courts hearing
cases in trespass or nuisance.20
lection (Lottery), 5 F.C.C.R. 4002, 4002 (1990) (choosing comparative hearings rather than lot-
teries for these licenses); Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Allow the Selection from
Among Mutually Exclusive Competing Cellular Applications Using Random Selection or Lot-
teries Instead of Comparative Hearings, 98 F.C.C.2d 175, 175 (1984) (implementing lotteries for
cellular telephony licenses). In 1993, Congress gave the Commission the authority to auction
licenses used in common carrier and private radio services, but not broadcasting licenses. Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, § 6001, 107 Stat. 312, 379–86. Finally,
in 1997, Congress broadened the auction authority and made auctions mandatory, requiring that
nearly all initial licenses (including broadcast licenses) be auctioned. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)–(j)
(2000). See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 144–146 (discussing the move from hearings to
lotteries to auctions).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)–(j). There are a few exceptions to the auction mandate. The FCC is
not permitted to auction licenses or construction permits for public safety radio services, for
noncommercial educational or public broadcast stations, or for digital television service given to
existing broadcast licensees to replace their analog television service licenses. § 309(j)(2); see
also Implementation of Sections 309(j) and 337, 15 F.C.C.R. 22,709, ¶¶ 88–91 (2000) (outlining
the FCC’s first-come, first-served licensing, with hearings as an option, for licenses exempt from
the auction requirement). The FCC is also prohibited from auctioning orbital locations or spec-
trum for international or global satellite communications services. 47 U.S.C. § 765f (2000); see
also Amendment of Commission’s Space Station Licensing Rules and Policies, 17 F.C.C.R.
3847, ¶¶ 5–10 (2002) (discussing the FCC’s comparative method of assigning space station li-
censes).
20. Some commentators have observed exactly this. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LAW AND
DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE 74–76 (1997) (proposing that common law courts, rather than the
FCC, adjudicate interference disputes); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of Broadcast
Regulation, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 149 (1990) (contending that common law courts were doing a
creditable job of mediating interference disputes before the federal government arrogated that
authority unto itself). As Hazlett and others have noted, an early case in the Illinois courts in-
volved the adjudication of a claim that one station was interfering with another and damaging
the latter’s rights, much like a common law property dispute. Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad.
Station, 68 CONG. REC. 216 (1926) (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. Nov. 17, 1926); see also Tom W.
Bell, The Common Law of Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1764–67 (1999) (arguing that
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Such a scheme is not a product of my imagination. A number of
commentators have proposed that the FCC sell spectrum to entities
and allow them to use the spectrum in any way they see fit, subject
only to limitations on interference (whether enforced by the FCC or
by common law courts).21 And in some cases the FCC has in fact
moved toward greater flexibility. It has issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking and accompanying policy statement that promise a will-
ingness to allow licensees to develop additional uses for their spec-
trum.22 More concretely, the FCC has, for example, allowed radio sta-
tions to use part of their spectrum for nonbroadcast services, such as
private paging, data transmission, and dispatch services.23 In addition,
for the 746–764 and 776–794 megahertz bands the Commission has
promulgated service rules that allow a wide range of wireless services,
leaving it up to particular licensees to choose what wireless service to
provide.24 Perhaps more dramatically, in a few small, high-frequency
bands, the FCC created a regime that not only allows for flexible uses,
but also does not require a license.25 The regulations limit the power
Oak Leaves applied principles of trademark law, and more generally asserting that trademark
law, rather than common law, should govern spectrum).
21. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 20, at 72–74 (advocating “[p]rivatizing the [a]irwaves”);
Thomas Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License
Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 569 (1998) (arguing for a market-based spectrum
allocation system); Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum
Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87, 102 (1997) (“So long as a spectrum
user’s emissions comply with objective numerical standards, it should ordinarily be free to offer
any services by using any technologies it wishes. The Commission should also consider expand-
ing spectrum users’ flexibility to negotiate among themselves interference limitations.”); Com-
ments of Gregory L. Rosston et al., In re Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimi-
nation of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets at 5, WT Docket No. 00-230, at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/hazlett/cthazlett010207.pdf (FCC Feb. 7, 2001) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (“The Commission should eliminate all requirements that are not re-
lated to interference or anti-competitive concentration.”).
22. Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Develop-
ment of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,178, ¶ 1 (2000); Promoting Efficient Use of Spec-
trum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R.
24,203, ¶ 2 (2000).
23. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 72.
24. Service Rules for the 746–765 and 776–794 MHz Bands, 15 F.C.C.R. 476, ¶ 2 (2000); see
also Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Development
of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,178, ¶ 2 (2000) (“Licensees/users should have flexibility
in determining the services to be provided and the technology used for operation consistent with
the other policies and rules governing the service.”).
25. See 47 C.F.R. § 15.407(a)(1)–(3) (2001) (listing technical requirements for an “Unli-
censed National Information Infrastructure”).
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that any entity can use and their emissions outside the frequency
bands, but otherwise they contain relatively few constraints.26
This flexibility applies to only a relatively small percentage of the
spectrum, however.27 The FCC often permits only one service on a
given slice of spectrum, and it often creates or mandates buffers be-
tween licensees.28 These strictures have particular significance for
purposes of this Article. Governmental restraints on the use of spec-
trum give rise to the possibility that a provider of a new service will be
denied use of the spectrum, even though its service will not interfere
with existing licensees. Limits on potential services raise the specter
of underutilized frequencies. And buffers between users create dead
space, thereby rendering those portions of spectrum legally unusable.
B. Unused and Underused Spectrum
The right to transmit over a particular frequency would have lit-
tle value if the transmission were subject to significant interference.
For most services, a signal that cannot be reliably received is not ter-
ribly useful. Thus, a central concern in spectrum policy is avoiding
undue interference. When considering interference, though, there is
an immediate problem: every transmitter creates some interference,
so interference is not an on/off switch but is instead a continuum.
Every time a person uses a cordless telephone, or even turns on a
light, there is a transmission of energy through the air that thereby
creates a tiny amount of interference for nearby users of nearby fre-
quencies. That interference often will be quite slight—in some situa-
tions, so slight that users of existing services will not experience any
loss of signal quality—but there almost assuredly will be some inter-
action between the radio waves propagated by the new source and
26. Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Provide for Operation of Unlicensed NII
Devices in the 5 GHz Frequency Range, 12 F.C.C.R. 1576, ¶¶ 32–55 (1997); see also Stuart
Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2,
¶¶ 84–85 (Aug. 2, 2002), at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/02_STLR_2/index.htm (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (summarizing the relevant federal regulation); Gregory L. Rosston
& Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50
COMM. L.J. 87, 96 (1997) (outlining justifications for the existing flexible regulation regime).
27. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spec-
trum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave
Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 339 (2001) (“[T]he services liberalized constitute
just a small slice of available airspace. In the prime frequencies under 3 GHz, particularly im-
portant for mobile uses, only about six percent of frequencies are zoned for flexible use. Above
3 GHz, the proportion is much less.” (footnotes omitted)).
28. See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
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those of an existing source. It would be much simpler if a transmission
at X watts caused absolutely no interference, and a transmission at
X+1 watts caused considerable interference, but that is not the world
that we inhabit.
The radio waves emitted by some services, though, cause so little
interference to other services that their addition to the airwaves
barely has any effect on existing services or can be remediated easily
(e.g., by adjusting the rabbit ears on televisions that receive broadcast
signals).29 The FCC has added many such services to the spectrum
over the years, knowing that their interference would not be zero, but
would be so small as to be de minimis.30 Indeed, one of the FCC’s
goals when it considers adding new services to the spectrum is to en-
sure that interference from those new services is kept at trivial levels
or can be avoided through simple remediation.31
Some potential providers of new services, however, have not
been allowed on the spectrum despite strong arguments that their
proposed use would create trivial amounts of interference and/or
could easily be avoided. Some of these situations have arisen when
the government prevents anyone from using a slice of spectrum—re-
gardless of potential licensees’ interest in using it. The best example
of ongoing prohibitions of this sort are mandated buffers between li-
29. See, e.g., Service Rules For 746–764 and 776–794 MHz Bands, 15 F.C.C.R. 5299, ¶¶ 4–
24 (2000) (allowing for new services that, according to the FCC, should create no greater inter-
ference than existing services); see also infra notes 33–51 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 14,588, ¶¶ 76–78 (1997) (adopting allotments for digital televi-
sion designed to create only de minimis interference); Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of Com-
mission’s Rules to Permit Operation of NGSO FSS Systems Co-Frequency, 16 F.C.C.R. 4096,
¶¶ 225–28 (2000) (permitting nongeostationary-satellite-orbit-fixed-satellite service and terres-
trial-fixed-multichannel video distribution and data service providers to share certain segments
of the Ku-band).
31. See, e.g., Review of the Technical Assignment Criteria for the AM Broadcast Service, 6
F.C.C.R. 6273, ¶ 129 (1991) (adopting an allotment plan to “allow small variations in inter-
allotment spacings to permit sufficient flexibility to derive an allotment plan that would satisfy
the needs and interests of licensees that desire to migrate and to ensure that the expanded band
would be as interference-free as possible”); Amendment of Part 81 of the Rules Concerning the
Duplication on Service by Public Coast Stations, 35 F.C.C.2d 642, ¶ 13 (1972) (“Our objective,
in assigning working frequencies to VHF public coast stations, as reflected and reaffirmed in
this proceeding, is to avoid to the maximum extent possible, destructive electrical interference
caused through simultaneous co-channel operation by stations.”); Amendment of Part 25 of the
Commission’s Rules and Regulations to Reduce Alien Carrier Interference Between Fixed-
Satellites, 8 F.C.C.R. 1316, ¶ 5 (1993) (“The goal of this rulemaking proceeding is to prevent
harmful interference between satellites and to minimize the impact if unintentional harmful in-
terference does occur.”).
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censees. In light of the danger of interference, a major concern of
regulators is to space uses sufficiently far apart that they will not cre-
ate significant interference for each other. The FCC thus frequently
requires that a given licensee operate on a frequency that is signifi-
cantly higher or lower than the frequency on which other licensees
operate.32 But what if some service could operate in that buffer zone
while creating only de minimis interference problems? In such cir-
cumstances, the government’s failure to allow that service would
needlessly keep the spectrum idle.
A number of potential providers have put forward strong argu-
ments that this is exactly the situation their service presents. The most
famous (some would say infamous) recent example is low power FM
radio.33 As the name suggests, these broadcasters would operate at
much lower wattage levels than traditional (full power) broadcasters
do. The idea was that in many markets additional radio stations could
broadcast without interfering with existing stations, so long as these
new stations transmitted their signals at sufficiently low power. Ac-
cording to the FCC, “licensing very low powered stations will fill in
the gaps in the spectrum that would otherwise go unused.”34
The FCC’s policy since the mid-1960s has been that, when it as-
signs a given frequency to an FM broadcaster (e.g., 99.5 megahertz,
which corresponds to 99.5 on the FM dial), it creates a buffer around
that frequency by refraining from assigning to anyone in that area the
three adjacent frequencies (in the example above, 98.9, 99.1, 99.3,
99.7, 99.9, and 100.1 would be off-limits to other users).35 In 1999, the
FCC proposed that it license low power radio stations to operate on
32. See, e.g., Amendment of Part 90 to Increase the Number of Frequencies in the 72–76
MHz Band for Low Power Mobile Use, 7 F.C.C.R. 8528, ¶ 4 (1992) (allowing for new uses while
providing for buffers between services); see also infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
33. Low power radio is famous because of the opportunity it provided for a profusion of
new voices on the FM dial. As is discussed below, legislation enacted in December, 2000, dra-
matically reduced the number of stations that would be able to offer this service, provoking the
outrage of many low power proponents. See, e.g., Eric Brazil, Congress Blocks Plans for Low
Power FM Radio, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 19, 2000, at A3 (quoting an advocate of low power radio
who characterized the December 2000 legislation as “an outrageous precedent”).
34. Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,208, ¶ 71 (2000).
35. The FCC grandfathered stations that were assigned before these buffers were created,
allowing them to continue operating despite their failure to satisfy these spacing requirements
(and thereby demonstrating that the buffers were not necessary). Grandfathered Short-Spaced
FM Stations, 12 F.C.C.R. 11,840, ¶ 3 (1997); Revision of FM Broadcast Rules, 40 F.C.C. 868, ¶¶
12–13 (1964); see also infra note 46.
As the numbers in the example indicate, the spectrum allocated to broadcasting is allot-
ted in channels of 200 kilohertz each. 47 C.F.R. §73.201 (2000).
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some of those unused channels.36 The FCC’s technical staff recom-
mended, and the FCC formally proposed, that low power stations be
placed on both the second adjacent FM channel (99.1 or 99.9 in the
example above) and the third adjacent channel (98.9 and 100.1), and
that these stations range in power from 10 watts to 1000 watts.37 The
technical staff concluded that these proposals satisfied concerns about
interference, but the FCC, in response to a negative reaction from in-
cumbent broadcasters, scaled back its proposal.38 As adopted in its
2000 rulemaking, the proposal for low power FM reduced the maxi-
mum power of the proposed service from 1000 to 100 watts, declined
to authorize low power FM service on the second adjacent FM chan-
nel, and created a buffer zone around the low power FM stations.39 In
addition, the FCC created a procedure to monitor interference and
halt the broadcasting of any low power FM station that interfered
with an existing station.40
The FCC’s original proposal, and the engineering studies on
which it relied, did not find that low power FM would produce abso-
lutely no interference.41 As I noted above,42 that standard is impossible
for even a toaster to meet.43 What the studies found, instead, was that
for over 99 percent of receivers, low power FM would not create any
36. Creation of a Low Power Radio Service, 14 F.C.C.R. 2471, ¶ 1 (1999).
37. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Chairman Responds to
House Vote to Cut the Number of Community Radio Stations by 80%, 2000 WL 377442 (Apr.
13, 2000) [hereinafter Press Release]. Full power FM broadcasters operate at power levels from
3,000 to 100,000 watts. Id.
38. Yochai Benkler, Property, Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a Core
Common Infrastructure 42, at http://www.law.nyu.edu/benklery/WhitePaper.pdf (Mar. 2001)
(White Paper for the First Amendment Program, Brennan Center for Justice at New York Uni-
versity School of Law) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
39. Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, ¶ 4 (2000); see also THOMAS
W. HAZLETT & BRUNO E. VIANI, LEGISLATORS V. REGULATORS: THE CASE OF LOW POWER
FM RADIO, 17 tbl.2, at www.aei.brookings.org/publications/working/working_02_01.pdf (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 02-1, Feb. 2002) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (charting the differences between the FCC orders).
40. Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, ¶ 67 (2000).
41. Others argue that low power radio would have produced no interference at all. See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 223 (2001) (stating that “there was very good technical evidence that these low power
radio stations . . . would create no technical interference with existing radio stations”).
42. See supra first paragraph of Part I.B.
43. Much less a toaster with pictures. See Bernard D. Nossiter, Licenses to Coin Money:
The FCC’s Big Giveaway Show, THE NATION, Oct. 26, 1985, at 402 (quoting former FCC Chair
Mark Fowler as saying that a television is merely “a toaster with pictures”).
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additional interference.44 Some radios with particularly crude receiv-
ers (usually handheld radios and clock radios), though, can easily be
subject to interference. They do a very bad job of selecting the de-
sired channel (from the group of channels surrounding the desired
channel), and, consequently, all sorts of other transmissions can affect
them. Some of these receivers (amounting to less than 1% of radios),
the studies found, might experience a small amount of interference.
Even this interference was easily mitigated, however: users could
bring their reception back to its original level simply by moving their
radios a foot or so.45 The FCC’s original proposal also noted that
there are already over four hundred full power stations operating un-
der FCC authority without third-adjacent-channel protection—in-
deed, many of these stations did not have second-adjacent-channel
protection46—and yet the FCC had received no complaints about in-
terference; and “[t]hese full power-stations . . . have consistently met
the Commission’s criteria for distortion-free signals.”47
The FCC, in other words, made a strong case that the interfer-
ence created by the low power FM plan it approved was so small as to
44. See F.C.C. Radio Spectrum Mgmt.: Hearing on H.R. 3439 Before the House Subcomm.
on Telecomm., Trade and Consumer Prot., 106th Cong. 36 (2000) [hereinafter Hearing] (testi-
mony of Theodore S. Rappaport, Professor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univer-
sity).
45. Id.
46. These stations were authorized prior to the Commission creating the third adjacent
channel protection requirements, and subsequently were grandfathered. Thus, even though they
operate with only one or two channels between them and the next station on the dial, the FCC
has allowed them to continue to broadcast. See supra note 35; see also Fact Sheet, Federal
Communications Commission, Low Power FM Radio Service: Allegations and Facts, at http://
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Factsheets/lpfmfact032900.html (Mar. 29, 2000) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (“Over 400 full power FM stations authorized
prior to November 1964 do not meet the 3rd adjacent channel protection requirements. In 1997
the FCC grandfathered these ‘short spaced’ FM stations.”).
47. Fact Sheet, supra note 46; Press Release, supra note 37; see also Hearing, supra note 44,
at 142 (testimony of Christopher Maxwell, Secretary/Treasurer, Virginia Center for the Public
Press):
Grandfathered “Short Spaced” stations . . . are close on the dial and are very near
each other. Do they interfere significantly with each? A drive through test has shown
that they do not. Compare their signal wattage with a 100-watt LPFM station. Would
you expect any interference in that case? Under these circumstances, it’s obvious you
would not.
It also bears noting that “pirate” radio stations often broadcast in these radio buffer zones
(e.g., on a second or third adjacent channel). According to one commentator, “Such broadcasts
did not disrupt existing communications; indeed, they long went undetected.” Hazlett, supra
note 27, at 389.
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be de minimis.48 In fact, a common criticism of the FCC’s proposal
was that it was too restrictive (e.g., by leaving unnecessarily large
buffers, in the form of the second adjacent channels), thereby idling
frequencies that could be used without creating interference.49 One
scholar calculated that, in contrast to the one thousand or so stations
that the FCC’s plan would yield (and in starker contrast to the few
hundred that Congress’s subsequent legislation will allow), over
ninety-seven thousand low power stations could be added without
creating additional interference.50 The FCC itself stated that its pro-
posal “g[a]ve even greater protection to existing radio service than a
strict reading of the engineering record would have warranted.”51
Others begged to differ, however. The National Association of
Broadcasters and National Public Radio mounted a massive lobbying
campaign against low power FM, arguing, inter alia, that interference
was a bigger problem than the FCC believed.52 They were unable to
persuade the FCC, but they were successful in lobbying Congress. In
December 2000, President Clinton signed legislation reducing by over
50 percent the number of low power FM stations that would be able
to operate—in other words, increasing the amount of spectrum that
would remain as unused buffer spectrum.53 The campaign against low
48. See Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,208, ¶ 18 (2000) (noting that
“the level of new interference from LPFM stations will be very small”); Fact Sheet, supra note
46:
The LPFM stations will be of such low power, and the separation distances prescribed
by the FCC for 100 watt stations are so conservative that if any interference occurs it
will be no greater than the minimal interference accepted by the FCC and the listen-
ing public on current radio receivers.
49. See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 27, at 389 (criticizing the FCC’s low power FM proposal,
and arguing that “[b]y extending an extremely limited, highly regulated opportunity to a small
handful of community radio stations, vast opportunities for low power FM broadcasting will
continue to be left unexploited”); Benkler, supra note 38, at 42–43 (“As a result of the FCC’s
conservatism, community groups in large urban centers with many incumbent broadcasters
would find it difficult, if not impossible, to operate.”).
50. HAZLETT & VIANI, supra note 39, at 26 (“Even when we cap the density of LPFM sta-
tions . . . the band maintains an insertion capacity of 97,701 new 100-watt stations.”); Hazlett
supra note 27, at 396 tbl.7 (estimating that a further 97,701 LPFM stations could be added with-
out causing additional interference to existing stations).
51. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Lottery Today Determines
Order for Accepting Applications for Low Power FM Radio Station Licenses, 2000 WL 306359
(Mar. 27, 2000).
52. See, e.g., Sarah Wildman, Mixed Signal: NPR sells out, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 12, 2001,
at 14, 14–16 (describing the resistance of National Public Radio to the FCC’s low power FM ra-
dio initiatives).
53. See Appropriations Act for the District of Columbia, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 632(a), 114
Stat. 2762, 2762A-111 (2000) (imposing restrictions on the FCC by modifying the rules on low
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power FM led Bill Kennard, then Chair of the FCC, to comment sar-
donically that “[t]he only real interference to Low Power FM radio is
from high priced Washington lobbyists.”54
The upshot is that there is a quite credible argument that the
government is needlessly keeping frequencies idle on the current FM
dial.55 That is, there is a reasonable case for the proposition that the
government is preventing uses of frequencies that would not cause
anything more than trivial interference. In other situations, the prob-
lem is not that the government is unwilling to allocate a slice of spec-
trum for any use, but rather that it allocates a slice only for services
(often a single service) that do not occupy all of its capacity, leaving
room for other services if only the FCC would allow them. This high-
lights that I am not talking solely about unallocated frequencies. The
allocation scheme for spectrum authorizes the government to approve
as many or as few uses as it wants for any given slice of spectrum, and
to allocate whatever size slice it deems appropriate.56 The combina-
tion of the control over uses and over spectrum sizes has resulted in
situations where a user has more frequencies than it needs, but has no
ability to offer (or allow another entity to offer) an additional service
on its frequencies.
power FM radio stations, including a prohibition against reducing minimum distance separa-
tions and against extending eligibility to applicants not listed, and also retroactively enforcing
the rule modifications); see also Stephen Labaton, Congress Severely Curtails Plan for Low
Power Radio Stations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A1 (“The provision . . . makes it all but im-
possible for licenses to be issued in cities of even modest size . . . . [A]t most a handful of sta-
tions in the least populated parts of the country may be started, although even that is now un-
certain.”); Frank Ahrens, Budget Bill Curbs Low Power Radio, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2000, at
E3 (reporting that the legislation “reduced the number of potential stations by as much as 75
percent” and that “almost no low power stations can be licensed in cities, where the FM dial is
crowded”); Lyssa Graham, New Legislation Hurts Low Power FM Radio Initiative, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 22, 2000, at 3A (stating that the legislation was “a major blow to FCC Chairman
William Kennard’s campaign to bring diversity back to the radio waves”).
54. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Statement of FCC Chairman
William E. Kennard on Low Power FM Radio, 2000 WL 332618 (Mar. 29, 2000).
55. One district court opined that it “‘is inclined to agree that the FCC’s non-commercial
low power broadcasting ban smacks of favoritism towards wealthier interest groups who do not
wish to share the airwaves with non-commercial stations.’” United States v. Szoka, 260 F.3d 516,
521 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting the district court’s unpublished opinion). Indeed, the court then
drew precisely the conclusion from this fact that this Article advocates: according to the court,
keeping low power stations off the spectrum would be “contrary to the FCC’s obligation to dis-
tribute the airwaves in a manner that furthers the ‘public interest’ and, thus, would be inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment.” Id.
56. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text on the decisions that the FCC makes
with respect to spectrum.
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In the best known example, the FCC has set aside substantial
amounts of spectrum for ultra high frequency (UHF) television, with
6 megahertz allocated to each television broadcaster for its NTSC
television signal (the signal in use today for almost all off-air televi-
sion reception in the United States),57 but on most of this spectrum
the FCC has not allowed any other uses.58 The problem is that some
of these UHF channels have never been used to broadcast UHF. In
many areas, there has been available UHF spectrum that no one has
been able to use for any purpose, because UHF television is not suffi-
ciently attractive to entice any broadcasters.59 That spectrum would be
of great value to other users (such as cellular telephony providers),
but other services have not been permitted on the spectrum. So the
spectrum has been unused, even though there were many who would
love to use it, because of governmental restrictions on its utilization.60
57. NTSC stands for the National Television Systems Committee, which was a group
formed in 1940 that created a common standard for broadcasting. That standard has been pre-
dominant in the United States—indeed, the exclusive means of broadcasting in the United
States until the advent of digital television—since 1940. BENJAMIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at
332.
58. See Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights,
Markets, and the Commons, in Comments of Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, In re Issues
Related to the Commission’s Spectrum Policies at 4, ET Docket No. 02-135, at http://gullfoss2.
fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513282647 (FCC July 18,
2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (used with permission) (noting that UHF license
holders “are unable to use the spectrum for any other purpose”). The FCC has allowed some
land mobile usage on UHF channels 14–20, but not on the many channels above 20. See Land
Mobile Use of TV Channels 14 Through 20, 23 F.C.C.2d 325, 341 (1970) (allowing land mobile
usage in ten of the top twenty-five urban areas). The FCC has allowed one other use of this
spectrum—low power television—but relatively few low power television stations exist. See, e.g.
EVAN R. KWEREL & JOHN R. WILLIAMS, CHANGING CHANNELS: VOLUNTARY
REALLOCATION OF UHF TELEVISION SPECTRUM 13, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/
working_papers/oppwp27.pdf (FCC, Working Paper No. 27, 1992) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (discussing the situation in Los Angeles).
59. See Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 37–38 (1995) (citing UHF frequencies as an example of a market
where scarcity does not exist because broadcasters prefer VHF frequencies); Mark S. Fowler &
Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207,
224–25 (1982) (discussing low market demand for spectrum outside large cities, especially “in
the UHF band, where some channels have remained unclaimed for decades”); Jeffrey Silva, TV
Spectrum Could Convert to Wireless, RADIO COMM. REP., July 8, 1996, at 1 (describing an FCC
auction plan to convert undesired UHF spectrum into spectrum used for next-generation wire-
less services). See generally Public Notice, Television Channel Utilization, 1997 WL 557928
(FCC Sep. 9, 1997) (listing commercial channel utilization around the country).
60. See Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 58, at 4 (noting that the UHF band “is extremely
underutilized”). The FCC is in the process of diminishing this underutilization, by reallocating
some of the existing channels for other purposes and using some existing allotments for digital
television purposes, but thus far the process is far from complete, and has been beset by delays.
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In other contexts, there is an applicant for a given allotment of
spectrum, and thus the relevant range of frequencies is not totally va-
cant, but its use for the designated purpose will occupy only a small
part of any given assignment. The limitation on additional uses means
that, even if a licensee can identify a supplemental use of its spectrum
that will not interfere with other uses or with its existing uses, the
government will not permit the additional service to be offered. The
result is that potentially valuable spectrum lies underused. The 2500–
2690 MHz band has been a notable example of this phenomenon. In
1963, the FCC allocated these frequencies to instructional television
fixed service (ITFS), and decided that the licensees would be accred-
ited schools seeking to augment their educational mission.61 There
were two problems, however: in some areas there were no applicants
for those frequencies, and those who did apply for this spectrum were
given much more spectrum than they wanted to use for their ITFS
transmissions.62 Both problems arose from the fact that the FCC had
allocated this bandwidth for ITFS, and nothing else. The FCC re-
sponded to this problem by allowing ITFS licensees to lease “excess
capacity” to multichannel multipoint distribution service (MMDS)
operators.63 Even with both uses, however, the demand has not been
See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 27, at 542 (noting that “[d]espite the existence of abundant unoc-
cupied bandwidth after the digital TV license awards, transitional concerns (moving UHF-TV
stations) continue to delay the implementation of new services”).
61. Amendment of Parts 2 and 4 of the Commission Rules and Regulations to Establish a
New Class of Educational Television Service, 39 F.C.C. 846, ¶¶ 15–29 (1963).
62. See Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 74 and 94 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations in
Regard to Frequency Allocation to the Instructional Television Fixed Service and the Multi-
point Distribution Service, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203, ¶ 25 (1983) (noting the lack of interest in some of
the frequencies devoted to ITFS, and the surplus bandwidth for those who did have the li-
censes).
63. FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 74.931(c) (2001); Amendment of Parts 21
and 74 of the Commission’s Rules With Regard to Filing Procedures in the Multipoint Distribu-
tion Service and in the Instructional Television Fixed Service, 10 F.C.C.R. 9589, ¶ 1 (1995);
Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 74 and 94 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations in Regard to
Frequency Allocation to the Instructional Television Fixed Service and the Multipoint Distribu-
tion Service, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203, ¶ 85, at 1236 (1983).
To obtain the license (and therefore lease to MMDS operators), an ITFS provider must
offer at least twenty hours of ITFS educational programming per week. 47 C.F.R. § 74.931(c)–
(d). This creates an incentive for an educational institution to offer educational programming sim-
ply for the sake of being able to lease the remaining spectrum to MMDS operators, and some
educational institutions appear to have done just that. See Mark Wigfield, Schools’ Spectrum
Rights Promise a Bonanza, But Can They Cash In?, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 6, 2000, at B1 (describ-
ing the financial incentives of schools to offer educational programming in order to lease the
remaining spectrum to private corporations). Jason Flaherty notes a particularly absurd result
involving the license issued to Southwestern Academy in Beaver Creek, Arizona:
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sufficient to fully occupy the entire range of frequencies allotted for
these purposes.64 Other services (notably, third generation wireless
telephony) would love to use that spectrum, but the FCC has not al-
lowed other uses and the spectrum remains underutilized.65
The central difference between unused and underused spectrum
is whether the spectrum is unallocated, or allocated but limited in its
uses (as is the case with most spectrum).66 In the former case, the
spectrum is not usable by anyone, and in the latter it is usable only for
certain services, which services might not occupy all of the available
bandwidth. The relationship between these two can be fairly fluid, as
it may be that spectrum in a given band is both unused and
underused, and that a new service can respond both to the nonalloca-
tion and the underallocation. UHF spectrum illustrates this point. In
addition to the underutilization described above,67 there is also gov-
ernment-mandated nonuse of spectrum in the form of buffers be-
tween UHF stations (known as “taboos”). The FCC has noted how
large the taboos are: “These taboos limit the maximum number of
UHF allotments in any community to 9 out of the possible 55 UHF
Southwestern Academy was awarded four of the six megahertz channels for a pro-
tected service area emanating from Casa Grande, Arizona. Southwestern Academy
only has a total of twenty-four students—one student for each megahertz of ITFS
spectrum they possess. Ironically, despite the lavish excesses of their ITFS spectrum,
Southwestern Academy is unable to use their service because the path between their
campus in Beaver Creek and their tower in Casa Grande is obstructed by steep can-
yon walls.
Jason Roy Flaherty, Comment, Reallocating the Instructional Television Fixed Service Electro-
magnetic Spectrum at 2.5 GHz, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1177, 1197 (2002).
64. See, e.g., Amendment of Parts 1, 21 and 74 to Enable Multipoint Distribution Service
and Instructional Television Fixed Service Licensees to Engage in Fixed Two-Way Transmis-
sions, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,764, ¶ 56 (1999) (stating that “most [ITFS channels] have lain fallow”);
Flaherty, supra note 63, at 1195–1200 (arguing that the ITFS spectrum is wasted and poorly al-
located); Scott Woolley, The Sky Is Calling, FORBES, May 13, 2002, at 151 (noting that “a 190-
megahertz-wide swath of bandwidth starting at the 2.5-gigahertz frequency lies virtually un-
used”).
65. See Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission’s Rules To Allocate Spectrum Below 3
GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services, 16 F.C.C.R. 17,222, ¶ 27 (2001) (adding mobile use to the
2500–2690 MHz band but refusing to reallocate or modify existing licenses).
66. The way that a licensee’s rights to its spectrum were structured—specifically, whether
or not a current licensee had the ability to block new, noninterfering uses of the spectrum that it
had been assigned—may be of considerable importance to the service providers involved; and if
a licensee’s rights were seen as extending to all potential uses of the spectrum it had been as-
signed, then this would be an additional difference between unused and underused spectrum.
But this difference is not inherent in the distinction between unallocated and allocated spec-
trum. See infra note 259.
67. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
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channels.”68 As with radio, the FCC has required separations between
stations, and, again, there are good arguments that these separations
allow for other services that would operate at lower power and would
cause little or no interference with existing uses.69 But, repeating the
pattern with low power radio, low power television broadcasters have
been allowed on the spectrum in smaller numbers than interference
concerns would seem to dictate.70
Incumbent broadcasters have contended that new services would
interfere with their broadcasts, so that buffers could not be reduced
without doing substantial harm to their signals.71 These arguments
were largely successful in preventing broadcasters’ competitors from
gaining access to “their” spectrum, but a funny thing happened when
the incumbent broadcasters wanted additional assignments of 6
68. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broadcast
Service, 2 F.C.C.R. 5125, ¶ 59, at 5132 (1987).
69. See Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer, Digital Television and the Quid Pro
Quo, 2 BUS. & POL. 115, 124 (2000) (noting that since the UHF taboos were established in 1952,
it is “unnecessary to use vacant slots for interference control because of the possibility of using
newer technologies . . . or of allowing non-interfering wireless services other than TV to utilize
unoccupied frequencies”).
70. See An Inquiry into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broadcasting and Tele-
vision Translators in the National Telecommunications System, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, ¶¶ 3, 29
(May 18, 1982) (stating that “interference to communications services” was one of six “decision
criteria,” and permitting low power television between channels 2 and 69); IRA BRODSKY,
WIRELESS: THE REVOLUTION IN PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS 17 (1995) ("[T]he spectrum
shortage is a manufactured problem. For example, the UHF-TV band comprises 336 MHz of
bandwidth. Few cities have more than a half dozen active UHF-TV stations (each occupying
just 6 MHz). The rest of the UHF-TV band has been sitting around for years collecting electro-
magnetic dust."); Paul Baran, Is the UHF Frequency Shortage a Self-Made Problem?, Speech
Delivered at the Marconi Centennial Symposium, at http://www.interesting-people.org/archives
/interesting-people/199507/msg00023.html (June 23, 1995) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(“Tune a spectrum analyzer across a band of UHF frequencies and you encounter a few strong
signals. Most of the band at any instant is primarily silence, or a background of weaker signals.
The spectrum analyzer connected to an antenna reveals that much of the radio band is empty
much of the time!”).
71. See, e.g., An Inquiry Into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broadcasting and
Television Translators in the National Telecommunications System, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, ¶ 43
(May 18, 1982) (indicating that the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, the National
Translator Service, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and other groups opposed the li-
censing of low power television on UHF channels only); An Inquiry into the Future Role of
Low Power Television Broadcasting and Television Translators in the National Telecommuni-
cations System, 82 F.C.C.2d 47, ¶ 61 (1980) (noting that cable television parties made many as-
sertions of interference from new translators but provided little evidence in support of their
claims); Amendment of Parts 2, 89, 91, and 93, 23 F.C.C.2d 325, ¶¶ 32–38, 54–64 (1970) (stating
that broadcasters were “strongly opposed” to sharing UHF television channels due to concerns
about interference).
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megahertz72 for digital television: the FCC found that it was able to
make room for a doubling of every licensee’s assignment by allotting
to each existing licensee unused spectrum originally allocated for
television channels 2–51.73 Admittedly, the design of the digital televi-
sion standard meant that adding digital television on the spectrum
created much less interference for the incumbents than adding new
full power analog television signals would have created. But some of
the potential new uses to which the incumbent broadcasters success-
fully objected (such as low power television) would also have created
dramatically less interference. There was so much unused bandwidth
within the existing broadcast allocation that the FCC could add a
massive new use of the spectrum without causing additional interfer-
ence for the existing users. Digital television, in other words, is an ex-
istence proof that a new service can be added without creating inter-
ference.
The examples above involve proposed services that are low
power versions of the existing service. These low power services
would greatly increase the number of speakers on a given medium,
and likely add a good bit of diversity to the medium. Just as troubling
as government decisions limiting low power services are government
decisions that deny access to services that would provide something
quite different from what is currently available. Promising new tech-
nologies offer exciting possibilities for the use of the airwaves, and,
once again, there are strong arguments that they would create trivial
interference for existing services, but government allocation decisions
leave much of their—and the spectrum’s—capacity untapped.
The best recent example is ultra-wideband (UWB) transmission.
UWB is a form of “spread spectrum” technology, which uses ex-
tremely low power transmissions that hop or spread among a wide
range of possible frequencies.74 Messages can be transmitted despite
72. That is, in addition to the six they already had. See Advanced Television Systems and
Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, 7 F.C.C.R. 5376, 5376 ¶1 (1992)
(providing for the granting of six additional megahertz to existing broadcasters).
73. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 7418, 7421 ¶ 4 (1998) (providing for assignment of new digital
television channels from existing space allocated for channels 2–51); BENJAMIN ET AL., supra
note 16, at 338–40 (discussing the decision to give each broadcast television licensee a digital
television license).
74. See Revision of Part 15 of Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmis-
sion Systems, 17 F.C.C.R. 7435, ¶ 6–7 (2002) (defining the technical characteristics of UWB);
Watch This Airspace, ECONOMIST TECH. Q., June 22, 2002, at 21 (stating that UWB “involves
transmitting very short pulses on a wide range of frequencies simultaneously at low power”).
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the very low power involved because the system is sending bits of
data along a wide swath of spectrum in small packets. As long as the
recipient has the appropriate algorithm, it can reassemble the data.75
The FCC has considered various proposals to devote spectrum to a
broad range of UWB technologies, and to spread spectrum devices
more generally. It has taken the significant step of approving some
uses of UWB, but it allows them only on limited portions of the spec-
trum.76
UWB proponents, though, put forward a strong case that their
service could be added to a much wider range of spectrum without
causing significant interference. In fact, they credibly argue that
UWB’s interference will not rise above the interference created by
background atmospheric radiation (i.e., the radiation in the universe)
and unintentional radiators (electrical appliances that are not de-
signed to emit radio waves but do so as a byproduct of their opera-
tion, such as light switches and VCRs).77 UWB operates at such low
75. See David G. Leeper, Wireless Data Blaster, SCI. AM., May 2002, at 65 (discussing the
properties of UWB transmission).
76. See Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Trans-
mission Systems, 17 F.C.C.R. 7435 ¶ 2 (2002) (authorizing limited use of UWB devices while
acknowledging that “the standards contained in this Order are extremely conservative”); 47
C.F.R. § 15.247 (permitting the use of spread spectrum technology on a few portions of the spec-
trum); Amendment of Part 15 of Commission's Rules Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices, 17
F.C.C.R. 10,755 ¶ 1 (2002) (streamlining some regulations applicable to spread spectrum, but
retaining the limitations on the use of that technology to small portions of the spectrum);
Amendment of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices, 16
F.C.C.R. 10,036 (2001) (same).
77. See Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Trans-
mission Systems, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,086, ¶ 1 (2000) (stating that UWB devices could be added
without interfering with existing radio services); LESSIG, supra note 41, at 232 n.44 (“UWB uses
extremely low power transmissions that do not rise above the noise floor.”); Hazlett, supra note
27, at 508 (stating that “legal devices like Pentium chips emit higher radiation levels in inciden-
tal operation (i.e., without providing wireless communications service)” than UWB); Mark Wig-
field, Tiny New Economy Company Spends Heavily on Lobbying To Push U.S. To Test Tech-
nology, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2000), at A16 (“Ultrawideband’s solution is to turn ‘garbage’
spectrum—now occupied by background radio emissions of such devices as computers and elec-
tric shavers—into usable airwaves for a host of new services.”).
I use the term “unintentional radiators” as a shorthand that comprises two different legal
categories: “unintentional radiators” and “incidental radiators.” The former is defined as “[a]
device that intentionally generates radio frequency energy for use within the device, or that
sends radio frequency signals by conduction to associated equipment via connecting wiring, but
which is not intended to emit RF energy by radiation or induction.” FCC General, 47 C.F.R §
15.3(z) (2001). VCRs and computers (which contain wires conducting energy but are not in-
tended to transmit energy through the spectrum) are examples of unintentional radiators. Re-
view of Part 15 and Other Parts of Commission’s Rules, No. 01-278, 2002 WL 1586363, at n.3
(FCC July 19, 2002). The regulations define an “incidental radiator,” meanwhile, as follows: “A
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power, and over such a wide swath of spectrum, that “to traditional
receivers their signals are indistinguishable from background noise.”78
In this way, one might fairly say that UWB causes no additional inter-
ference; users would not be able to discern any degradation of their
existing signals.79
The bottom line is that much spectrum appears to be unused or
underused, in the sense that services could be added that would cause
little or no harm to existing uses. Indeed, the FCC itself has stated as
much. In setting out its 2000 policy statement proposing a loosening
of restrictions on the use of spectrum, the FCC acknowledged that a
“preclusion of higher valued uses might occur if service flexibility is
restricted by rule or the cost of trading is high. When considered
across our many services, these factors may leave a substantial
amount of spectrum unnecessarily lying fallow.”80 The FCC has also
recognized that allowing new uses of the spectrum can have the effect
of avoiding this underutilization:
device that generates radio frequency energy during the course of its operation although the
device is not intentionally designed to generate or emit radio frequency energy. Examples of
incidental radiators are dc motors, mechanical light switches, etc.” 47 C.F.R. § 15.3(n). These
two categories thus contain devices that emit radio frequency energy as a byproduct of their in-
tended activity.
78. Kevin Werbach, Open Spectrum: The Paradise of the Commons, RELEASE 1.0, Nov. 20,
2001, at 1, 5 n.1; see also Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 58, at 11 (stating that, “for most pur-
poses, [UWB] is part of the background radio noise, and non-UWB receivers that are designed
to reject noise would not recognize the signal, so there is no interference with high powered
broadcasters”); Watch This Airspace, supra note 74, at 21 (suggesting that UWB signals “pass
unnoticed by conventional radio receivers”); Robert X. Cringely, The UWB Era, WORTH, Mar.
2002, at 68 (stating that UWB “is virtually undetectable and . . . doesn’t interfere”).
79. Bandwidth from Thin Air, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1999, at 85–86; David R. Hughes
& Dewayne Hendricks, Spread-Spectrum Radio, SCI. AM., Apr. 1998, at 95; see also Hazlett,
supra note 27, at 444–49 (noting that UWB causes no noticeable interference with signals and
describing the regulatory hurdles slowing its adoption).
80. Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Develop-
ment of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,178, ¶ 11 (2000); see also 1998 Biennial Regulatory
Review—Streamlining of Radio Technical Rules in Parts 73 and 74 of the Commission’s Rules,
15 F.C.C.R. 21,649, ¶ 20 (2000):
The Commission realizes that many stations are operating at less than ‘full’ facilities
because of other Commission regulations, other government agencies’ limitations, or
restrictions of local jurisdictions. . . .
. . . Thus, we conclude that the public interest would be served by adopting proce-
dures to promote more efficient use of FM spectrum by making available this underu-
tilized spectrum on a demand basis for competing broadcast uses.
(footnote omitted) (quoting Modification of FM Broadcast Station Rules to Increase the Avail-
ability of Commercial FM Broadcast Assignments, 94 F.C.C.2d 152, ¶ 65 (1983)).
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More intensive use of spectrum that is already licensed but is un-
derutilized or inefficiently utilized has the potential to help alleviate
imbalances between the supply and demand for spectrum in certain
markets, address the problem of underserved rural areas, and, in
general, ensure the efficient provision of existing and new wireless
services to all markets.81
The FCC’s actions have not matched its rhetoric, however, so the un-
derutilization of spectrum persists.82 And that raises the question on
which this Article focuses: When a proposed service is denied access
to the spectrum and seeks to challenge that denial on First Amend-
ment grounds, what sort of review should a court apply, and what
government interests will justify keeping it off the spectrum?
81. Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Devel-
opment of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,203, ¶ 8 (2000); see also Principles for Promoting
the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Development of Secondary Markets, 15
F.C.C.R. 24,178, ¶ 12 (2000) (stating that “[a]n effectively functioning system of secondary mar-
kets would encourage licensees to be more spectrum efficient by freely trading their rights to
unused spectrum capacity”).
82. The lengthy rulemaking process entailed in an FCC decision to change the allocation of
a portion of the spectrum means that a decision to open up underused or underutilized spec-
trum for additional services often takes a significant amount of time. Insofar as the government
is in the process of reducing the underutilization of a slice of spectrum (i.e., increasing its usage)
by authorizing additional services, see, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text, it would not
be entirely accurate to describe that slice as simply underused: this portion of the spectrum
would be temporarily underused but in the process of being more fully—and perhaps com-
pletely—utilized. Thus, it would seem more accurate to describe this slice of spectrum as in
transition.
The “in transition” appellation could encompass the entire spectrum, however, if one ap-
plies the term broadly. After all, the FCC is always able to change the allocation of a given slice
of spectrum, and might be said to be constantly “considering” doing so (in the sense that the
Commission could choose to act at any time). Moreover, it seems reasonable to posit that al-
most all current spectrum allocations will change within the next fifty years, and thus are in a
long-term “transition.”
Such an interpretation of “in transition” is unnecessarily, and unhelpfully, broad. Surely
any spectrum can be reallocated, but at any given time the FCC has initiated formal proceedings
to change only some parts of it. And, in the absence of a formal beginning of the administrative
process necessary to change an allocation, it would be inaccurate to refer to spectrum as “in
transition.”
This is significant because a service provider that wanted to offer a new service would
stand on different footing with respect to spectrum in transition than it would to simply unused
or underused spectrum. If the government were in the process of allocating that spectrum for a
different use that would interfere with the proposed service, the potential provider’s position
would be considerably weaker. One could not say that the spectrum was straightforwardly un-
used, and that undercuts the viability of a claim premised on the existence of unused spectrum
(i.e., a claim based on the arguments put forward in this Article).
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II.  DIRECT GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF A
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
A. A Hypothetical: The Government Licenses All Printing Presses in
a Content-Neutral Manner
Suppose that the federal government decided to claim control of
all printing presses in the United States: the government seized (and
paid for) all printing presses that currently existed and declared that
there would be no private ownership of any printing presses that may
come into existence.83 The government added, though, that it would
license all current presses, and all those that might be manufactured
in the future, to private users. That is, the government would not be
managing the presses, but would instead turn them over to private
publishers, who could publish their newspapers, magazines, etc. To
avoid any appearance of a content-based judgment about who re-
ceived the licenses, the government would select the winners of the
licenses in a content-neutral manner (say, via a lottery or an auction).
And to avoid any suggestion of government control of newspapers
once they obtained their licenses, the government by statute would
provide that the licenses were freely transferable and were not revo-
cable. A license, the government would explain, was a property right,
not unlike the medallions that some cities give to taxicabs that allow
them to operate. So the government would therefore have a licensing
regime but otherwise would not exercise control over the licensees.
83. Paying for the printing presses should eliminate any viable Fifth Amendment objec-
tions to this scheme. The Takings Clause does not prevent the government from seizing prop-
erty if the government pays for it. The Clause prevents the government from taking private
property without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Seizing all the printing presses and
paying for them would be akin to seizing all the garlic presses and paying for them: it may be
bad policy, and but it would not seem to run afoul of the Takings Clause.
It bears noting that the Takings Clause has been interpreted to impose a slight limit on
the government’s exercise of its eminent domain power, in the form of a requirement that the
property be taken for public use. But the Supreme Court has interpreted the words “public use”
very broadly in the takings context, stating that “where the exercise of the eminent domain
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compen-
sated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.” Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 241 (1984); see also id. (“[T]he Court has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment
for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably with-
out reasonable foundation.’”) (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668,
680 (1896)). It seems, therefore, unlikely that the Takings Clause would pose a significant obsta-
cle to the government’s plan to pay for all printing presses.
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What would be wrong with this, as a matter of First Amendment
law? A critic might object that the government had effectively taken
control of newspapers out of private hands. But the government
would not be exercising control over the printing presses, and the pri-
vate publishers of those newspapers would continue to publish them.
In response to any suggestion that the government was favoring
newspapers it liked, the government could point out that its selection
scheme was neutral. Maybe the problem would be that the govern-
ment could try to influence printers in more subtle ways. That is, once
newspapers knew that the government controlled their licenses, they
would limit their coverage in order to avoid annoying government of-
ficials. But the government could respond that by enshrining in stat-
ute the irrevocability and transferability of licenses, it had abjured
such influence. And, of course, as soon as the government did, in fact,
attempt to penalize any newspaper for content-based reasons, that
newspaper could then bring a legal challenge against the action, and
perhaps the entire scheme.
Cases are of limited help, as no cases are squarely on point. The
closest fit might appear to be cases involving prior restraints, and in
particular Near v. Minnesota,84 in which the Court invalidated a prior
restraint on the publication of a newspaper.85 Linguistically, a license
is a restraint imposed prior to publication, but prior restraints are un-
derstood to be more specific than that—restraints on publishing cer-
tain kinds of information, not restraints on operating a newspaper in
the first place. Near highlights this: the challenged regulation did not
involve licensing per se, but rather an injunction that pertained to
particular forms of speech. It is true that the injunction in that case ef-
fectively shut down the newspaper, but the Minnesota statute in-
volved was no general licensing regime. It provided for the enjoining
of the publication of “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspa-
per, magazine or other periodical,”86 and the speech involved was an
allegation that a Jewish gangster effectively controlled much of Min-
neapolis.87 Far from a content-neutral licensing scheme, the injunction
was triggered by the content of the speech, and only by content ad-
judged to be particularly unworthy of publication.
84. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
85. Id. at 722–23.
86. Id. at 701–02 (quoting Act of Apr. 20, 1925, ch. 285, 1925 Minn. Laws 358).
87. Id. at 703–04.
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The awkwardness of the doctrinal and case law fit should not
trouble us greatly, though. The reason there is no case law directly on
point is that the government has not instituted a licensing regime that
singles out printing presses. If the government were to seize control of
all the garlic presses in this country (again, with payment in full for
them), no fundamental rights would be implicated. But when the gov-
ernment instead seizes printing presses, it directly implicates the free-
dom of speech and of the press by subjecting them to a special regula-
tory regime. The publishers would have a strong argument that any
sort of licensing regime specific to newspapers—even a content-
neutral one—created constitutional problems simply by singling out
newspapers for a particular form of regulation and its attendant has-
sles. Indeed, the government seizing control of a means of printing or
sending speech is a paradigmatic First Amendment case, raising con-
cerns that seem to underlie the First Amendment.88
To what sort of judicial scrutiny would this licensing regime be
subject? As with many other structural regulations of the means of
communication, the regulation would be content-neutral, so strict
scrutiny might seem inapplicable. That said, the regulation would still
seem to be subject to heightened scrutiny.89 The basic level of First
Amendment scrutiny for content-neutral structural regulation of
speakers is the intermediate scrutiny of Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC,90 under which a regulation must serve an “important or
substantial governmental interest” unrelated to the suppression of
speech, and cannot burden substantially more speech than is neces-
sary to further that interest.91
There would be a plausible argument that this licensing scheme
was subject to an even higher hurdle. The Supreme Court has usually
88. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451–52 (1938):
The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of
the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his
“Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.” And the liberty of the press became
initially a right to publish “without a license what formerly could be published only
with one.” While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be re-
garded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a
leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision.
(footnote omitted) (quoting WILLIAM H. WICKWAR, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS 15 (1928)); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988)
(“Indeed, a law requiring the licensing of printers has historically been declared the archetypal
censorship statute.”) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152).
89. See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.
90. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
91. Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
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applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to content-neutral
regulations, but Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Com-
missioner of Revenue92 is a notable exception. In that case, the Su-
preme Court invalidated a use tax applicable to publications, even as
it conceded that there was no indication (apart from the nature of the
tax itself) of any censorial or otherwise impermissible motive on the
part of the legislature that enacted the tax.93 The Court stated that
taxation of newspapers was not permissible “unless the State asserts a
counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot
achieve without differential taxation.”94 Note that the Court required
an interest of “compelling” importance that the government “cannot
achieve” absent its regulation. This is the language of strict, not in-
termediate, scrutiny.
It is not clear, though, that this more rigorous scrutiny under
Minneapolis Star would apply to the licensing regime laid out above.
Licensing might seem more troubling than taxation in the degree of
control it affords to the government, which might support review at
least as strict as that in Minneapolis Star. On the other hand, the gov-
ernment would not be exercising that control, as it would give out the
licenses freely. And in Turner the Court suggested that Minneapolis
Star turned on the fact that the challenged tax applied to only a small
number of newspapers, whereas in this hypothetical the licensing
scheme would apply equally to all newspapers.95 One might also argue
that the licensing as implemented in this hypothetical would impose
relatively small burdens or other costs on newspapers that would not
exist in an unregulated market,96 whereas the taxation in Minneapolis
92. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
93. Id. at 580, 592–93.
94. Id. at 585.
95. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 659 (stating that, in Minneapolis Star, “[w]e subjected the tax to
strict scrutiny for two reasons: first, because it applied only to the press; and, second, because in
practical application it fell upon only a small number of newspapers”); id. at 660 (stating that the
tax at issue in Minneapolis Star was subject to strict scrutiny because it “targeted a small number
of speakers, and thus threatened to ‘distort the market for ideas’” (quoting Leathers v. Med-
lock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991))).
96. This is particularly clear if the government auctioned rights to printing presses. If the
government conducted auctions that did not favor any class of bidders (i.e., with no bidding
preferences or other mechanisms to skew the power of some bidders), there is little reason to
think that government auctions would differ from private auctions (i.e., private sales). Recall
that the government would have paid for the printing presses that it seized via eminent domain
(to avoid violating the takings clause). Assuming that it did so, and that it did not constrict the
quantity of presses (i.e., it let the market produce them as before), then it should have no effect
on prices to add to the existing regime of private transactions a two-step process in which the
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Star imposed a nontrivial cost on publications that would not have
existed absent regulation.
The precise level of scrutiny of this licensing scheme would
probably not affect the outcome of a First Amendment challenge,
however, because the government’s action would seem unjustifiable
under intermediate scrutiny. That is, it seems unlikely that the gov-
ernment could provide a justification that would satisfy even the
Turner standard, which, after all, requires that challenged govern-
ment action be tailored to an “important or substantial” government
interest.97 This standard, as Turner itself revealed in its treatment of
the government’s proffered interests, has some bite. The Turner
Court found that a requirement that local broadcasters be carried on
cable systems could satisfy this burden only if “the Government has
adequately shown that the economic health of local broadcasting is in
genuine jeopardy and in need of the protections afforded by must-
carry.”98 Courts applying Turner scrutiny have similarly applied its
scrutiny with some rigor, invalidating a wide range of content-neutral
regulations.99 In order to show that its action is tailored to an “impor-
government buys all presses and then immediately sells them to the highest bidder. The main
reason to expect price swings is simply the likelihood that many bidders would be wary about
the government’s willingness to leave the quantity of presses undisturbed. Note also that, to the
extent that bidders can bid for particular presses that are expensive to move from their existing
locations, one might expect strategic bidding that would affect the costs for some incumbents.
But it would seem obligatory for the government, in order to make its scheme work fairly, to
pay for the immediate transport of printing presses from one location to another. This would be
quite expensive, of course, and therefore a good argument against this governmental role in the
first place. But it would seem compelled by principles of neutrality.
97. Turner, 512 U.S. at 662.
98. Id. at 664–65.
99. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (invalidating
regulations limiting the percentage of national subscribers a cable system operator could have
and the percentage of channels its affiliates could occupy on its system); Horton v. City of Hous-
ton, 179 F.3d 188, 195 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a fee for nonlocally produced programming
“demonstrates the lack of correlation between the amount charged to non-locally produced
programs and its stated justification for imposing a fee”); Preferred Communications, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “limiting speech to a single
operator is ‘substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest,’ and
therefore invalid” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989))); Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 202 (4th Cir. 1994) (invalidating a stat-
ute that forbade local telephone companies from providing video programming to their sub-
scribers because, in light of less burdensome available alternatives, it was “not ‘narrowly
tailored’ to serve the goals to which it is dedicated”); U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d
1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating a similar statute because its goals could “be achieved
through a variety of less speech-restrictive means”). After Chesapeake and U.S. West were de-
cided, Congress repealed the relevant provision, so those opinions were vacated as moot. On
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tant or substantial” interest, in other words, the government would be
required to show a real harm that is directly alleviated by its action.100
The significance of this is that the government would likely be hard-
pressed to offer a justification for licensing newspapers (and not busi-
nesses more generally) that would constitute an important or substan-
tial government interest. The difficulty that a licensing regime would
have in satisfying First Amendment standards is reflected in the con-
sensus view: “Although it is virtually impossible to find a case that di-
rectly so holds, it is fairly clear that any attempt to license a newspa-
per or magazine would violate the Constitution.”101
Now we turn to spectrum. The government’s regulatory regime
for spectrum is similar to the one I outlined above,102 except that the
granting and renewing of licenses often has been content-based.103
Holding aside the question of how licensees are chosen and granted
renewals, the government’s claim of control, and its decision to li-
cense frequencies while retaining that control, are the same for spec-
trum as they are for printing presses in the example above. On this is-
sue of government control and licensing, what are the relevant First
Amendment considerations?
One would have a hard time arguing that the First Amendment
does not apply to spectrum. Like printing presses, spectrum is used
almost exclusively for communications.104 What is transmitted is in-
formation. In fact, it is misleading to refer to “spectrum” as if it had
some independent existence. We do so as a convenient shorthand, but
what we are really talking about when we refer to a spectrum license
is the right to transmit radio waves at a certain frequency in a par-
ticular location.105 The only things that can be transmitted over spec-
trum are radio waves, and in virtually all cases such waves are com-
these cases, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 54–59 (2001).
100. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 281, 288–91 (2000).
101. Spitzer, supra note 7, at 993; see also LESSIG, supra note 41, at 289–90 (“It would cer-
tainly be unconstitutional to force newspapers to buy a license to print.”).
102. See supra text accompanying note 83.
103. See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 81–137 (demonstrating that in FCC license
hearings, content often played a major role).
104. See infra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
105. And perhaps also at a particular time (if the frequency is divided into time intervals)
and to a particular location (if it is not a general broadcast). See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note
16, at 24–34 (explaining spectrum and frequency generally).
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municating information. Pipes are used to transport many things—
gas, liquid, electricity, etc. Steel is fashioned into garlic presses as well
as printing presses. Spectrum, though, is used to send information—
some combination of voice, video, and data—from one point to
another. It can send different kinds of information, just as a printing
press can create different kinds of printed matter and a fiber optic
cable can send different kinds of information. But, like a printing
press or a fiber optic cable, spectrum is useful only for transmitting
radio waves106—and almost all of those waves contain information.
The other aspects of these regulatory regimes seem identical for
the printing press and spectrum examples. In both cases the govern-
ment has seized control; in both cases would-be speakers must now
obtain a government license. So it would seem that the same First
Amendment analysis would apply. The obvious difference here is that
there is understood to be a justification for government control of the
spectrum that does not exist for printing presses: scarcity, which is
treated as distinguishing spectrum from printing presses and justifying
government control of the former but not the latter.107
B. Another Hypothetical: The Government not only Licenses
Printing Presses, but also Keeps Some Presses Idle by Refusing To
License Them
Now imagine that the government not only seized control of
printing presses but also decided to limit the number of printing
presses it would license. That is, suppose a few new publishing ven-
tures were announced, with entities planning to establish printing fa-
cilities in the state in order to start several new community newspa-
pers; and suppose these ventures had the funds to purchase new
printing presses that they would use for the purposes of this venture.
Finally, imagine that the government responded by saying that it
would invoke its licensing power in an unusual way: it would license
the operation of some of these new printing presses, but not all of
them. Once again, it would distribute these licenses in content-neutral
manner. The government would not be choosing among the appli-
cants, but rather would be choosing how many licenses these appli-
cants would have a shot at; all the applicants would then have a
chance to obtain the license through a content-neutral distribution
106. Indeed, spectrum is merely the range of frequencies suitable for the sending of radio
waves. See supra note 1.
107. See infra notes 124–35 and accompanying text.
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scheme. And if the wise judges of the court suggested that the gov-
ernment was violating the First Amendment by preferring incum-
bents, we can posit that the government would happily agree to im-
pose its content-neutral selection method for the restricted number of
licenses on all printing presses—that is, for both existing and pro-
posed printing operations. But, in any event, the government would
keep some presses idle by refraining from licensing them.
Again, nothing in existing doctrine or case law is on all fours, be-
cause the government has never tried to do such a thing. The reason
the familiar doctrines of First Amendment law do not squarely apply
is that they are aimed at nuances of abridgement. This wolf, as it
were, comes as a wolf.108 As before, the First Amendment would be
implicated, and some form of heightened scrutiny would apply. In-
deed, there would be a reasonable argument that the relevant stan-
dard was strict scrutiny. The government might try to distinguish
Minneapolis Star on the ground that its tax applied to a small number
of newspapers, whereas here the licensing scheme would fall upon all
newspapers equally.109 But if Minneapolis Star were not so cabined,110
its application of strict scrutiny to newspaper taxation would seem to
extend to limits on licenses to print. Indeed, such limits would be even
more troubling than mere taxation of newspapers. A regime that re-
quired licenses and constrained the number of licenses would raise all
the issues that taxing does, and more.
If Minneapolis Star were read to apply only to differential con-
straints on media enterprises, there would still be other arguments for
strict scrutiny in this context. Mere government licensing as a looming
presence raises fears, but it does not impose any limits on anyone.
Here, by contrast, there would be a limit—one that constricted the
number of newspapers that could publish. The government would be
constraining the flow of information via newspaper. A variety of gov-
ernment actions can have the effect of limiting the amount of infor-
mation contained in newspapers. If there were no income taxes, for
instance, newspaper publishers might spend the money saved on taxes
for additional printed pages. But this government decision would be
108. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Frequently an
issue of this sort [involving the separation of powers] will come before the Court clad, so to
speak, in sheep’s clothing . . . . But this wolf comes as a wolf.”).
109. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 659 (1994) (emphasizing that the tax
in Minneapolis Star “fell upon only a small number of newspapers”).
110. Or if a court found that the licensing regime did hurt some newspapers more than oth-
ers.
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different, because it would single out printing presses, rather than ap-
plying to all economic activity. And it not only would create a licens-
ing scheme but also would more specifically limit the number of play-
ers in the market. It would be akin to a limit on how many pages or
how many copies a newspaper could produce.111
In this way, it would seem to run afoul of core First Amendment
doctrine, in that individuals would receive information from fewer
sources than they would absent the regulation. For many theorists,
the central First Amendment value is a profusion of information in-
puts.112 Although it has not been at the fore of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, the Court has sometimes suggested the importance of
the transmission of expansive views to the public.113 A related consti-
tutional concern is that the government would be restricting speakers’
ability to publish. This has long been at the center of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence.114 The First Amendment, after all, squarely
limits the government’s ability to abridge speech, and the Court has
111. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (invalidating a sales tax im-
posed on newspapers with a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week and holding that,
although newspapers may not enjoy immunity from general taxation, a tax calculated to “limit
the circulation of information to which the public is entitled” is wholly inconsistent with the
First Amendment); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991) (stating that strict
scrutiny is applicable to measures that “distort the market for ideas”); Turner, 512 U.S. at 660
(same).
112. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 41, at 115–16 (stating that the aim of the protection of free
speech is to create incentives to produce ideas and move them to the intellectual commons);
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256 (ar-
guing that the First Amendment should protect the “forms of thought and expression within the
range of human communications that allow one to vote properly”); Benkler, supra note 38, at 7
(“[T]he First Amendment operates . . . as an expression of a fundamental commitment of the
American polity to individual expressive autonomy and to robust democratic discourse in a
widely distributed and diverse polity.”).
113. The classic quotation is from Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945),
where the Court stated that the First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest pos-
sible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wel-
fare of the public.”
114. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559–60 (1948) (invalidating an ordinance re-
quiring a permit from the chief of police prior to using a sound amplification device); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539–40 (1945) (stating that “[a]s a matter of principle a requirement of
registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an exer-
cise of the rights of free speech and free assembly” and “a requirement that one must register
before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite
incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (finding permissible a tax on the income of a person who engages in activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment, and impermissible a tax imposed on that person for the
privilege of engaging in those activities).
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quite properly found that abridgements include roadblocks and other
restrictions that are aimed at forms of communication.115
An additional set of reasons for concern about a regime that al-
lowed the government to constrict the supply of licenses revolves
around the government’s incentives to impose tighter limits than are
necessary. First, the government would have an incentive to create
fewer licenses as a means of enhancing the government’s power and
control. Insofar as those with power have an interest in retaining it,
the incentive not to allocate frequencies exists. If the government im-
poses limits on the number of licenses, it signals to current licensees
seeking to expand that the government is willing to use its constrain-
ing authority. With any luck (from the government’s perspective), this
may produce licensees who are inclined to stay in the government’s
good graces. In any event, the government only strengthens its posi-
tion by demonstrating a willingness to limit the granting of licensees
as it sees fit. Keeping a resource scarce is a way to keep power. By
contrast, if the government fails to act on its power and gives out li-
censes to the maximum extent that it can, it foregoes these levers.116
Second, if the government sells licenses (as it currently does for most
spectrum), it may receive less money from bidders for those licenses if
it opens up the supply of licenses to the maximum that can operate
without interfering with each other. Depending on the shape of the
relevant curves, maximizing the number of licensees (even if all are
paying) might not be consistent with maximizing the revenue flowing
to the government.117 The government, as purveyor of the licenses,
115. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080,
2089 (2002) (invalidating an ordinance regulating the activities of solicitors and canvassers).
116. See Spitzer, supra note 7, at 1060–61:
[I]t would be safer for first amendment values if the government sold all the spectrum
and then bought whatever it needed in the market. There would be no incentive to
reduce the volume of broadcast speech under that procedure. . . . If the government
were allowed to sell only as much spectrum as it wished, rather than to sell all the
spectrum and then buy as much as it wished, less spectrum would be available for pri-
vate communication. From the perspective of first amendment values, the latter ap-
proach would be preferable.
117. See Buck, supra note 26, ¶ 116 (“Now that politicians have come to depend on auction
revenue for balancing the budget, it is in their interest to keep access to the spectrum artificially
scarce, and therefore expensive.”); Spitzer, supra note 7, at 1060:
If the federal government auctioned off property rights in the spectrum while keeping
title to some of the spectrum, the government would have an incentive to restrict the
volume of spectrum sold and to raise the price of spectrum. . . . When searching for
the revenue-maximizing price, the government would act like a profit-maximizing
monopolist. The government would restrict the volume of spectrum that it sold so as
to force prices above the competitive level and increase total revenues.
BENJAMIN 10/28/02 2:07 PM
36 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1
might find that the best way to maximize its total revenue is to con-
strict the market for licenses by keeping some off the market. After
all, a basic economic argument against monopolies is that a profit-
maximizing monopolist might produce a suboptimal supply of the
good it monopolizes.118 This is a strategy that many monopolists are
thought to pursue, and the government is a monopolist with respect
to the spectrum.
A third reason for concern flows from the fact that the costs re-
sulting from allowing new entry will be salient, but the costs of not
allowing new entry will be less visible. Adding uses on to the spec-
trum may increase interference, and certainly will increase competi-
tion for incumbents. Those incumbents have every incentive to play
up the potential negative effects of permitting new uses. The absence
of new entrants, meanwhile, merely continues the status quo. The
costs of denying entry are perceptible only with respect to what might
have been. Thus one should expect a bias toward false negatives (or
Type II error119)—the government refusing to allow uses on the spec-
trum even when it should. As Thomas Hazlett put it, “The allocation
system will be especially prone to Type II errors because the losses
associated with overutilization of spectrum will be closely monitored
and carefully reported, while losses from underutilization generally
will not be.”120
CHARLES L. JACKSON ET AL., PUBLIC HARMS UNIQUE TO SATELLITE SPECTRUM AUCTIONS 3,
Strategic Policy Research, Inc., at http://www.spri.com/pdf/reports/sia/pubharms.pdf (Mar. 18,
1996) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“To increase revenues, individual countries con-
ducting auctions will have an incentive to restrict the supply of satellite spectrum (e.g., ware-
housing spectrum and orbital resources), implement a priori planning and oppose new alloca-
tions of satellite spectrum.”).
Congress, in apparent response to this fear, has in some contexts prohibited the FCC
from basing decisions on how to assign licenses “solely or predominantly on the expectation of
Federal revenues.” 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(7)(B) (1994). Because this prohibition applies to the as-
signment of particular licenses (that is, after the FCC has already decided to allocate licenses to
a particular service), it does not directly respond to the concern that the government might keep
some spectrum off the market entirely by failing to allocate it. But the legislation does seem to
indicate a congressional awareness of the incentives created by the government’s monopoly
power over the spectrum.
118. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 1.2 at 12 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing this argument against
monopolies).
119. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Hal J. Singer, and David J. Teece, A General Framework for
Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1639, 1643 (1999)
(noting that “[a] Type I error is the failure of the Commission to deter a harmful event,”
whereas “a Type II error is the failure of the Commission to allow a beneficial event”).
120. Hazlett, supra note 27, at 389.
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More generally, insofar as incumbents can affect the govern-
ment’s strategy, incumbents’ incentives run toward restrictions on the
supply of licenses.121 Incumbents have never relished the prospect of
more competition, and their existence as licensees—and the rents that
flow from their position as incumbents—give them the ability to
mount opposition to new entrants. Significantly, this is not just a mat-
ter of theory. The history of broadcast licensing demonstrates that in-
cumbents sought—successfully—to persuade the government to limit
its distribution of licenses.122
The upshot is that the addition of limits to the licensing scheme
would substantially increase the burdensomeness of the scheme. One
result of the government constraining the number of printing presses
is that strict scrutiny might well apply. More fundamentally, though,
the imposition of constraints on the number of presses would almost
certainly doom the regulation whether intermediate or strict scrutiny
applied, because it would be difficult for the government to put for-
ward a sufficient interest for its action.123 It is hard to imagine a justifi-
cation for the government seizing control over printing presses, and it
is even harder to imagine a justification for a limitation in the number
of speakers. Thus, the ultimate fate of regulations involving govern-
ment control of printing presses and those involving government re-
strictions on the number of licenses for printing presses would likely
be the same.
When I transfer the hypothetical to spectrum, however, the pic-
ture changes. We already have a justification for government control
of the spectrum, in the form of scarcity. The question is whether it can
leaven the judicial scrutiny of a governmental limit on the users of
spectrum, and the answer is no. In fact, as the next Part discusses, the
very justification for government control of the spectrum undercuts
any limit on the amount of spectrum that is licensed.
121. See, e.g., Charles D. Ferris & Terrence J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers and Bears: Broad-
cast Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 299, 322–23 (1989)
(noting that “it serves the interests of those who have gained access to a frequency to restrict as
much as possible its availability to potential competing users”).
122. See Hazlett, supra note 20, at 138–43 (marshaling historical evidence to argue that in-
cumbents successfully sought barriers to entry in the form of limits on the distribution of spec-
trum licenses).
123. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983) (noting that singling out particular elements of the press for differential treatment is
subject to strict scrutiny “unless justified by some special characteristic of the press”).
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III.  RATIONALES FOR LENIENT REVIEW
A. The Implications of Scarcity
The Supreme Court has distinguished its treatment of govern-
ment control of the spectrum from the treatment it would apply to
similar regulation of printing presses. In so distinguishing, the Court
has relied on the scarcity rationale. The main case is NBC v. United
States,124 in which the Court faced its first serious challenge to the
regulation of broadcasting. At issue were the chain broadcasting
rules, which limited the ability of radio networks to control the pro-
gramming of their broadcast affiliates. NBC’s arguments to the Court
focused on the First Amendment. NBC contended that “[r]adio is no
less entitled to the protection of the guaranties of the First Amend-
ment than is the press.”125 According to NBC, “only clearly defined
interests, the protection of which is of greater importance than the
protection of free speech, will support the threat to the freedom of
speech inherent in the licensing of the instruments or vehicles of
speech.”126 NBC did not argue that there were no such countervailing
interests; instead, NBC asserted that there was one such interest—in-
terference (or, as NBC put it somewhat more elegantly, “the sheer
physical necessity of preventing destructive electrical interference be-
tween stations”).127 Concerns about interference, NBC argued, could
not justify the government’s regulatory regime.
The Supreme Court rejected NBC’s arguments, finding that gov-
ernment control of the spectrum, and the rules it implemented pursu-
ant to that control, were justified by the scarcity of the spectrum. Its
main reasoning appeared in a single paragraph:
[There are] certain basic facts about radio as a means of communica-
tion—its facilities are limited; they are not available to all who may
wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to
accommodate everybody. There is a fixed natural limitation upon
the number of stations that can operate without interfering with one
another. Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its develop-
ment as traffic control was to the development of the automobile. In
enacting the Radio Act of 1927, the first comprehensive scheme of
124. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
125. Brief for Appellant National Broadcasting Company at 38, NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943) (No. 554).
126. Id. at 29–30.
127. Id. at 31.
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control over radio communication, Congress acted upon the knowl-
edge that if the potentialities of radio were not to be wasted, regula-
tion was essential.128
Spectrum, according to the Court, was not just another commodity. It
was in particularly short supply, and it was legitimate for the govern-
ment to decide that it should be in charge of doling out that supply.
The Court thus found that the scarcity of the spectrum justified—per-
haps even called for—government control.
This prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation was reempha-
sized by Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.129 A radio station chal-
lenged an FCC rule providing that, if a broadcast licensee aired a per-
sonal attack or political editorial against an identified person or
group, the licensee was obligated to provide that person or group with
an opportunity to respond to the attack or editorial.130 The Supreme
Court upheld this requirement131—whereas five years later the Court
struck down a similar rule that applied to newspapers, without sug-
gesting that Red Lion was no longer good law (indeed, without citing
Red Lion).132 What was the Supreme Court’s reason for accepting the
right of reply in Red Lion? The broadcast spectrum is scarce, the
Court stated, in that “there are more immediate and potential uses
than can be accommodated.”133 The Court declared that
[O]nly a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can
hope to communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible com-
munication is to be had, even if the entire radio spectrum is utilized
in the present state of commercially acceptable technology. . . .
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to
the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. If 100 per-
sons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to
allocate, all of them may have the same “right” to a license; but if
128. NBC, 319 U.S. at 213; see also id. at 226 (rejecting NBC’s First Amendment argument
against the chain broadcasting rules based on the Court’s conclusion that, “[u]nlike other modes
of expression, radio inherently is not available to all . . . and that is why . . . it is subject to gov-
ernmental regulation”).
129. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
130. Id. at 373–75.
131. Id. at 375.
132. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–58 (1974).
133. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 399.
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there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a few can
be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airwaves.134
According to the Court, the unfortunate fact of scarcity—unfortunate
because it undercuts the First Amendment goal of allowing everyone
to speak and all views to be raised—allowed for government regula-
tion of broadcasters. The Court concluded that, in light of the scarcity
problem, it was reasonable for the government to regulate stations
and their programming, at least to some extent.135
Lower courts and scholars—and even the FCC at one point136—
have forcefully contended that the scarcity affecting spectrum is no
different from the scarcity affecting newsprint or printing presses.137
134. Id. at 388–89; see also id. at 396–98:
Scarcity is not entirely a thing of the past. Advances in technology, such as micro-
wave transmission, have led to more efficient utilization of the frequency spectrum,
but uses for that spectrum have also grown apace. . . . Among the various uses for ra-
dio frequency space, including marine, aviation, amateur, military, and common car-
rier users, there are easily enough claimants to permit use of the whole with an even
smaller allocation to broadcast radio and television uses than now exists.
135. See id. at 400–01:
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government’s role in allo-
cating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable without govern-
mental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views, we
hold the regulations and ruling at issue here are both authorized by statute and con-
stitutional.
136. See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH, 2
F.C.C.R. 5043, ¶ 65 (1987):
We . . . believe that the scarcity rationale developed in the Red Lion decision and suc-
cessive cases no longer justifies a different standard of First Amendment review for
the electronic press. Therefore . . . we believe that the standard applied in Red Lion
should be reconsidered and that the constitutional principles applicable to the printed
press should be equally applicable to the electronic press.
But see Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 15 F.C.C.R.
19,973, ¶ 17 (2000) (repudiating “the dicta in Syracuse Peace Council regarding the appropriate
level of First Amendment scrutiny” for broadcast), vacated by Radio-Television News Dirs.
Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
137. See Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(“Broadcast frequencies are much less scarce now than when the scarcity rationale first
arose . . . and it appears that currently ‘the number of broadcast stations . . . rivals and perhaps
surpasses the number of newspapers and magazines in which political messages may effectively
be carried.’” (quoting Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1983))); Coase, supra
note 7, at 14 (“[I]t is a commonplace of economics that almost all resources used in the eco-
nomic system (and not simply radio and television frequencies) are limited in amount and
scarce.”); Spitzer, supra note 7, at 1012–20 (identifying different versions of the scarcity ration-
ale and arguing “none of these basic scarcity arguments provides a relevant difference between
print and broadcast that justifies treating the two differently”); Glen O. Robinson, The Elec-
tronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 903–04 (1998) (stating
that it no longer makes sense to base regulation of the radio spectrum on scarcity).
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Despite these arguments that there is nothing unique about the scar-
city affecting spectrum, scarcity has been and continues to be the pre-
vailing judicial rationale for treating broadcasting differently from
newspapers and other media.
In both NBC and Red Lion, the Court also noted the potential
for interference with transmissions over the spectrum. And in NBC
(and arguably in Red Lion), the Court seemed to suggest that inter-
ference was related to the scarcity of the spectrum and thereby helped
to justify government regulation of the spectrum.138 The potential for
interference is quite real for transmissions via spectrum, so the
Court’s concern is understandable. Broadcast transmissions can inter-
fere with each other such that no one’s message gets through. NBC
described the months preceding passage of the Radio Act of 1927139
(which first declared that there could be no private ownership of the
airwaves) as ones in which “[e]xisting stations changed to other fre-
quencies and increased their power and hours of operation at will.
The result was confusion and chaos. With everybody on the air, no-
body could be heard.”140
As many commentators have noted, however, interference can
arise with respect to anything, and thus the fact of interference nei-
ther distinguishes spectrum from other goods nor implies scarcity.141 If
138. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943):
There is a fixed natural limitation upon the number of stations that can operate with-
out interfering with one another. Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its de-
velopment as traffic control was to the development of the automobile. In enacting
the Radio Act of 1927, the first comprehensive scheme of control over radio commu-
nication, Congress acted upon the knowledge that if the potentialities of radio were
not to be wasted, regulation was essential.
(footnote omitted); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375–76:
Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector,
and the result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies con-
stituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the
Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little use because
of the cacaphony [sic] of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and pre-
dictably heard.
(footnote omitted).
139. 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
140. NBC, 319 U.S. at 212.
141. See, e.g., Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part I: Why Can’t Cable Be
More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 221–22 (1987):
The threat of electromagnetic interference requires regulation of the airwaves, just as
the threat of auto accidents requires traffic control. But ultimately the question of in-
terference is independent of whether or not spectrum space is scarce. Even if spec-
trum space were unlimited, interference problems would remain and require regula-
tion, though only of a technical nature. Scarcity, on the other hand, might justify some
resource-sharing regulation if logically related to the scarcity problem. By combining
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two people try to transmit on the same frequency in the same direc-
tion at the same time, they will interfere with one another and thus
block one another’s messages. But the same thing is true for all rival-
rous goods (which includes all tangible goods). If two people try to
print on the same paper at the same time, or to talk into the same tin
can tied to a string at the same time, or for that matter to sit in the
same chair at the same time, they will interfere with one another.142
Thus the fact that spectrum is subject to interference provides no in-
formation about spectrum that might distinguish it from anything else
or justify any regime different from the one applicable to all other
goods.143
This is not to suggest that interference is not a problem for spec-
trum; it is a quite significant problem. But the Supreme Court has
never suggested—and there would be no basis for suggesting—that
interference alone justifies government control over the spectrum.
Concerns about interference might reasonably support some level of
government action—in particular, to protect the right of one person
or another to use a given resource (e.g., operate a printing press or sit
in a certain chair). Scarcity, by contrast, raises the prospect of some
sort of rationing regime. Ordinarily in market economies, the ration-
ing is achieved through private auctions, but another possible re-
sponse to short supply is for the government to take control. That is,
scarcity without government intervention might lead to the resource
going only to the highest bidders; a government that wanted to spread
the resource around more fully might choose to respond to scarcity by
taking over the distribution process.144 In this way, scarcity might jus-
the notions of scarcity and interference, instead of considering them as distinct and
separate rationales for different kinds of regulation, Justice Frankfurter [in NBC] in-
appropriately made the leap from necessary but limited technical regulation to a
comprehensive scheme for government control of broadcasting.
(footnote omitted).
142. That is why we call these goods “rivalrous.”
143. See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 20, at 138:
The interference problem is [rightly understood to be] one of defining separate fre-
quency ‘properties’; it is logically unconnected to the issue of who is to harvest those
frequencies. To confuse the definition of spectrum rights with the assignment of spec-
trum rights is to believe that, to keep intruders out of (private) backyards, the gov-
ernment must own (or allocate) all the houses. It is a public policy non sequitur . . . .
144. The apparent fear is that if spectrum is sold to the highest bidder, owners of the spec-
trum would cater to only a portion of the potential audience and/or to particular interests of its
audience, and thus some segments of the population will find that their listening interests are
ignored and that they are not served by the broadcasters. This danger is, of course, possible with
respect to any scarce resource. If a resource is scarce, the high demand relative to the supply will
drive up the price, leaving only the wealthy able to purchase it. Thus one might say that produc-
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tify a much broader governmental regime than interference would.
The problem of interference would not justify anything more than
clearly demarcated rights and an enforcement function to back them
up; once that is done, interference poses no more concerns. Scarcity,
on the other hand, might justify such a demarcation and protection of
rights plus governmental decisions about who gets those rights in the
first place. And such a broader regime, of course, is the one that was
created in the United States.
Is interference, then, irrelevant to spectrum regulation? No. Al-
though the fact of interference does not provide any distinguishing
data, the frequency with which such interference occurs can help to
indicate how scarce a resource is. Imagine, for example, that there
was a small island so enshrouded by fog that explorers could not see
its dimensions, and they wanted to know how capacious it was. They
might drop individuals around the perimeter of the island and then
ask them to walk inward. They could determine the size of the island
by finding out when each person bumped into each of the others. The
more interference they encountered in their first 1000 steps, the
smaller the island would be. The Supreme Court’s suggestion in NBC
of the relevance of interference thus makes some sense, because the
commonness of such interference helped to establish that the spec-
trum was scarce.145
In any event, with respect to government control of the spec-
trum, interference has been understood by the Court—and can only
be understood—as an adjunct of scarcity. The extent of interference
helps to establish the degree of scarcity, but it is the scarcity that justi-
fies a government role that goes beyond demarcation of rights. Inter-
ference, by itself, has no particular significance (because it is univer-
sal), and the Court has never indicated otherwise. Scarcity has always
been the focus, with interference helping to establish that scarcity ex-
isted.
The significance of the Court’s reliance on scarcity is that gov-
ernment actions taken in response to that scarcity will be subject to
more lenient review than are regulations of sources of speech that are
not scarce. This is an instantiation of a broader point about regula-
ers of diamonds or beluga caviar cater only to the wealthy, and that the poor have been driven
out of those markets. But the idea with spectrum is that it is so important (because of its role in
communication) that the failures of the market are particularly unpalatable, and communities
are particularly poorly served.
145. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
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tion: government regulation of a good designed to alleviate the harms
created by the good’s scarcity are more readily justifiable than similar
regulation of a good that is not understood to be scarce. But what
happens when the government regulation of a scarce good tends to
constrict the supply? In those circumstances, one cannot say that the
government’s action responds to the harms created by scarcity. Far
from alleviating scarcity, the government would be exacerbating it.
The logic of the scarcity rationale is that there are not enough
opportunities for speakers to express themselves, and that the gov-
ernment has a role to play in ensuring that these limited opportunities
be put to the most valuable uses for society. One might think that
such highest-valued uses should be determined by individual stations
transmitting as they see fit, but our representatives have decided to
entrust the government with the obligation of putting the spectrum to
its highest and best uses. The government may define society’s wel-
fare in a manner different from the way that particular individuals
might define it, and thus it may emphasize some goods over others. It
may even give special status to some categories of speech that it val-
ues highly.146 But one form of action clearly would not be responsive
to concerns about scarcity: decisions that would constrain the number
of speakers on the spectrum. Scarcity is the problem that the govern-
ment is supposed to overcome. Courts treat scarcity as unfortunate
and regrettable, and the government’s mission as one of minimizing
its negative impacts. The scarcity rationale is not consistent with lim-
iting the amount of spectrum that is licensed; to the contrary, scarcity
undercuts any government action that imposes such a limit.
If the spectrum is so scarce that its paucity justifies government
intervention, it must also place on the government some burden to
avoid wasting it. The Court in NBC tied these points together. The
Court stated that “[t]he facilities of radio are limited and therefore
precious; they cannot be left to wasteful use without detriment to the
public interest.”147 Indeed, this idea is enshrined in statutes and inter-
national agreements that respond to the perceived scarcity of the ra-
dio spectrum by committing the government to “the operation of the
maximum practicable number of radio channels in those portions of
146. That is, after all, the point of the right of reply at issue in Red Lion. The reply was not
going to replace silence; the reply would displace other programming that would have been
aired in its stead. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
147. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
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the spectrum where harmful interference may occur,”148 and to the
minimization of waste of the spectrum.149
When the government takes actions that end up enhancing,
rather than minimizing, the problems that gave rise to government
regulation in the first place, the entire justification for lenient review
of government regulation is subverted. If scarcity is a problem that
justifies a government response, the one sort of response that it
clearly does not justify is one that would diminish the number of sta-
tions that transmit communications. Insofar as scarcity exists, it
should create some presumption against government action that
would produce fewer stations transmitting over the airwaves.
B. Other Rationales
The government could seek to avoid this problem by jettisoning
the scarcity rationale. But the cure might be worse than the disease
from the government’s perspective, because scarcity is the prevailing
justification for regulation of the spectrum in the first place.150 Scarcity
is the doctrine on which the Supreme Court has relied in allowing
government control over spectrum that it would never allow over
print. Abandoning the scarcity justification casts doubt on the entire
regime of government regulation of spectrum. And the problem for
the current regulatory regime is that jettisoning the scarcity rationale
does not help to justify the status quo. The question from Part II of
this Article was how to justify treating print differently from spec-
trum, and the proffered answer was scarcity. If scarcity is junked as a
rationale, one must find something to replace it that would justify not
148.  International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 10(3)(c), 28 U.S.T.
2495 (entered into force with respect to the United States on Apr. 7, 1976).
149. See Article 33 of the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, June
30, 1989, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, FINAL ACTS OF THE
PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE 10–11, 13–15, 30 (1990) (“Members shall bear in mind that
radio frequencies . . . are limited natural resources and that they must be used rationally, effi-
ciently and economically.”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(D) (1994) (articulating as a central
goal of the assignment process the “efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum”); 47 U.S.C. § 922(4) (1994) (requiring governmental actions “necessary to promote the
efficient use of the spectrum”); Martin A. Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum
Allocation, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 57–58 (1982) (“International regulation of orbit/spectrum is
based upon application of the principle of maximum channel dispersion to the resource devel-
opment technology of geostationary satellite communications. This principle requires the objec-
tive of international orbit/spectrum resource development law to be to maximize the availability
of satellite communications pathways . . . .”).
150. As I noted above, interference without scarcity would not justify government control
over the spectrum. See supra notes 141–45 and accompanying text.
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only wasting spectrum but also government control of the spectrum in
the first place, while not applying to print. Thus, when the govern-
ment keeps a slice of spectrum idle and is challenged by a failed ap-
plicant for that slice, defenders of the status quo would be faced with
a dilemma: either scarcity still existed, in which case it would seem in-
cumbent upon the government to allow on the air stations that did
not create unacceptable interference, or scarcity did not exist, in
which case the central basis for regulating spectrum differently from
print would have evaporated.
This might seem overstated; aren’t there other bases upon which
the government could justify distinguishing spectrum from print, and
controlling the former (including keeping some of it idle)? The Su-
preme Court has, in fact, articulated a different justification for one
particular form of broadcast regulation, and that justification in no
way relied on scarcity: in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,151 the Court up-
held regulations limiting the broadcasting of indecency, based on its
conclusion that broadcasting was uniquely pervasive and accessible to
children.152 But the Court has never applied the pervasiveness and ac-
cessibility rationales in the context of government decisions about
which, and how many, broadcasters to allow to transmit. Indeed, the
Court has never applied pervasiveness and accessibility outside the
context of limiting the broadcasting of indecency—and it is hard to
see how it could. The pervasiveness and accessibility of a medium
may be relevant to measures designed to shield people from undesir-
able content, but that is a matter of controlling licensees. Shaping
speakers’ messages, in particular blocking negative messages, is re-
sponsive to concerns about those speakers’ pervasiveness; keeping
channels of communication unused is not.153 The fact that broadcast-
ing is pervasive and accessible provides no support for government
control of the spectrum—much less deciding how many licenses will
be assigned.154
151. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
152. Id. at 748–50.
153. This is not to say that content regulation is or should be constitutional. My point is
merely that a concern about pervasiveness and accessibility is directly served by content-based
limits on speakers, but has no such connection to the antecedent decision to close channels of
communication.
154. In fact, pervasiveness and accessibility arguably cut against limits on the users of spec-
trum: if broadcasting really is that powerful, it would seem an inversion of the First Amendment
to allow the government to control it to the extent of keeping it unused.
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Some defenders of government regulation of spectrum have re-
lied not on scarcity (or pervasiveness or accessibility), but instead on
arguments about the role of communications in a republic.155 The
problem with those arguments for the task at hand is that we are try-
ing to put forward a justification for distinguishing spectrum from
print, and for the government controlling the former but not the lat-
ter. As these commentators readily admit, however, their arguments
apply equally to communications via spectrum and print; they do not
contend that broadcasting should be treated differently from newspa-
pers. That is, the main defenders of government control of the spec-
trum acknowledge that the distinctions between broadcast and print
do not support a difference in the protection afforded them, and they
argue that both broadcast and print should be subject to government
regulation.156 Thus, they would allow government regulation of spec-
trum without relying on the scarcity rationale, but only because they
envision the abandonment of the cases that subject print regulations
to rigorous scrutiny. Such a harmonizing of the constitutional status
of print and spectrum is probably a good idea. Many commentators
have called for treating spectrum and print the same way—some
155. To oversimplify, these commentators have argued against leaving communications to
market forces, on the grounds that communications help to define people both as individuals
and as a society and that markets are flawed (they rely on preexisting wealth structures and give
too much power to some voices and some views). In light of the importance of communications
and the problems with markets, these commentators have supported spectrum regulations de-
signed to increase the diversity and number of voices on the airwaves. See OWEN M. FISS, THE
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 52–78 (1996) (arguing that the government should ensure robust public
debate, rather than leaving decisions about who speaks to the market); FISS, LIBERALISM
DIVIDED, supra note 8, at 10–17, 23, 43, 154–58 (arguing that media regulation is necessary be-
cause the market ensures only that the viewpoints of the wealthy will be heard); SUNSTEIN, su-
pra note 8, at 49–50 (arguing that in a market system, the goal of presenting people with diverse
views on public issues may be severely compromised); Fiss, Why the State, supra note 8, at 791
(“[L]eft to itself public debate will not be ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide open,’ but instead will
be skewed by the forces that dominate society. The state should be allowed to intervene, and
sometimes even required to do so . . . to correct for the market.”) (quoting New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 366–72 (1997) (“As a rule, governmental structural intervention [in media
markets], when it occurs, has been beneficial.”); Baker, supra note 8, at 104 (“[T]he government
has the power to structure the media in a manner that the government thinks will promote the
best communications environment.”).
156. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 48–51, 92, 110 (rejecting the scarcity rationale as a dis-
tinction between broadcasting and print media, but contending that the need to insure access
and diversity justify government regulation of both print and broadcast media); Barron, supra
note 8, at 1666 (stating that the distinction between newspapers and broadcasting stations is du-
bious because access to both is limited); Baker, supra note 8, at 93–94, 127–28 (contending that
content concerns justify structural regulation of all media, including newspapers and broadcast-
ers).
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would allow regulation of both, others would allow regulation of nei-
ther157—and their arguments have considerable force. But in this Arti-
cle, I am addressing the question of how a claim that the government
is wasting the spectrum should be treated under the prevailing regula-
tory scheme, in which print is understood to be protected from gov-
ernment control, and spectrum would be similarly protected but for
some justification (the proffered one has been scarcity).
It is worth noting, though, that these commentators’ theories of
the First Amendment would (like the scarcity rationale) justify gov-
ernment control of the airwaves, but their theories would not jus-
tify—and indeed would seem to condemn—government waste of the
spectrum.158 According to their reasoning, a central First Amendment
value is that individuals be exposed to a wide variety of perspectives
(in the Supreme Court’s words, to information from “diverse and an-
tagonistic sources”).159 Their concerns about the speech marketplace
arise from a fear that the market will not produce enough expressive
output.160 This reasoning would seem to create a presumption against
government actions that unnecessarily constrict the number of speak-
ers.161 They might additionally support measures aimed at increasing
the diversity of speakers, but increasing the number of speaking op-
portunities would seem to serve that goal as well. Given that their
proposals for government regulation respond to their fears of too lit-
tle speech, government measures that block additional speakers
would seem to be highly suspect. The ability to fit more speakers on
157. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 112, 155–57 and accompanying text.
159. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (stating that the First Amend-
ment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public”).
160. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 21 (arguing for a “Madisonian” conception of the First
Amendment and expressing concern that “if deregulated markets do not deal with public issues,
or do so only superficially, the Madisonian aspiration has not been fulfilled”); Fiss, Why the
State?, supra note 8, at 787–88 (enumerating the market restraints on the presentation of mat-
ters of public interest).
161. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 22 (arguing that it is important that “a significant part of
the citizenry is actually exposed to diverse views about public issues”); Baker, supra note 8, at
80 (“Laws aimed at restricting either the press’ expression or an individual’s autonomously cho-
sen expression should be, even if for different reasons, equally impermissible.”); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27 (1948) (“To be
afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-government. Any such suppression of ideas about
the common good, the First Amendment condemns with its absolute disapproval. The freedom
of ideas shall not be abridged.”); Meiklejohn, supra note 112, at 261 (emphasizing that govern-
ment should promote policies to bring “every citizen into active and intelligent sharing in the
government of his country”).
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the spectrum with no loss of existing speakers would be an impera-
tive.
In fact, Yochai Benkler has argued for a reconceptualization of
First Amendment doctrine that appears to include, as one of its ele-
ments, allowing users of noninterfering services to bring First
Amendment challenges to their exclusion from the spectrum.162 He
argues that First Amendment values cast doubt on measures that
limit the ability of individuals to communicate with one another via
the spectrum.163 One apparent aspect of this critique is that constraints
on the use of services that do not interfere with existing users should
be permitted.164 Thus, although his arguments have a different focus
from mine, he and I seem to be in agreement on the question at issue
in this Article: What are the limits on the government’s ability to con-
strain the use of spectrum beyond what interference would require?
Professor Benkler, though, presents his own normative vision of the
First Amendment, and places his proposal within his larger theoreti-
cal construct, rather than arguing that his vision describes the current
state of the law.165 The point of this Article, on the other hand, is that,
under the law as currently developed, the government cannot prevent
the introduction of noninterfering uses. Even if courts reject Profes-
sor Benkler’s attempt at reorienting the First Amendment and in-
stead stick to the law as it has been developed, those courts should
nonetheless agree with him (and me) that, in most cases, the govern-
ment violates the First Amendment when it blocks uses of the spec-
trum that do not create additional interference.
There are a few who argue that broadcasters should be treated
differently from newspapers and who do not base that distinction on
scarcity.166 The main alternative they supply is based on the historical
fact that, for many years, licenses were given to broadcasters.167 The
idea is that government regulation of broadcasters’ activities is a quid
pro quo for the broadcasters’ receiving their licenses free of explicit
monetary charge (the payment, in other words, would come in the
162. See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and
Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 41–57 (2001) (criticizing laws that decrease the number or variety of
options for autonomous expression).
163. Id.
164. Benkler, supra note 38, at 34.
165. Id. at 34–41.
166. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
167. Logan, supra note 10, at 1691.
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form of obligations on the part of the broadcasters).168 At the outset, I
should note that my argument is not limited to broadcasting.169 The
more important point, however, is that the quid pro quo argument fo-
cuses on the claims that the government can make on broadcasters
once it has given licenses to them. The question here is what justifies
the government in keeping noninterfering services off the spectrum in
the first place. The quid pro quo argument, if it has any weight, ap-
plies only in the context of obligations of the chosen licensees. It does
not affect whether it is constitutional for the government to refuse to
allocate to some potential licensees. At the level of deciding whether
to allocate or not, all spectrum is equal, and there is as yet no “quid”
for which a “quo” from a beneficiary might be appropriate, because
there is no beneficiary.170
A different possibility bears mention: one might want to try to
argue that the spectrum is public property, and thus subject to gov-
ernment control in ways that printing presses are not. That is, one
might say that, whether scarce or not, the spectrum is property that
the government effectively owns and thereby has the right to con-
trol.171 The degree of control for First Amendment purposes would be
governed by public forum analysis, which applies to government
regulations of speech on public property.
This argument has not been widely embraced, and with good
reason. Applying the “property” rubric to spectrum inappropriately
reifies it. As I noted in Part II, spectrum has no independent exis-
tence.172 Courts and commentators use the term “spectrum” as short-
hand for the ability to transmit at a given frequency. As Glen Robin-
son put it,
The “spectrum” is merely a way of describing the forms of electro-
magnetic radiation; it is not a thing but a force (or more precisely a
“disturbance in the force,” to employ Star Wars terminology). Nei-
ther the means of radiation—a radio transmitter—nor the medium
of conduction—space—have ever been regarded as public prop-
168. Id.
169. See infra Part VI.A.
170. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 109 (arguing that “the fact that [the government]
chooses to allocate licenses as it does, rather than through ordinary markets, ought not to give it
power that it would not otherwise have”); Spitzer, supra note 7, at 991 (“The government prop-
erty rationale also should fail because the government, limited by the first amendment and
other constitutional provisions, cannot do ‘anything’ it likes with its resources.”).
171. See supra note 1.
172. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
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erty.173
The public property/forum argument presumes that spectrum is
inherently government property; neither scarcity nor any other ra-
tionale is necessary to justify government control. (If scarcity or an-
other rationale is necessary, then the arguments set out earlier in this
Part apply.) This position seems untenable. Not only does this argu-
ment assume its conclusion—spectrum is public property because it is
inherently public property—but it also provides no answer for the
question of how one distinguishes spectrum from printing presses, or
air. If spectrum is public property, then why not printing presses? For
that matter, why couldn’t the government contend that, just as spec-
trum is the medium through which encoded electronic communica-
tion passes, air is the medium through which nonencoded voices (e.g.,
in public rallies) pass, and both are public property over which the
government can exercise control. The scarcity rationale gives an an-
swer to this question, but the public property rationale does not.174
This is not to say that the government cannot claim control of the
spectrum. The government has done so, and in making my arguments
I assume that control. But the question is the basis of that control;
and basing government control on government control is unsatisfac-
tory, both because of its circularity and its failure to distinguish spec-
trum from forms of property that the government could not control.
Government control is not a justification for government control, but
a response to some other justification.175
As with the arguments based on the role of communications in
American society, one could argue that the approach to all forms of
communication should involve government control. That is, one could
attack a baseline of private control of the means of communication as
prejudicing the analysis away from government control, and argue in-
stead for a baseline of government control.176 One might argue that
one has to choose a baseline either way, and that the choice of gov-
ernment control as the starting point is as defensible as a choice of
private control. The problem with this approach, for purposes of this
173. Robinson, supra note 137, at 912.
174. THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING 225–29 (1994).
175. Logan, supra note 10, at 1715–16.
176. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470, 478–89 (1923) (arguing that there is no natural baseline for private versus
public realms, so a “liberty” could just as easily be seen as an interference with others' rights).
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Article, is that I am exploring the implications of the current regula-
tory scheme, and that scheme treats private control as the baseline for
all forms of communication (with the explanation for government
control of the spectrum revolving around scarcity).
Additional ammunition for the argument against a public forum
approach to the spectrum is the awkwardness of the fit in terms of
doctrine. The following seems an odd description of any kind of pub-
lic forum: a right that can be licensed to private parties for readily re-
newable licenses, which licenses the government often sells to the
highest bidder;177 and those licensees are not public fora, or common
carriers, or otherwise obliged by virtue of the Constitution to open
themselves up to any speaker whose messages the licensees do not
wish to transmit.178 Red Lion held that imposing obligations on licen-
sees is not forbidden by the First Amendment, but that is quite differ-
ent from a claim that a station violates the First Amendment by re-
fusing to carry speech; and that latter claim is exactly what is at issue
in public forum cases.179
Even if public forum analysis did apply to the spectrum, it would
not support the government’s refusal to allocate spectrum to services.
177. There is some dispute over whether the government can seek any funds from potential
users of public fora, limited public fora, or even nonpublic fora. See David Goldberger, A Re-
consideration of Cox v. New Hampshire: Can Demonstrators Be Required to Pay the Costs of
Using America’s Public Forums?, 62 TEX. L. REV. 403, 405 (1983) (considering “whether the
approach of the Court in Cox v. New Hampshire and related cases, which seemingly approves
governmental charges that are imposed to recoup costs associated with demonstrations, is con-
sistent with the first amendment policies and principles articulated in modern public forum
cases”). But insofar as the government can receive money in return for access to such fora, the
government would not be allowed to earn a profit; the government would be limited to recoup-
ing its administrative costs. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941); Sentinel Commu-
nications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1205 (11th Cir. 1991).
178. See Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 107–09 (1973) (con-
cluding that a licensee is neither a common carrier nor a public forum).
179. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (“In the case of
television broadcasting, however, broad rights of access for outside speakers would be antitheti-
cal, as a general rule, to the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to ful-
fill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.”); id. at 674–75:
Claims of access under our public forum precedents could obstruct the legitimate
purposes of television broadcasters. Were the doctrine given sweeping application in
this context, courts “would be required to oversee far more of the day-to-day opera-
tions of broadcasters’ conduct, deciding such questions as whether a particular indi-
vidual or group has had sufficient opportunity to present its viewpoint and whether a
particular viewpoint has already been sufficiently aired.” “The result would be a fur-
ther erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters,” transferring “control over
the treatment of public issues from the licensees who are accountable for broadcast
performance to private individuals” who bring suit under our forum precedents.
(citation omitted) (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 127, 124).
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On the contrary, public forum analysis would seem to undercut the
government’s position. The problem for the government, under a
public forum analysis, is that spectrum is used almost exclusively for
communications.180 This is important because a central question with
respect to public property—whether traditional public forum, limited
public forum (which spectrum would presumably be), or nonpublic
forum—is the extent to which the government can accommodate
other, competing interests in its treatment of that forum. As the
Court noted in Grayned v. City of Rockford,181 “[t]he crucial question
is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.”182 In public
parks (classic public fora), the question might be whether the gov-
ernment’s interest in preventing crime justifies restrictions on speech.
Or, in prisons (nonpublic fora), courts would consider what role there
is for communication, given that the predominant purpose of the
prison is incarceration and speech is at best peripheral to that pur-
pose. By contrast, the central use of spectrum is communication; the
only “normal activity” on the spectrum is transmitting information.
There is no other purpose that the government could invoke as justi-
fying a limit on communication via spectrum, because there are no
other purposes. So spectrum is not limited in the sense that there are
countervailing uses that call for a balancing of uses by the govern-
ment. There is no balance, because there are no other uses. To put
the point in doctrinal terms, the government will not be able to offer a
justification of the form “we will not allow your proposed use of the
spectrum because we are using it for a different purpose” when the
spectrum is unused. When the spectrum lies fallow, it is not being
used for any purpose. Recall the point made earlier about idle spec-
trum: no one basks in the warmth of its glow, or gains utility from its
preservation for another day. It has no beauty, because it is just the
right to transmit on a particular frequency at a particular time. And
there is no issue of its preservation, because its use today has no im-
pact on its use tomorrow.
So if public forum analysis did apply, it would seem to undermine
a governmental decision to refuse to allocate spectrum. When it is
180. There are a few uses of spectrum that one might exclude from the category of commu-
nications (like radio astronomy and the radiation of some microwaves), but these occupy an ex-
tremely small percentage of the spectrum and constitute an extremely small percentage of the
uses.
181. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
182. Id. at 116.
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choosing among licensees, the government has to make a choice
among competing communicators. But when it is choosing whether to
license or not, it is choosing between a use and no use. There are no
other potential uses of spectrum, so there are no tradeoffs.
IV.  DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
A. The Inapplicability of NBC and Red Lion to Cases Alleging
Government Wasting of the Spectrum
This discussion might seem interesting but foreclosed by NBC
and Red Lion. Haven’t those cases effectively ruled that all aspects of
spectrum regulation are subject to some form of lenient scrutiny, akin
to rational basis review?
The short answer is no. At the outset, it bears noting that neither
opinion ever stated that it was applying rational basis review, or any-
thing close to it.183 And, at least in the case of Red Lion, its care in
parsing the strength of the government’s justifications suggests that
this was more than mere rational basis review. (NBC spent less time
formally discussing the First Amendment claim, but that was in sub-
stantial part because it had spent so many pages prior to that formal
discussion laying out the problem of scarcity.) After all, if the review
was merely for a rational basis, the Court in Red Lion need not have
long tarried with the subtleties of the government’s argument; just
about any justification would suffice, so there would be no need for
any significant discussion. Indeed, when the Court did characterize
the scrutiny applied under Red Lion (in a 1984 case, FCC v. League
of Women Voters184), it used the language of intermediate scrutiny—
treating Red Lion as looking to whether “the restriction is narrowly
tailored to further a substantial governmental interest.”185
More fundamentally, NBC and Red Lion did not address, and
did not purport to address, all forms of spectrum (or even broadcast)
regulation. NBC approved of a set of rules regulating broadcasters’
business relationships (the chain broadcasting rules), and Red Lion
approved regulation of broadcasters’ programming (in the form of a
right of reply). The most that can be said is that in the background of
183. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943); see also Baker, supra note 8, at 58 n.7 (noting that Red Lion was “written without refer-
ence to tests or levels of scrutiny but rather directly evaluated the arguments”).
184. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
185. Id. at 380.
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these cases was the larger question of whether the government could
control the spectrum in the first place.186 That larger question was, at
least in NBC, in some senses on the table. But approval of govern-
ment control of the spectrum does not imply approval of decisions
that keep some of it unused. Indeed, nothing in either opinion sug-
gests that a decision to keep spectrum off the market based on con-
cerns other than interference would be consistent with the Court’s
holding. In fact, parts of each opinion suggest that such waste would
be problematic. As I noted in Part III.A, NBC emphasized that
“wasteful use” of the spectrum was to be avoided.187 In Red Lion, the
186. In a few lower court cases, “pirate” broadcasters have argued that the government’s
failure to allow them to operate as low power broadcasters violates the Communications Act of
1934 and the First Amendment. Grid Radio v. FCC, 278 F.3d 1314, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
United States v. Neset, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1114–15 (D.N.D. 1998), aff’d on other grounds, 235
F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. 1235, 1237–38 (N.D. Cal. 1998),
aff’d on other grounds, 219 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000). These “pirates” simply began broadcasting
in contravention of the existing FCC regulations, without petitioning the FCC for a rulemaking,
applying for a license, or otherwise attempting to operate within the law. The FCC brought en-
forcement actions against a few of them, and in response they challenged the FCC’s authority to
push them off the spectrum.
In Neset and Dunifer, the district court did not reach the merits of the broadcasters’ chal-
lenge, because in both cases the court found that the broadcaster lacked standing based on its
failure to attempt to lawfully obtain a license (and in both cases the circuit court found that it
lacked jurisdiction). Neset, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1115–16; Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. at 1240. In Grid Ra-
dio, by contrast, the court did not flatly refuse to consider the broadcaster’s challenge, but in-
stead found that his status as a scofflaw significantly affected its treatment of his arguments. The
court began its analysis of his constitutional and statutory challenge by stating that:
Szoka [the broadcaster] could have petitioned for a rulemaking or applied for a
waiver and, if the Commission denied his request, challenged that denial in the ap-
propriate circuit court. That he did neither, choosing instead to operate without a li-
cense, makes it inappropriate for us to consider his challenge to the microbroadcast-
ing ban absent “an undisputable indication . . ., either because of the reasoning of a
Supreme Court decision or intervening legislation,” that the microbroadcasting ban
was unlawful or unconstitutional.
278 F.3d at 1321 (citations omitted) (quoting Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 68 (D.C. Cir.
1998)). The court thus applied an unusually high barrier to Szoka’s constitutional challenge. It is
therefore unsurprising that the court found that Szoka’s claims did not satisfy this high thresh-
old, and did not even merit much discussion. Indeed, as the analysis in this Article suggests, if I
were a judge applying this stringent test of indisputable unlawfulness I would conclude that the
arguments marshaled in this Article would not satisfy it.
It does bear noting, though, that in its brief application of this high standard to Szoka’s
constitutional challenge, the court stated that “although the Supreme Court has ‘obliquely sug-
gested it might [one day] reconsider’ the scarcity doctrine on which the microbroadcasting ban
rests, judicial ambivalence falls far short of a ‘clear manifestation that [a] rule . . . is [facially]
illegal.’” Id. at 1322 (alteration in original) (quoting Tribune, 133 F.3d at 68). Insofar as the
court was suggesting that the scarcity rationale supports measures that limit even noninterfering
uses of the spectrum, the point of my Article is that it takes the wrong lesson from scarcity.
187. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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discussion arose in its treatment of the First Amendment. The Court
intimated that, in light of the dearth of entities that could transmit at
any given time, the First Amendment obliged the government to en-
sure that different voices would be on the airwaves.188 The Court has
not picked up on this suggestion in Red Lion that the First Amend-
ment requires the government to open up the airwaves,189 but cer-
tainly its language provides no support for the proposition that its
holding extends to government actions that have the effect of limiting
the amount of spectrum that can be used.190
To conclude otherwise, one would have to find that scarcity cre-
ates rational basis review across the board, so that it does not matter
if scarcity happens to cut against the government’s position in this
case. The idea would be that low-level scrutiny applies to all regula-
tion of broadcasting, if not all uses of spectrum, because of scarcity.
But that seems to separate a justification from what it justifies, valor-
izing the justification for its own sake. It would be bootstrapping of
the most troubling sort for the government to parlay the lenient scru-
tiny that flows from the unfortunate fact of scarcity into a basis for
limiting the number of voices on the spectrum.191 In defending its limi-
188. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopoliza-
tion of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. . . . It
is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitu-
tionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
(citations omitted).
189. See infra note 282.
190. FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 801 (1978). In that case, the
Court upheld regulations that barred the common ownership of a broadcaster and a newspaper
in the same community (so the rule affected the ownership of broadcast stations without reduc-
ing the number of stations). In finding these regulations constitutional, the Court emphasized
that “their purpose and effect is to promote free speech, not to restrict it.” Id. at 801. Limita-
tions on the use of spectrum, though, would restrict the amount of speech available.
191. Justice Stevens has put forward a somewhat similar analysis in the commercial speech
context. In reviewing restrictions on commercial speech, Justice Stevens has suggested that the
Court should not apply a lower level of scrutiny if the reasons for that lower scrutiny do not ap-
ply to the relevant speech restriction. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501
(1996) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.):
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from mislead-
ing, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial
consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for
according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less
than strict review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of
truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preserva-
tion of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous
review that the First Amendment generally demands.
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tations on the usage of spectrum, the government should not be able
to invoke the lenient review that itself is a product of a concern about
scarcity.192
One way of thinking about this point is to consider the signifi-
cance of an applicant’s demonstration that its proposed use would
cause de minimis additional interference. Such a showing would indi-
cate that the spectrum is less scarce than the government supposes,
and thereby would tend to weaken the scarcity argument; the smaller
the problem posed by interference, the less scarce the spectrum is.
The contention would be that more uses can be allowed on the spec-
trum than the government had previously thought possible, and thus
scarcity is not as big a problem as had been assumed. When a frus-
trated applicant brings a case that undercuts the scarcity rationale,
government reliance on scarcity as its justification for denying a li-
cense to that applicant assumes its conclusion. If a court engages in
minimal scrutiny of the claim that the scarcity rationale does not sup-
port, and instead undermines, a government denial, it is putting the
analytical cart before the horse. It would be akin to a court deciding
at the outset to apply lenient review to a dispute as to whether a given
government action infringed on fundamental rights and thus should
not be subject to such review. In fact, it would not merely be akin to
such a judicial move: it would be such a move.
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492–93 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring):
In my judgment the [relevant] prohibition is just as unacceptable in a commercial
context as in any other because it is not supported by the rationales for treating com-
mercial speech differently under the First Amendment: that is, the importance of
avoiding deception and protecting the consumer from inaccurate or incomplete in-
formation in a realm in which the accuracy of speech is generally ascertainable by the
speaker.
192. This point is all the clearer if one conceptualizes scarcity as constituting an important
government interest rather than as giving rise to a lower level of scrutiny. See supra note 183
and accompanying text. That is, if one understands Red Lion and NBC as cases where scarcity
was the harm to which the government could respond, but in which scarcity did not significantly
alter the level of scrutiny, rather than as cases where scarcity created a markedly lower level of
scrutiny, then measures that waste spectrum would obviously gain no benefit from the scarcity
rationale and would thus be subject to ordinary First Amendment review (i.e., the review appli-
cable where scarcity is not a factor). The point in the text is simply that, if scarcity is indeed un-
derstood to create a lower level of scrutiny (as most understand it), such scrutiny would not ap-
ply to all conceivable cases—including those where the government’s action is diametrically
opposed to the concern that gave rise to the lower scrutiny in the first place. Nothing in the
cases suggests that scarcity lowers the level of scrutiny when the challenged action increases
scarcity. Even if scarcity lowered the level of scrutiny for all cases in which the government does
not constrict voices (but see the discussion immediately below in text), applying such scrutiny
when the government does constrict voices would ignore, and conflict with, the basis upon
which the scrutiny was lowered.
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Still, a skeptic might persist, hasn’t the Court done exactly that in
the broadcasting context? That is, hasn’t the Court said that scarcity is
not only a justification for government action but also a basis for
treating all aspects of broadcast regulation as subject to lenient scru-
tiny? Again, the answer is no. Perhaps the most notable counterex-
ample is FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.193 In that case, the Court con-
fronted regulations of broadcast indecency. The plurality found that
the standard of review was a fairly forgiving one, but what is striking
is that its proffered reasons for that standard of review were that
broadcast is “uniquely pervasive” and “uniquely accessible to chil-
dren.”194 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court rely on scarcity as jus-
tifying a weaker level of review, even though—if the broad reading of
Red Lion is correct—the Court could have simply stated in a sentence
or two that scarcity justifies lenient scrutiny for all broadcast regula-
tion and then applied that lenient scrutiny.195 If scarcity really does
create across-the-board lenient scrutiny for broadcast regulation, it
seems strange that the Court did not bother to take this easy path—or
even to mention scarcity or Red Lion as possible justifications. This
absence is all the more striking given that the FCC, in its order pe-
nalizing Pacifica and in its brief to the Supreme Court in the subse-
quent case, relied in part on scarcity;196 the Court, of course, did not.
What this suggests is that the Court did not treat scarcity as creating
lenient scrutiny for all broadcast regulation. In some cases, scarcity
would not help to justify the government’s position.197 As a result, it
would not be relevant as a justification, nor would it create a lower
standard of scrutiny.198 Scarcity was a nonfactor in keeping indecency
193. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
194. Id. at 748–50.
195. See id. at 770 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The opinions of my brothers Powell and
Stevens rightly refrain from relying on the notion of ‘spectrum scarcity’ to support their re-
sult.”).
196. Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, ¶ 9
(1975); Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 39–40, FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528).
197. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Marjorie L. Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable Pro-
grams: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 606, 621 (1983) (“[N]o
scarcity rationale, well- or ill-considered, can logically justify reducing the amount of offbeat or
unusual broadcast programming. Spectrum scarcity justifies, if anything, diversity of speech in
the broadcast medium, not government censorship. Therefore, the scarcity rationale unsurpris-
ingly provided no support for the Pacifica result.”).
198. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 748 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (noting that scarcity may be relevant to some forms of broadcast regulation,
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off the airwaves, and it would be a nonfactor in keeping potential us-
ers off the spectrum.199
One might be tempted to respond that the Court’s willingness to
allow the government to choose licensees weakens my argument in
this Article. After all, if the government can choose to dole out a li-
cense based on whatever considerations it deems appropriate, why
can’t it choose not to dole out a license for any reason it deems suffi-
cient? At the outset, it bears noting that the government has not been
given so free a hand to choose licensees. In NBC, in fact, the Court
emphasized that there were meaningful limits on the FCC’s discretion
to choose among license applicants.200 So there is some bite to the re-
view. But the real answer is that the two types of actions—choosing
licensees and choosing whether to license—are quite different from
one another. As I have argued, scarcity cuts in opposite ways.
Scarcity is understood to justify the FCC’s free rein in choosing
among competing licensees. The idea is that the spectrum is so pre-
cious that it is appropriate for an agency to choose who will be the
best steward of that valuable speaking opportunity. With respect to
choosing whether to license spectrum in the first place, the scarcity ra-
tionale undercuts government restrictions on spectrum. This is not the
question of which among various competing applicants should receive
a license, but, instead, the antecedent question of whether the spec-
trum should be used at all. If the spectrum really is scarce, then it
should be incumbent upon the agency to dole it out. The preciousness
but that “it has little to do with a case that involves the effects of television viewing on chil-
dren”).
199. The Court may have been persuaded by the argument articulated in the opinion below
(and quoted in Justice Brennan’s dissent) that “although scarcity has justified increasing the di-
versity of speakers and speech, it has never been held to justify censorship.” Pacifica Found. v.
FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)); see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
770 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting this statement).
In fact, there is a better argument that scarcity is relevant to keeping indecency off the
spectrum than there is for the relevance of scarcity to keeping proposed uses off the spectrum:
the government might be able to argue that eliminating indecency would make room for better
programming. When a certain form of programming is prohibited, it is not replaced with dead
air, but instead with other programming. If the government prohibited all low-value program-
ming, its replacement would presumably be programming of higher value. Indecency prohibi-
tions are thus akin to choices between spectrum applicants (i.e., choosing Applicant A over Ap-
plicant B), rather than the choice of whether or not to allocate spectrum in the first place (i.e.,
choosing to use spectrum or to keep it idle). And scarcity tends to support comparative deci-
sions as between uses of the spectrum—the spectrum is so valuable that it should be used only
by worthy broadcasters—but undercuts decisions not to use the spectrum in the first place. See
supra notes 124–149; infra note 258 and accompanying text.
200. 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
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of the spectrum supports granting spectrum, and undercuts attempts
at limiting it.201
B. The Applicability of Heightened Scrutiny
As this Article suggested at the outset, regulating the supply of
frequencies, like regulating the supply of printing presses, is subject to
heightened scrutiny unless there is some rationale for more lenient
review. And, as the preceding sections have indicated, there is no ra-
tionale that supports both a special regime for spectrum and the gov-
ernment keeping frequencies idle. What this suggests is that, if a liti-
gant puts forward evidence showing that it could use a set of
frequencies that the government keeps off the market, a court should
review the government’s refusal to allocate that spectrum under some
form of heightened scrutiny.
Because neither scarcity nor any other rationale would support
the government’s position, government nonlicensing of the spectrum
would seem to be subject the same review that would be applied to
government nonlicensing of printing presses in a government ware-
house. The idea is that there is no rationale for lessening the First
Amendment scrutiny of either. Whatever bases there might be for
weakening the review applied to other forms of spectrum regulation,
government measures denying frequencies would not come under
them, and thus would be left subject to the same unleavened scrutiny
that would apply to other kinds of regulation that are unaffected by
the scarcity rationale—such as limits on the distribution of printing
presses. That is, the unavailability of scarcity as a justification for re-
201. That is the end of the matter for my purposes, but it does prompt a query: insofar as
selecting licensees is important, why is the judicial review of decisions to choose particular licen-
sees as deferential as it is? One possible answer turns on the fact that lenient review need not
indicate unimportance; rather, it might be understood to reflect, most obviously, a conclusion
that judges are ill-equipped to second-guess the agency, for reasons of democratic legitimacy
and experience. As to the former, the political accountability of the FCC—created by factors
like the relatively short term of FCC commissioners, the fact that the FCC’s budget is at the
mercy of the appropriators, the fact that the Department of Justice has litigating authority in the
Supreme Court, etc.—arguably gives it greater legitimacy than a court would have in making
policy decisions about, for example, what constitutes programming in the public interest. This is
a familiar point from administrative law, one that is reflected in doctrines of deference: when
agencies make policy judgments, courts are deferential, on the rationale that such judgments are
better placed in the hands of political actors than of judges. As to experience, the FCC’s history
of evaluating applicants might be seen as giving it an advantage in being able to predict which
ones will follow through on their plans, which ones will provide the programming that is deemed
to be in the public interest, etc.
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fusals to allocate renders irrelevant the availability of scarcity as a jus-
tification for other spectrum regulation.
Some might think this goes too far. They might argue that NBC
and Red Lion should still serve as guideposts, even if they do not con-
trol. In order to see the problem with this reasoning, one must look
back to Red Lion and NBC. In neither case did the Court say that ra-
tional basis review, or any particular level of review, applied to the
regulation at issue.202 Both cases looked at the substance of the gov-
ernment’s justifications for its actions without identifying exactly what
kind of review the Court was applying in looking at those justifica-
tions. Significantly, when the opinions addressed the substantive basis
for the regulations at issue, scarcity was a central justification. The
level of scrutiny affected the level of justification required, but, what-
ever the level of scrutiny, the government was going to have to pro-
duce some justifications for its regulation. And those justifications
themselves relied heavily on scarcity. Scarcity thus not only served to
leaven the scrutiny involved (at least to some extent), but also was a
centerpiece of the government interest that justified the particular
regulation at issue. This undercuts the applicability of NBC and Red
Lion to cases, like those involving unused spectrum, where scarcity is
irrelevant (or, more precisely, is relevant as a support for the en-
trants’ attack on the government’s position). Not only is the standard
of review in those cases inapposite, because the scarcity rationale is
not helpful and thus does not lead to a leavening of the standard of
review, but the substantive discussions of the justifications in NBC
and Red Lion is also inapposite, because scarcity was a main justifica-
tion for the government’s action on the merits. When that element of
scarcity is not present, the justification is missing and the cases are no
longer terribly useful. The Court’s analysis of the regulation, as well
as the level of scrutiny that determines the analysis’s rigor, revolve
around a support beam that has vanished.
A skeptic might persist: Even if their lenient standard of review
does not apply and the analysis is inapposite, shouldn’t the review of
alleged government wasting of spectrum be leavened a bit in light of
the fact that other regulation of spectrum is subject to more lenient
review? On this theory, the fact that scarcity justifies lenient review of
other spectrum regulation means that an allegation of wasting of the
spectrum is subject to somewhat less rigorous review than would be
an allegation of wasting of printing presses.
202. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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The problem with this argument is that it seems to extend the
scarcity rationale, and the cases that rely on it, in the sorts of ways I
criticized in the previous section. To put the point differently, why
should the legitimacy of government control of the spectrum affect
the analysis of a claim of wasting, if the basis for that control cuts en-
tirely against waste? The scarcity argument may have the opposite ef-
fect: perhaps judicial review of a lawsuit alleging that the government
is wasting a scarce resource should be more rigorous than judicial re-
view of a suit claiming that the government is wasting a resource that
is not scarce.
One other argument might seem tempting: the analogy to print-
ing presses is faulty, because wire substitutes for spectrum. The argu-
ment would be that, because of the availability of wire, spectrum
regulation is akin to restricting one type of printing press while al-
lowing another form of printing press to be used.
There are two possibilities here: either wire is a suitable substi-
tute for spectrum, or it is not. If it is not a suitable substitute for spec-
trum (which means that spectrum has relevant qualities that wire
lacks), then the argument founders. It would not be good enough for
the government to restrict printing presses but to allow people to use
inferior alternatives, and the same should be true of wire as an infe-
rior alternative. If wire is a substitute for spectrum (meaning that it
has all the properties of spectrum, and perhaps advantages of its
own), then the argument succeeds in demonstrating that spectrum is
not like printing presses in terms of uniqueness. This second position
is in fact one taken by many commentators—namely, that wire is a
substitute for spectrum, and a perfect substitute for those services that
do not require mobility (such as television).203 The problem is that, if
wire is such a substitute, then spectrum is not scarce, and the edifice
supporting government regulation of the spectrum has been eviscer-
ated. Indeed, the arguments for treating wire as a substitute for spec-
trum have been put forward in the service of attacks on the scarcity
rationale. There is no scarcity, so the argument goes, because the
relevant communications channel is not spectrum alone but spectrum
203. See, e.g., Hazlett, supra note 7, at 929:
The ability to substitute wired frequencies for wireless spectrum space should be self-
evident today, when consumers and businesses choose daily between the rival forms
of communications transmissions—for example, when deciding whether to use a TV
antenna or satellite dish versus a cable TV hook-up, or placing a telephone call via a
landline versus a cellphone (or cordless phone).
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plus wire.204 So, again, defeat of the wasting claim also undercuts the
prevailing rationale for government regulation of the spectrum.
Even assuming that a suit based on the wasting of printing
presses should be subject to more rigorous review than a similar suit
with respect to spectrum, heightened scrutiny would still seem appro-
priate in the spectrum context. The standard level of scrutiny applied
to content-neutral restrictions on speech is articulated in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.205 In that case, the government had
forcefully argued that the statutory provisions requiring cable systems
to carry local broadcasters should be subject to lenient scrutiny.206 The
Court flatly rejected that position, stating that “laws that single out
the press, or certain elements thereof, for special treatment ‘pose a
particular danger of abuse by the State,’ and so are always subject to
at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”207 The
Court then went on to delineate that heightened scrutiny—requiring
“important or substantial,” rather than merely legitimate, govern-
ment interests, and that those interests not burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further that interest.208 As I noted in Part
II.B, this heightened scrutiny has been applied with some rigor in
both the Supreme Court and lower courts.209
As I also noted in Part II, the newspaper licensing cases suggest a
higher hurdle. In Minneapolis Star, the Court stated that “we cannot
countenance [taxation of newspapers] unless the State asserts a coun-
terbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve
without differential taxation.”210 This is the language of strict scrutiny,
not the intermediate scrutiny of Turner.
One can, of course, have First Amendment scrutiny that is less
rigorous than that in Turner. The case involving spectrum that is cited
204. See id. (“Stated bluntly, the technical possibility of creating additional frequency space
via wires renders the physical scarcity doctrine meaningless.”).
205. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
206. See id. at 640 (discussing the government’s argument that “the [challenged] provisions
are nothing more than industry-specific antitrust legislation, and thus warrant rational-basis
scrutiny”).
207. Id. at 640–41 (quoting Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987));
see also id. at 641 (“Because the must-carry provisions impose special obligations upon cable
operators and special burdens upon cable programmers, some measure of heightened First
Amendment scrutiny is demanded.”).
208. Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
209. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
210. 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
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as the central example of such review, in fact, is Red Lion.211 So there
are three possibilities: less rigorous review, as in Red Lion; intermedi-
ate scrutiny; and strict scrutiny. If a court applies the first of these,
there is no sense in which it is taking account of the fact that the main
rationale for such scrutiny is absent (and actually cuts the other way)
in the case of keeping spectrum idle. To look at it a bit differently, if a
court applies lenient review to the wasting of spectrum, then it is sug-
gesting that scarcity has become sufficiently talismanic that its inap-
plicability does not matter. The obvious answer is one of the forms of
more rigorous review. As I noted above, there is a fair argument that
the review should be at least as high for cases involving wasted spec-
trum as for those involving wasted printing presses, and that the latter
would be subject to strict scrutiny.212 But, at a minimum, the appropri-
ate level of review would seem to be intermediate scrutiny. Such re-
view would reflect the inapplicability of scarcity (or any other ration-
ale) as a basis for weakening the review.
This is, after all, the standard level of review applied to content-
neutral regulations of speech-related activities. It is worth emphasiz-
ing Turner’s statement that “laws that single out the press, or certain
elements thereof, for special treatment . . . are always subject to at
least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”213 This
statement does not admit of any exceptions—“always” is a fairly clear
term. But even if “always” does not mean “always,” at a minimum
Turner’s language would require a powerful justification for going
below the basic standard of heightened scrutiny; and there appears to
be no justification—powerful or otherwise—for leavening Turner’s
standard here.
V.  APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO THE
WASTING OF SPECTRUM
Government actions that keep spectrum idle likely will not sur-
vive intermediate scrutiny absent nontrivial interference. Indeed,
such actions probably could not survive any scrutiny that involves
some form of meaningful review of the government’s justifications of
211. As I noted above, it is not clear that Red Lion applied low-level review (whether ra-
tional basis or otherwise). See supra note 183 and accompanying text. But those who so construe
Red Lion cite it as the prime example of constitutional review of government decisions regard-
ing spectrum that is more lenient than the intermediate scrutiny of Turner.
212. See supra p. 62 and notes 92–96; 108–11 and accompanying text.
213. Turner, 512 U.S. at 640–41.
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its actions. So long as a court imposes a hurdle higher than minimal
rationality—and even Red Lion and NBC do that—declining to allow
services that do not noticeably increase interference with existing
services would probably fail the test.
In brief, the constitutional analysis runs as follows. First, inter-
ference will generally be the only harm that constitutes an important
or substantial government interest in denying someone use of the
spectrum. Second, as to interference, some new services will cause
only de minimis interference or will cause more significant interfer-
ence that can easily be remediated and therefore avoided. Under such
circumstances, there would not seem to be a sufficient government in-
terest in denying the new use (or one might say that the availability of
remediation is an alternative that demonstrates a lack of tailoring).
A. The Absence of Sufficient Government Interests Beyond
Interference
The first question is what government interests will be “impor-
tant or substantial,” and thus satisfy the first part of the intermediate
scrutiny inquiry. In most cases, there will be only one such govern-
ment interest in preventing usage of frequencies: interference. Other
interests generally will not meet this threshold. This flows from a key
feature of wireless transmissions—namely that, unless they interfere,
their use imposes no costs on the government or the people. There
are no streets that are torn up, no rights of way that are affected, and
no public easements that get occupied. This stands in sharp contrast
to cable television or wireline telephony. In fact, the contrast goes
even deeper. Even in situations where an area has no streets, no util-
ity poles, no rights of way, etc., there can be a cost to stringing wires
in the form of a damaged vista. That is, people may gain utility from
an unspoiled view, and the knowledge that a pristine area remains so.
Nonutilization of land, in other words, can be a valued use. But it is
hard to see how the government could have a sufficient interest in
some frequencies being unused. Spectrum is remarkably resilient.
Broadcasters can transmit as much dreck as they want today and it
will still be there tomorrow, unchanged and ready for good program-
ming. No matter how intensively or improperly anyone uses it, spec-
trum stays the same. And no one can possibly enjoy the beauty of its
nonuse, because there is nothing to behold. The use of spectrum is
simply the transmission along a certain frequency, and the mere fact
of such transmission imposes no greater costs than does my enemies’
private conversation, which also stimulates the air around their
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transmission but miraculously makes no imprint on the world, spoils
no visual image, and leaves the air ready for more words.214
One way to highlight this point is to compare the government’s
refusal to allocate spectrum with its refusal to allow media companies
to use some land areas through zoning. At first blush, the analogy
might seem powerful. Media companies need land, and certainly the
government could not zone the entire United States such that no me-
dia companies could exist, but the government is not estopped from
enacting zoning regulations that prevent media companies from lo-
cating in some areas (e.g., residential ones). That is, even if the gov-
ernment owns the land, or controls it through zoning, it is not obli-
gated to open up all the land for media companies. It can leave the
land unused, or zone it for uses incompatible with those of the media.
This analogy fails, though, for two reasons. First, land is suitable
for a wide variety of uses, and the government must make tradeoffs
between competing uses, whereas spectrum is suitable only for send-
ing and receiving radio waves. There are many competing nonmedia
uses of land, but all uses of spectrum involve transmission, and over-
whelmingly what is transmitted is information.215 This flows from the
way spectrum is defined, namely, as the right to transmit at a given
frequency at a given time. In this way, land use decisions are analo-
gous to choices among various uses of the spectrum (e.g., broadcast
versus mobile telephony), not to the decision whether or not to allow
any use of the spectrum. Second, as I noted above, letting land lie
fallow is still a use of the land, because it may serve as a vista, or as a
214. One could try to say that wireless communication imposes a cost on the rest of society
if it transmits information that hurts people or that people otherwise do not like, but of course
that does not distinguish spectrum in any way, as that is true of all forms of communication
(and, indeed, is inherent in communication).
215. In this regard, Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988), is instruc-
tive. In explaining why regulating the location of newsracks raised a much more serious First
Amendment issue than regulating building construction or the selling of soft drinks, the Court
stated,
laws of general application that are not aimed at conduct commonly associated with
expression and do not permit licensing determinations to be made on the basis of on-
going expression or the words about to be spoken, carry with them little danger of
censorship. For example, a law requiring building permits is rarely effective as a
means of censorship. . . .
. . . Newspapers are in the business of expression, while soda vendors are in the
business of selling soft drinks. Even if the soda vendor engages in speech, that speech
is not related to the soda; therefore preventing it from installing its machines may pe-
nalize unrelated speech, but will not directly prevent that speech from occurring.
Id. at 760–61.
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replenishment of an aquifer, or some other useful purpose.216 The
government might choose to set aside some land as a park or preserve
on which buildings will never be built, but such a decision makes no
sense in the context of spectrum. No one gets any utility from spec-
trum lying fallow (except for incumbents, who see the supply of com-
petition constricted).217
So, as I suggested at the outset, the better analogy is not to real
estate, which has many uses (including as fallow land), but to printing
presses. There is no value in an idle printing press. If the licensing
scheme discussed in Part II were created for printing presses, and an
applicant who failed to obtain one of the licensed presses inquired
about the unused presses (i.e., the presses that the government chose
not to license), it would be insufficient for the government to respond
that it simply had no interest in distributing them, or that there were
enough newspapers and no more were needed. Instead, the govern-
ment must have a good reason for failing to distribute all of them. It
would be sufficient for the government to tell an applicant that some-
one else had obtained the license. In that case, the frustrated appli-
cant’s use would interfere with that of an incumbent. But, as with
spectrum, absent such interference there would appear to be no valid
basis for restricting the licenses.
This is not to suggest that there are no costs to using spectrum
other than interference, but rather that those costs will rarely, if ever,
constitute a sufficiently great government interest.218 One cost of li-
censing spectrum, at least for some people, involves the greater
transmissions that such licensing will afford. If you believe that televi-
sion is a “vast wasteland”219 filled with programming that harms peo-
ple, you might well want the government to allow less programming,
rather than more. This is not a nonsensical position. There is research,
for instance, that correlates the viewing of televised violence with
216. See supra first paragraph of Part V.A.
217. As one commentator put it, “[w]e should never forget that any transmission capacity
not used is wasted forever, like water over the dam. And, there has been water pouring here for
many, many years, even during an endless spectrum drought.” Baran, supra note 70.
218. That is, an important or substantial interest, or a compelling interest if strict scrutiny
applies. See supra notes 89–101 and accompanying text.
219. See Newton N. Minow, Speech to the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9,
1961) (decrying the poor quality of most television programming and urging broadcasters to do
better), in NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND 188
(1995).
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subsequent antisocial behavior.220 The problem with this position is
that it is squarely aimed at restricting communication for the sake of
restricting communication. The underlying complaint is that too much
is already being transmitted, and we do not want any more added to
the world. This complaint may have some traction in a world without
the First Amendment, but it is difficult to see how it can constitute a
substantial, or even legitimate, government interest in a world where
freedom of speech is enshrined in the Constitution. After all, this is
not even a case of saying that American society has enough of one
form of speech and thus needs to devote that spectrum to other pur-
poses. There are no other purposes for the spectrum, so the argument
is that the government should restrict speech simply for the sake of
doing so. If that is a sufficient government interest, then the hurdle of
a government interest will be met every time, and thus is a chimerical
hurdle.221
Another possible cost is more serious: any spectrum that the
government licenses is spectrum that it does not have in reserve for
future uses.222 One tempting form of this argument raises the possibil-
220. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 174, at 120–34 (discussing the history of the
violence hypothesis and its supporting research); Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman,
Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1487, 1536–51 (1995) (reviewing the vio-
lence hypothesis).
Interestingly, researchers have found that the few studies on the effect of exposure to in-
decent sexual material have shown no effect or harm to children under the age of eighteen. See
Edward Donnerstein et al., On the Regulation of Broadcast Indecency to Protect Children, 36 J.
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 111, 115 (1992):
[S]exual innuendo or veiled references to sex may have little impact on a younger
child who is unlikely to understand the meanings of such references. In contrast, older
children who are more likely to understand the references are also likely to have de-
veloped moral judgments that would mediate any effects.
See also Jeremy Harris Lipschultz, Conceptual Problems of Broadcast Indecency Policy and Ap-
plication, COMM. & L., June 1992, at 27 (“No known social values can be shown which support
the need to keep children away from indecent language.”).
221. The same is true of another cost one might identify: government outlays. The govern-
ment will have to spend some amount of money in processing the license—in evaluating the li-
censee’s proposed transmission, in filling out the paperwork for the license, or other administra-
tive costs. But if that is a sufficient government interest, it would be satisfied in every case.
When the government allows a printing plant to be established, it must spend some money in
evaluating the plan for the plant in terms of noise, pollution, etc. If it could deny licenses based
simply on those administrative costs, then it could deny every license.
222. Note the tension between the government arguing that it needs to keep spectrum in
reserve and arguing that there is no room on the spectrum for additional uses: if there is no such
room, then there is no extra spectrum for the government to keep open for future use. Thus,
insofar as the government responds to a potential user’s request for spectrum by saying that
there is no idle spectrum, the government undercuts the claim that it has an interest in keeping
that spectrum available for other uses in the future.
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ity that the government allows a licensee to use a slice of spectrum
and later wants to use that spectrum itself for government purposes.
Its granting of the license would create a roadblock for its later use by
the government, and thus an opportunity cost. But there is no road-
block, because insofar as spectrum licenses confer property rights,223
the government could seize the spectrum license via eminent domain
and pay for it.224 One possible reply is that the cost of purchasing it
from the licensee would constitute a significant government outlay.225
But the government would lose money on this transaction only if it
chose to give away the license in the first place. If the government
sold the license initially, it would presumably merely repay the money
that it received. Yes, the government could give the license gratis and
thus find itself paying for the license without ever receiving any
money for it, but that would be a result of the government’s decision
to give away the license to the first user. It is hard to see how the gov-
223. Congress has proclaimed that it alone controls the spectrum and that private parties
obtain licenses only. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994):
It is the purpose of this Act, among other things, to maintain the control of the
United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use
of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of
time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be con-
strued to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
 And section 304 of the same statute provides that
[n]o station license shall be granted by the Commission until the applicant there for
shall have waived any claim to the use of any particular frequency or of the electro-
magnetic spectrum as against the regulatory power of the United States because of
the previous use of the same, whether by license or otherwise.
47 U.S.C. § 304; see also Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 331–32 (1945) (holding
that “[n]o licensee obtains any vested interest in any frequency,” and that the FCC may revoke
any station license pursuant to statutory procedures); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470, 475 (1940) (stating that “[t]he policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have any-
thing in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license”).
224. See MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES:
CONTROLLING THE CONTENT OF PRINT AND BROADCAST 22–24 (1986) (“The government
could conceivably use eminent domain to recombine spectrum rights and thereby eliminate
hold-out problems.”). So even if incumbents did obtain ownership rights in spectrum, the gov-
ernment would always have available the ability seize that (or any other) property via eminent
domain.
225. It might seem tempting to put forward a different reply—namely, that seizing spectrum
from A in order to allocate it to B (more accurately, to a new service provided by B) would run
afoul of the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment, because it would really be a pri-
vate use. The problem with this argument is that it flies in the face of Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld against a takings chal-
lenge legislation that seized property from A (lessors) and gave it to B (lessees). The Court
ruled that a public use was not necessary as long as the legislature had a public purpose, and
stated that any exercise of the eminent domain power that “is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose” would pass muster. Id. at 241; see also supra note 83.
BENJAMIN 10/28/02 2:07 PM
70 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1
ernment could persuasively argue that it has a substantial interest in
holding a license off the market because otherwise it might foolishly
give that license away and later want to get it back. Given the ease
with which the government could avoid this problem (by selling the
license), once again this interest seems so slight that it would render
the requirement of a substantial government interest meaningless.
There is, however, a different formulation of the cost of granting
a license: the problem might be not so much that the government will
have to pay for the license to get it back, but rather that the recipient
might become a sufficiently entrenched incumbent that the govern-
ment can never get it back for another use. The idea is that, once a li-
censee gets the right to use a portion of spectrum, it has a stake in
keeping that license and will use all its influence—influence enhanced
by the earning power created by the license—to do so.226 This concern
certainly is not farfetched. Incumbents always have an interest in
maintaining their allotments (and preventing anyone else from ob-
taining one). Indeed, it is the power of spectrum incumbents that has
helped to create the unused spectrum in the first place—since incum-
bents never relish competition.227
This has been borne out in practice. On many occasions some-
one—the FCC, or a competing user, or a think tank—has proposed
that spectrum currently allocated for one use instead be shifted to a
different one. The response from the incumbents is usually unequivo-
cal: “We see this as our spectrum, and we will fight you tooth and nail
226. See, e.g., ROGER C. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEREGULATION: INTEREST GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 12 (1983) (“[R]egulation
can create interests in the perpetuation of regulation even where none existed before. Thus, a
rule once in place may have far stronger support than it originally commanded, even though the
rule might impost greater costs than benefits on the public.”).
227. This danger of entrenchment could be remedied if the spectrum were freely tradable. If
I knew that I could get paid for my spectrum, I would have every reason to want to maximize
the legally authorized uses of that spectrum. The problem here is that many of the users (par-
ticularly the government licensees) know that they will not receive any money if they allow
other uses of their spectrum, so they lack this incentive.
To put the point differently, the fear of entrenched incumbents would have force only be-
cause the government had restricted the uses of the spectrum and declined to make licenses into
freely tradable property. If a licensee could sell its spectrum and use it for any noninterfering
purposes, it would have no reason to resist a new potential use for its frequencies. The addition
of an additional authorized service on a given range of frequencies would enhance the value of
that spectrum, and its availability would not mean that the licensee had to give up the spectrum;
the licensee could keep the spectrum if it so chose. The fear of the power of incumbents arises
only because the government has chosen to exercise much greater control over the spectrum.
Loosening control is an obvious option, which suggests that the government’s interest in keep-
ing control would not be very strong.
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to keep it that way.” This is exactly what has happened recently, for
example, in the attempts at making room for third generation wireless
telephones (known as 3G). Those who had underutilized spectrum—
most notable among them, government users—mightily resisted the
suggestion that any of their spectrum be devoted to 3G services. Eve-
ryone argued that someone else’s spectrum should be taken.228
The fact that incumbents so contend does not mean that they are
always successful. On the contrary, their arguments often fail. The
FCC has on many occasions pushed particular services off their spec-
trum, when it has concluded that a different service constitutes a bet-
ter use.229
The real problem with the proposition that a fear of entrench-
ment justifies keeping spectrum off the market, however, is that the
government’s unwillingness to regain control of spectrum it has allo-
cated is the source of the government’s interest. The government
would be saying it had little confidence that, once it had granted a li-
cense, it would have the stomach to seize it back. The government
thus would be creating its own regulatory justification. Its interest
would arise from its failure to stick to its principles of maximizing the
value of the spectrum. It is difficult to see how the government’s un-
willingness to utilize the readily available mechanism for reclaiming
the spectrum can constitute an important or substantial government
interest. If that argument were persuasive, the requirement of an im-
portant or substantial government interest would be meaningless in
any case involving potentially powerful incumbents and a scarce re-
source. The government could simply articulate its interest as its fear
that it would not stand up to the incumbents once they had obtained
some benefit from the government. Moreover, if the government
were successful in making this argument, it would be hard to under-
228. See, e.g., Battle of the Airwaves, THE ECONOMIST, July 29, 2000, at 57–58 (discussing
how various licensees have managed to keep their spectrum from being devoted to 3G services).
229. See, e.g., Reallocation of the 216–220 MHz, 1390–1395 MHz, 1427–1429 MHz, 1429–
1432 MHz, 1432–1435 MHz, 1670–1675 MHz and 2385–2390 MHz Government Transfer Bands,
17 F.C.C.R. 368, ¶1 (2002) (allocating seven bands for nongovernment use in keeping with “ar-
ticulated goals for efficient spectrum use”); Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innova-
tion in the Use of New Telecommunications Technologies, 8 F.C.C.R. 6589, ¶1 (1993) (adopting
“a plan that will provide for the fair and equitable sharing of 2 GHz spectrum by new services
and the existing fixed microwave services”); Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact
upon the Existing Television Broadcast Services, 6 F.C.C.R. 7024, ¶¶ 30–31 (1991) (relocating
low power television).
BENJAMIN 10/28/02 2:07 PM
72 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1
stand how it could ever justify licensing any spectrum.230 After all, in
any given case, there might be a better user just around the corner,
one that would be forestalled if the government failed to reclaim
spectrum from the incumbent to whom it had given the spectrum.231
A slightly different formulation of this argument about prior uses
prejudicing later ones would focus not on entrenchment but instead
on efficiency: the government might argue that, even if it was not
afraid to reclaim spectrum, such seizing of the spectrum might impose
230. This relates to the seeming analogy of the land preserve. Why isn’t empty spectrum like
a conservation easement designed to prevent land from being developed? The idea of such a
preserve is that the land is perpetually protected from development, as keeping the land in its
pristine state is a valued use. Here, by contrast, there is no value in fallow land, so there is no
value in having a preserve. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. What if I change the
analogy to that of a land bank that is held off the market for future development? The problem
is that one can never know when one has found that perfect use. There will always be the possi-
bility of a still better use in a few years’ time. At any time T, there will be current uses that are
attractive and conceivable future services that are even more attractive. The government will
thus leave the spectrum empty, and wasted, at current time T in order to have it available at fu-
ture time T. And, all the while, the government could have authorized a service while it waited
for something better, knowing that it could remove that service from those frequencies as soon
as the better service became available.
231. What about the possibility that incumbent entrenchment will coincide with users be-
coming accustomed to using particular devices that utilize that spectrum? After all, consumers
can come to rely on particular services, and path dependence heightens this possibility. Does my
argument about incumbents mean that a fear of harm to consumers is not an important or sub-
stantial government interest? The answer, as is discussed more fully below, is that harm to an
existing service, whether or not consumers rely on it (and therefore a fortiori if consumers do
rely), is an important or substantial government interest. See infra notes 262–67 and accompa-
nying text. But adding noninterfering services on to the spectrum is fully consistent with pro-
tecting that interest. The whole point is that a noninterfering service does not harm existing
services, and so can be added without harming those services or those who rely on them. One
might well argue in favor of pushing some services off the spectrum, but that person would have
to rely on arguments different from those put forward in this Article. The point here is simply
that the government cannot deny access to the spectrum based on a fear that the new incumbent
will become entrenched—even if such entrenchment includes having consumers rely on it.
This last sentence highlights an important distinction: the proposition that the govern-
ment has an important or substantial interest in protecting consumers (and incumbents more
generally) from harm is quite different from a notion that the government cannot, as a legal
matter, move existing services off the spectrum (and thereby harm those who rely on them). If
the latter were true, then one would not say that the government was unwilling to reclaim spec-
trum, but rather that it was actually unable to do so; and thus the government would have a
strong claim to an important or substantial interest in failing to allocate any spectrum in the first
place. The problem with this reasoning is simple: the government can reclaim spectrum. It is not
legally disabled from doing so. As I noted above, the government has emphasized that licenses
do not confer any permanent rights; and, even if they did, the government retains its powers of
eminent domain. See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying text. Thus, the government cannot
rely on the fear of legal entrenchment as creating an important or substantial interest in refusing
to assign spectrum.
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costs on the private parties that would be better avoided by not allo-
cating the spectrum in the first place. The government might contend
that, even if a new user understood the danger of the government re-
claiming the spectrum, that user might nonetheless invest more than
was warranted, with the result that when its spectrum was reclaimed it
would have substantial stranded costs (i.e., costs specific to its use of
those particular frequencies). The government, so the argument
would run, would have an interest in preventing the losses resulting
from such stranded costs, and thus would have an interest in refusing
to allocate the spectrum in the first place.232
The government would be telling potential service providers that
they might not make wise investing choices, even after hearing from
the government about its level of interest in reclaiming that spectrum
at some future point. The problem is that this paternalistic interest is
used to cut off an option that new users would otherwise have. The
government would be saying that it had an important or substantial
interest in denying potential new providers the option of utilizing the
spectrum, for fear that if they had the choice between spectrum and
wire they would make the choice that would not maximize their own
wealth. It is certainly possible that the government would know what
was in the potential provider’s interest more than the provider itself
would, but the more widely accepted view is that those whose eco-
nomic interests are at stake will do a better job of evaluating their
own position. And, in any event, it is difficult to see how the govern-
ment could have an important or substantial interest in imposing its
vision of the provider’s appropriate investment decision on the pro-
vider.
Might the efficiency problem, instead, be that the government
reclaiming the spectrum would produce too little investment? That is,
the government might articulate an interest in avoiding giving licen-
sees the impression that it will seize existing spectrum, for fear that
such an impression will lead providers to invest too little in their spec-
trum, thereby creating less value for themselves and society. The
problem with this formulation is that it ignores whom the reclaiming
would affect, and how. To review the bidding: the government would
be claiming an interest in refusing to allow noninterfering new serv-
ices on the spectrum for fear that, when it removed those services
232. If the existence of these stranded costs would induce the government to refrain from
reclaiming the spectrum, then we are back to the entrenchment argument—and the problems
with that argument—discussed above. See supra notes 226–31 and accompanying text.
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from the spectrum, other service providers would become scared
about their own status on the spectrum and thus would invest subop-
timal amounts of money in their services. But there would be no rea-
son for providers of services that the FCC has carefully chosen,
through its ordinary processes of allocating spectrum to the highest
and best use, to have any heightened concern about losing their spec-
trum based on the government having reclaimed spectrum from a
noninterfering use that forced its way onto the spectrum by invoking
the First Amendment arguments suggested in this Article. The gov-
ernment’s successful removal of one of the latter groups of service
providers—which by definition the government had never deter-
mined was the best use of any portion of spectrum, and which it
would have kept off the spectrum if it had had the choice—would not
send a signal that the government was looking to unsettle all existing
uses; and, even if it did send that signal, the government could dis-
claim such an intent.233 Government reclamation of spectrum in these
circumstances would merely remind licensees chosen in the ordinary
manner that the government could, in fact, seize spectrum; but those
licensees would already know that. Indeed, those entities whom the
FCC chose in its regular processes as providing the best service
should be heartened by the government’s willingness to reclaim spec-
trum from the services that utilized First Amendment arguments to
gain access in the first place, as it would underscore the FCC’s com-
mitment to devote spectrum to what it determined to be the best
service.
That still leaves the possibility that other providers who force
their way onto the spectrum by marshaling the First Amendment ar-
guments addressed in this Article would be induced to invest too lit-
tle. That is, even if those licensees blessed by the FCC had nothing to
fear from the government seizing spectrum back from those it was
233. This relates to another possible argument. Might the government be able to argue that
it had an important or substantial interest in refusing to allocate spectrum, because otherwise
incumbents would not know whether the government wanted to put them on the spectrum or
instead was compelled to give them space on the spectrum (using the arguments in this Article)?
No. Insofar as the government feared the consequences of incumbents’ uncertainty about their
status as desired occupants, the government could easily avoid the confusion by clarifying the
basis on which it allowed services on the spectrum. The government could indicate whether it
was allowing a given service on the spectrum only because it was obliged to by the First
Amendment, or whether it was choosing to allow the service regardless of any First Amend-
ment obligations. The government’s fear of the consequences of incumbents’ uncertainty about
their status would not seem to constitute an important or substantial interest, because the gov-
ernment could avoid the uncertainty in the first place.
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compelled to allow on the airwaves in the first place, providers simi-
larly situated to those whose spectrum was seized would have reason
to fear such reclamation; and thus they might invest a suboptimal
amount in their own services. But this argument does not work, be-
cause the alternative proposed by the government is no investment
and no noninterfering service. If the fear is that a less than ideal
amount will be invested, it is a nonsensical response to that fear to en-
sure that nothing at all will be invested. To put the point differently,
recall that I am talking about spectrum that is currently lying fallow.
Unless society places a negative value on additional communications
(which would be inconsistent with the First Amendment234), some ad-
ditional use of that spectrum is better than none at all. By hypothesis,
the government is willing to reclaim the spectrum once a better use
becomes available, so I am talking about the intervening period when
the spectrum would otherwise be idle. Given that spectrum is not a
wasting resource, it is preferable to have some new service on that
spectrum, even at a lower level of investment than might be optimal,
to no new service at all. It seems impossible, then, for the government
to assert an important or substantial interest in keeping noninterfer-
ing services off the spectrum out of fear that letting them on would
lead them to produce fewer communications than would be ideal.
A third possible cost is the burden on incumbents from having
more competition. The government might argue that opening up the
spectrum to more uses will destabilize existing companies’ services.
The possibility is real. Presumably, the reason an entrant would de-
vote the time, money, and energy to creating a new spectrum service
is that this entrant believed it could gain new customers, perhaps at
the expense of existing companies. Part of the whole point of allowing
new speakers on to any medium is that they add to the debate. In
doing so, they may of course tend to weaken the competitive position
of the incumbents.
That a fear is well founded, however, does not make it a suffi-
cient basis for government action to counteract it. First, protecting
competitors will not be sufficient. As has been frequently stated in the
context of antitrust law, the goal is to protect competition, not com-
petitors.235 Second, even as to competition, destabilization will not
234. See supra note 112; infra note 241 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (“The
antitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’” (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))).
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create a sufficient government interest. Absent a serious danger of
widespread bankruptcies, concerns about competition will not suffice.
These principles are reflected in case law, most notably in Turner I.236
In that case, the government had sought to justify provisions requir-
ing that cable operators carry local broadcasters by invoking concerns
about the competitive difficulties that broadcasters would face if they
were not carried on cable systems.237 Turner found that, in order to
pass constitutional muster, the harms to broadcasting had to be more
specific and more powerful.238 The plurality stated that, “in applying
O’Brien [i.e., intermediate] scrutiny we must ask first whether the
Government has adequately shown that the economic health of local
broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy and in need of the protections af-
forded by must-carry.”239 The Court further indicated the seriousness
of the hurdle in emphasizing that “the parties have not presented any
evidence that local broadcast stations have fallen into bankruptcy,
turned in their broadcast licenses, curtailed their broadcast opera-
tions, or suffered a serious reduction in operating revenues as a result
of their being dropped from, or otherwise disadvantaged by, cable
systems.”240 Accordingly, competitive pressures on incumbents will
not suffice. The government must be able to show genuine jeopardy
236. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
237. See id. at 662 (noting that the government presented three specific interests that justi-
fied the must-carry regime: “(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast
television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of
sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television programming”).
238. See id. at 664 (“[The government] must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and ma-
terial way.”).
239. Id. at 664–65.
240. Id. at 667. Interestingly, the Court had a similar thrust in a major case from 1940 that
addressed a purely statutory challenge to the denial of a license. In that case, FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), the Court concluded that, under the Communications
Act, protecting competitors ordinarily will not constitute grounds for denying a license to a po-
tential entrant. See id. at 475 (“Congress intended to leave competition in the business of broad-
casting where it found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with other
broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his programs attractive to
the public.”). Sanders Bros. did suggest that an entrant could be denied a license if that would
bankrupt both the entrant and the incumbent, and thus it may have required a bit less than
Turner does, but the Court in Sanders Bros. immediately added that its concerns about bank-
ruptcy “are distinct from the consideration that, if a license be granted, competition between the
licensee and any other existing station may cause economic loss to the latter.” Id. at 476. No
First Amendment arguments were raised in the briefs or in the opinion, so the case does not
directly relate to the question of what the First Amendment requires. But it is noteworthy that,
half a century before Turner, the Court concluded that economic loss to incumbents was not a
sufficient basis for keeping potential entrants off the spectrum.
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to the economic health of an entire industry—a burden that seems
exceedingly unlikely to be satisfied when the government action at is-
sue is opening up some additional spectrum for new users.
The previous paragraph should not obscure a further point: there
is good reason to see destabilizing competition as not merely insuffi-
ciently harmful to constitute a government interest under the First
Amendment, but rather as an affirmatively beneficial development
for First Amendment purposes. A more crowded competitive envi-
ronment means more channels of communication for the public. The
limitations on speech restrictions embodied in the First Amendment
are in considerable tension with the stasis of a noncompetitive envi-
ronment; they seem, instead, to promote a less stable world contain-
ing a wide range of speakers. In this way, it seems fair to say that the
First Amendment, far from encouraging the creation of a stable re-
gime with a few major voices, leads to a world containing a multiplic-
ity of voices.241 The destabilizing competition that results from re-
moving unnecessary limitations on spectrum (and, for that matter,
other barriers to entry) seems to flow from the First Amendment;
and, conversely, it is hard to see how limiting that competition can
fairly be construed as consistent with the First Amendment.
B. Determining Whether a Given Level of Interference Satisfies
Intermediate Scrutiny
Given that interference will generally be the only possible con-
cern that could rise to the level of an “important or substantial” gov-
ernment interest, the next question is that of the level and nature of
interference that will satisfy the constitutional test. Recall from Part I
that all emissions of radio waves create some interference. But, as
Part I also indicated, there is good reason to believe that some poten-
tial new uses of spectrum would create so little additional interference
that they would have a trivial impact on existing uses—their interfer-
ence would not rise above the level of background noise. Other pos-
241. See supra notes 112 and 161; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)
(stating that the First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the pub-
lic”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000):
The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic
and moral judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed.
What the Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not
for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.
Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential of this revolu-
tion if we assume the Government is best positioned to make these choices for us.
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sible new services would create a nontrivial (though still small)
amount of interference for some users, but that interference could
easily be mitigated, at little or no cost. If a court is persuaded that this
is so (i.e., that this is a correct statement of fact), what should it do?242
Conceivably, a court might hold that even the most trivial
amount of interference is sufficient to constitute an important or sub-
stantial government interest. The court might conclude that once any
interference was possible, the government had a strong interest in
stopping it from continuing to occur or preventing it from occurring.
Such an approach, though, seems untenable. Given that every device
that emits radio waves—which includes almost every electrical de-
vice—creates interference, it would give the government unfettered
power to limit use of the spectrum, thereby eviscerating heightened
scrutiny. Application of the requirement of an important or substan-
tial interest would be a sham, because the test would always be met.243
This hypothetical judicial approach to interference is also unneces-
sary, because very low levels of interference are often not discerni-
ble.244 It would, simply stated, be overkill.
The more obvious, and appropriate, judicial response to interfer-
ence is to conclude that very low levels of interference do not rise to
the level of an important or substantial government interest. This
would comport with the threshold for such an interest that the Court
laid out in Turner. In order for the government’s interest in imposing
must-carry regulations to satisfy the requirement of an important or
substantial interest, economic harm to broadcasters needed to be so
great that the entire industry was threatened; lower levels of eco-
nomic harm would not be sufficient.245 This might not require that an
entire form of communication be blocked by interference in order for
the threshold to be satisfied; presumably, application of the important
or substantial government interest test requires something less than
such a complete degradation of existing services. But, at a minimum,
242. This obviously raises tricky issues involving how a court should evaluate factual claims
about interference. I leave those questions of factfinding for another day.
243. If even a small amount of interference would be sufficient to justify any government
decision denying access to a proposed service, then incumbents would have an obvious incen-
tive: encourage others to produce—or manufacture on your own—receivers so crude that any
additional use of the spectrum would cause at least a bit of interference with these receivers.
Such a tactic would offer a shield against new competition on the spectrum, if the existence of
any interference were sufficient to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
244. See supra notes 29–31, 77–79 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 98–100, 235–40 and accompanying text.
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it would seem to require some nontrivial level of interference. Unless
the interference itself is significant, it is hard to see how the govern-
ment’s interest in preventing that interference can be.
This does not necessarily answer the question about services that
would create nontrivial interference for some users that is easily
remediated. Low power radio is a good example. For the small per-
centage of radios that would suffer from interference, interference
could be avoided by simply moving the radio a foot or so. No special
devices would need to be purchased; the owner could eliminate the
problem through just a bit of movement.
Again, a court could conclude that this level of interference satis-
fied the requirements of intermediate scrutiny, but, again, such a con-
clusion seems inappropriate. The court’s analysis would have to be
that any imposition on even a few individuals satisfied the govern-
ment’s burden. (It would be “any” imposition, because it is hard to
imagine one more slight than having to move a portable radio a cou-
ple of feet.) This is a conceivable position, but it is difficult to justify.
A problem can be insignificant, and thus fail to give rise to a substan-
tial government interest, either because it is easily avoided or because
it is unavoidable but very small.246 It is not clear why a judge (or any-
one else) should consider the latter but not the former a harm that is
so insignificant that it cannot give rise to an important or substantial
government interest. Just as one might say that a physical object in a
public path (say, a news rack on a sidewalk) cannot constitute a sig-
nificant harm if people can simply move laterally a few feet and
thereby avoid it, so, too, might one say that an intangible blockage is
insignificant if it requires only that a user move a receiver a foot or so.
It bears noting that one could also see this as an issue of tailoring.
Having users avoid interference by taking the smallest of actions is an
obvious alternative to keeping the proposed service off the spectrum,
and one that would not restrict speech. The availability of this solu-
tion would undercut the government’s denial of access to the air-
waves.247 If ever there were an easy alternative to regulating the provi-
246. On the close relationship between the underlying harm that is the subject of govern-
ment regulation of communications and the level of the government interest that is necessary to
satisfy intermediate scrutiny, see Benjamin, supra note 100, at 288 (“As part of raising the bar
for what is required of legislation that infringes upon First Amendment interests, we expect the
underlying harm to which the legislature is responding to be a serious one.”).
247. In Turner II, the plurality indicated that the government need not adopt the least
speech restrictive alternative, and that the existence of some imaginable less restrictive alterna-
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sion of speech, this would be it. As I noted above, it is hard to imagine
a regime that poses less of a burden on individuals.248
tive would not doom the statute. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 218 (1997). The plu-
rality stated that it would not
“sift through all the available or imagined alternative means of regulating [cable tele-
vision] in order to determine whether the [Government’s] solution was ‘the least in-
trusive means’ of achieving the desired end[.]” . . . Our precedents establish that when
evaluating a content-neutral regulation which incidentally burdens speech, we will not
invalidate the preferred remedial scheme because some alternative solution is mar-
ginally less intrusive on a speaker’s First Amendment interests.
Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797
(1989)). All that was required, according to the Turner plurality, was that “‘the means chosen
are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.’” Id. at 218
(quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 800).
In order to evaluate the breadth of the means chosen, though, it would seem useful to
have a sense of the scope of the government’s interest and the ways it could be met. The avail-
ability of some less restrictive alternative might not inexorably invalidate the government ac-
tion, but it could still indicate that “the means chosen [were] substantially broader than neces-
sary to achieve the government’s interest.” Id. So a judge would want to look at alternatives as a
way of examining the tightness of the fit between the government’s interest and the means cho-
sen. See Benjamin, supra note 100, at 304 (describing how “judicial review of legislation for
Constitutional purposes” involves “compar[ing] the legislation to other, hypothetical worlds
that would be created if other legislation was passed”). And that is exactly what the Court did in
Turner II: it examined the proffered alternatives to see if they really were available and effec-
tive. It found that they were not, and on that basis it found that the must-carry regime survived
the tailoring prong. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 218. Presumably, a Court that deemed alternatives to
be irrelevant would ignore them entirely or, at most, dismiss them in a couple of sentences. In-
stead, the opinion engaged in a careful discussion of each suggested alternative to the must-
carry regime, detailing why none of them would be an adequate alternative. Id. One proposed
alternative would not have protected enough broadcasters (the opinion so concluded about a
proposal to substitute must-carry rules that would apply more narrowly); another would serve a
different purpose (this was the opinion’s assessment of a proposal for subsidies for financially
weak stations; the opinion emphasized that “[m]ust-carry is intended not to guarantee the finan-
cial health of all broadcasters, but to ensure a base number of broadcasters survive to provide
service to noncable households”); yet another would not be as effective in achieving Congress’s
goals (as the opinion concluded about a leased-access regime: “Because this alternative is aimed
solely at addressing the bottleneck control of cable operators, it would not be as effective in
achieving Congress’ further goal of ensuring that significant programming remains available for
the 40 percent of American households without cable.”). Id. at 221. This extensive discussion
would be unnecessary if the alternatives had no possible significance. The Court’s treatment of
them suggests that, on the contrary, the availability of an adequate alternative would have been
quite relevant to the analysis, because it would have undercut the government’s argument that
its chosen means were not broader than necessary.
248. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. One more possible approach would be to
understand this in terms of overinclusiveness—the apparent focus of the requirement that “the
means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s inter-
est.” Turner II, 520 U.S. at 218 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 800). For many services that will
cause a bit of interference, the vast majority of their transmissions will present no problem
whatsoever for anyone. Rather than eliminate the proposed service entirely, the government
should respond to the small number of users who suffer from interference by mitigating their
problem. The idea is that keeping the service off the spectrum would be broader than necessary.
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Is this alternative inadequate because it burdens users, rather
than service providers? After all, the individuals are going to have to
move their radios all by themselves. Is an alternative that poses dif-
ferent sorts of costs from the original regulation a truly viable alterna-
tive for constitutional purposes? The short answer is yes. In most
cases in which a court has found that alternatives exist such that the
challenged regulation is not sufficiently tailored, the proffered alter-
natives impose a different set of burdens from the challenged regula-
tion.249 The point of the challenge is to find an alternative that restricts
less speech. That usually means an alternative that covers different
activities (so that it is less restrictive of First Amendment interests),
and it often means an alternative that applies to different parties in
different ways than the original regulation did.250
Again, the Turner case is illustrative. One of the main proffered
alternatives was an A/B switch that consumers would install and that
would allow them to switch between cable reception (for stations
provided by their cable operator) and reception over the airwaves
(for their local broadcasters). Such a switch would obviously be quite
unlike the must-carry regulations, with different sorts of burdens on
different parties. If the fact of these differences was significant (let
alone dispositive), one would expect the Court to so indicate. On the
contrary, the plurality did not mention these differences, instead fo-
cusing on the difficulties of implementing this alternative (because,
for example, many homes did not have antennas to receive broadcast
signals and the A/B switches had technical flaws).251
The bottom line is that if a service will impose trivial harms—
measured in the quantity of interference and the remediation neces-
sary to avoid that interference—that will not be sufficient to support a
finding that the government is justified in keeping it off the spectrum.
There may be a few situations in which the government can justify ex-
cluding a new service on the grounds of some unusual harm resulting
from its addition to the airwaves that is unrelated to interference—
most notably, if its addition would cause the sorts of economic harm
to an industry noted in Turner. Absent such extraordinary conditions,
if a service’s interference is insignificant, then the government will
have no basis for denying it access to the airwaves.
249. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
250. See id; infra note 319.
251. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 219–21.
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VI.  THE BREADTH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AVOIDING WASTE
A. Spectrum or Broadcasting?
My argument has focused on the treatment of spectrum as an
undifferentiated means of transmission. Some will find this treatment
of broadcast alongside other spectrum uses problematic. Hasn’t the
Supreme Court said that medium-specific review is appropriate?
Doesn’t this suggest that courts should treat broadcast differently
from other uses of the spectrum?
Distinctions among spectrum uses would focus my argument on
whatever regulatory schemes were justified by the scarcity rationale—
presumably, first and foremost broadcast. But this medium specificity
would not help the government in defending restrictions on any part
of the spectrum. Regulation of nonbroadcast frequencies (including
restrictions on their use) would be subject to ordinary heightened
scrutiny, because there would be no rationale for lesser scrutiny. And,
with respect to broadcast frequencies (where by hypothesis the scar-
city rationale would apply), for reasons discussed in Part III.A, scar-
city would not reduce the scrutiny applicable to decisions limiting
spectrum availability. Medium specificity would limit the applicability
of scarcity to one part of the spectrum, but the implications of scarcity
for government actions constraining the use of that spectrum would
remain.
The argument for treating broadcast differently is weak even as
far as it goes, however. The fungibility of the spectrum makes a me-
dium-specific analysis particularly inappropriate. One can draw a dis-
tinction between broadcast television and wireless telephony in the
way that they allow people to communicate (one to many versus one
to one), even though both use the spectrum. In light of this difference,
it is plausible that regulation of the communications allowed by these
technologies should be subject to different standards. But such dis-
tinctions do not apply to unused frequencies. All spectrum is suitable
for more than one service, and all services are suitable for more than
one place in the spectrum. There is no part of the spectrum that is, as
a technological matter, “broadcast.” Delineating some portion of the
spectrum as “broadcast” for constitutional purposes and other por-
tions as “nonbroadcast” would be arbitrary. One could decide to
identify all spectrum currently used for broadcasting as constitution-
ally “broadcast,” and all other spectrum as constitutionally “non-
broadcast,” but there is no reason to convert the happenstance of ex-
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isting allocational choices into the constitutionally mandated scheme.
(And note that this would tend to ossify the existing allocational
choices, as courts would presumably oversee any deviations from the
constitutional categories of “broadcast” and “nonbroadcast.”252) The
basic point is that it makes little sense to demarcate the spectrum that
is suitable for broadcasting but is unused from the spectrum that is
suitable for other purposes but is unused. There cannot be one stan-
dard for “unused spectrum available for broadcasting” and another
standard for “unused spectrum available for other uses,” because it is
the same spectrum. Because the spectrum is unused, it does not by
rights fall into either category. The principle of avoiding waste, then,
is not limited to broadcast spectrum. The government should avoid
waste of any of the spectrum, because all of it (by the logic of the pre-
vailing theory) is scarce.
One might complain that I am not talking about the main form of
medium specificity. Courts have tended to distinguish broadcast not
so much from other uses of spectrum but instead from services that
do not use spectrum, notably cable and newspapers.253 This line of
reasoning does not undercut my argument, however, because that is
the basic distinction that this Article explores. Courts have indeed
treated broadcast differently from media that do not use spectrum,
and the basis for that distinction has been the scarcity rationale.254 The
point here is simply that, although courts have often spoken in terms
of “broadcast,” the scarcity on which they rely is not limited to broad-
252. This relates to the point earlier in the Article about choosing among competing uses as
opposed to choosing not to allow any use. If courts defined a portion of the spectrum as “broad-
cast” for constitutional purposes and another as “nonbroadcast,” then courts would need to po-
lice any changes in the spectrum devoted to “broadcast” or “nonbroadcast” services. Courts
would review all choices among competing uses, rather than merely those choices that waste
spectrum. Indeed, because all changes in allocation affect either broadcast or nonbroadcast
services, all new allocational choices would be subject to scrutiny. Such a review of allocational
decisions is broader than the one advocated in this Article, and, unlike the approach advocated
in this Article, it would essentially constitutionalize all allocational choices and thus be in some
tension with NBC. And, as the text points out, this constitutionalization would be based on the
technologically dubious notion that spectrum can be demarcated such that some is “broadcast”
and the rest is “nonbroadcast” as a constitutional matter.
253. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637–41 (1994) (explaining that the
Supreme Court’s “justification for [their] distinct approach to broadcast regulation rests upon
the unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (“[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them.”).
254. As I discussed in Part III.B, supra, the other proffered bases for distinguishing broad-
casting from other media do not justify any special treatment of broadcasting for purposes of
refusing to allocate spectrum.
BENJAMIN 10/28/02 2:07 PM
84 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1
casting. Spectrum is sufficiently fungible that it makes little sense to
treat “broadcast” spectrum as a special category of spectrum.
B. Beyond Refusals To Allocate Unused Spectrum
How broadly does this principle of nonwasting apply? As the dis-
cussion so far indicates, it applies to government refusals to allocate
unused spectrum. But other questions remain. One possibility arises
from the section immediately above: Do the First Amendment con-
cerns raised in this Article apply to government decisions to limit the
quantity of spectrum that is devoted to any one service? If, for exam-
ple, the government limits the range of frequencies devoted to broad-
casting, and opens all other frequencies only to nonbroadcasting uses,
is the argument against government wasting of the spectrum applica-
ble?
Such limits may raise a number of concerns, because the gov-
ernment would be constraining the number of broadcast voices on the
spectrum.255 If people were to place greater value, for constitutional
purposes, on broadcasting than on other forms of wireless transmis-
sion (akin to valuing the use of presses for mass media over their use
for private mailings), then we might conclude that a low limit on the
use of frequencies for broadcasting created constitutional problems.
But the mere fact of limiting broadcasting to a portion of the spec-
trum would not implicate the concern about wasting spectrum that is
the focus of this Article. Choosing, say, cellular telephone users over
broadcast users does not necessarily reduce usage of the spectrum.256
Either way, the frequencies are being used.257 In this way, choosing
255. Indeed, it is little different from the government transferring the allocation of some
spectrum currently devoted to broadcast to an entirely different purpose, thereby reducing the
amount of spectrum devoted to broadcast. The distinction between freezing the amount of
broadcast spectrum and reducing it may simply reflect the size of the initial allocation to broad-
cast (i.e., that in the second situation the government initially set aside more spectrum for
broadcast).
256. This applies as well, of course, to spectrum limits (or reductions) for other services—
such as caps on the amount of spectrum that the FCC will devote to cellular telephony. Such
limits do not, in and of themselves, waste spectrum. If, though, it so happens that such limits
result in spectrum being wasted, because the prohibited service would occupy currently
underutilized spectrum, then the problem identified in this Article would apply. But that is not a
necessary result of spectrum caps on any particular service. Some sort of limit on the use of
spectrum is necessary for this problem of underutilization to apply, but it is by no means
sufficient. See infra discussion immediately following note 261 in text.
257. Such an allocation may be bad policy for the same reason that all spectrum allocation
may be bad policy—namely, that it may make more sense to leave the market to choose what
gets transmitted over different parts of the airwaves, and for that matter what is left off the spec-
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among competing uses of spectrum is similar to choosing among
competing licensees who want to provide a particular use.258 In both
cases, the government is choosing among various options, and pre-
sumably the frequencies will be used regardless of that choice.
1. Underutilization and Spectrum Management. This is not the
end of the story, though, because allocation decisions can be relevant
to the concerns raised in this Article if they have the effect of creating
underutilization of the spectrum. Recall from Part I that on some
parts of the spectrum the government limits a licensee to one pre-
scribed use of its frequencies and also allots to that user more spec-
trum than it needs for the particular service. Even if a potential new
user reached an agreement with the existing licensee to use a bit of
the licensee’s extra frequencies for a noninterfering use, the new use
would not be permitted; the rules governing the license would not
permit it.
In such circumstances, the potential new user would have the
same complaint about this allocated spectrum that the potential user
of the unallocated FM buffer would have—that the government’s re-
strictions on the use of the spectrum had the effect of unnecessarily
keeping spectrum idle. The main difference between the two claims
would be that in one case the idle spectrum was unusable because un-
allocated, and in the other it was unusable because of the strictures on
the allocation.259 The essence of each claim would be the same: the
trum entirely (so that it is delivered via wire or not at all). See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo
Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON
REG. 53, 69 (1999) (arguing for “granting the licensee the ultimate choice of application of the
spectrum”); Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional “Broadcast” and
Wireless “Carriage”, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1079 (1997) (suggesting that “the fundamental
rule should be to de-zone spectrum usage where possible”). After all, if fewer people want to
pay for a twenty-four hour channel focusing on the lives of law professors than want to pay for a
twenty-four hour channel focusing on the lives of celebrities, then perhaps the latter should pre-
vail; and the same might be true for our twenty-four hour law school channel versus cellular te-
lephony. The twenty-four hour law school channel could still try to transmit via wire. And if it
could not succeed there, maybe that should tell its backers something about the desirability of
watching law professors in action. Having the government make allocation decisions might even
raise constitutional issues. If allocation is as difficult to defend as the above suggests, it might
not survive whatever level of scrutiny would be applied, on the theory that the government was
controlling modes of speech with little justification. But that argument is separate from concerns
arising from the wasting of spectrum.
258. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
There is one other possible difference that would be of tremendous importance both to
the potential users and to the current licensees, but which is tangential to the arguments put
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forward in this Article: new uses of allocated spectrum raises the question of the breadth of the
existing licenses. This is purely a question of how the rights in the license are constructed and
construed. If a license to broadcast television were construed as giving the licensee complete
control over a given range of frequencies, then any potential user would have to obtain the ex-
isting licensee’s agreement before it could offer a new service—just as someone who wanted to
offer a new service on a portion of a parcel of land would have to gain the approval of the par-
cel’s owner. If, on the other hand, a license to broadcast were construed as conferring only the
right to broadcast on that range of frequencies without interference, and as not including a
broader property right in that range of frequencies, then a potential new user would not have to
gain the agreement of the licensee. Just as someone who held only the mining rights to land
would have no claim if the owner of the surface allowed a new use that did not interfere with
the mining, the holder of the broadcasting rights would have no claim against a new user; the
licensee could not claim interference with her rights to that range of frequencies, because she
would have no rights other than the right to broadcast.
This question of the extent of a licensee’s rights is for the most part separate from the is-
sues discussed in this Article. The construction of the breadth of the license determines how the
surplus created by the new service will be divided—specifically, whether the existing licensees
get a piece of the action. It does not of its own force determine whether the service will be al-
lowed in the first place, and there is good reason to expect that most promising new uses will
make it on to the spectrum under either regime. Someone with a promising new use of land
usually finds willing sellers, and economic rationality should apply with equal force to land and
spectrum holders. If the spectrum holders tried to form a cartel in order to keep the new use off
the spectrum (or simply to raise their prices collectively), or if all the spectrum in a market were
held by one entity, then existing competition laws would kick in, as they would in the real prop-
erty context. See infra note 281 and accompanying text. It bears noting, though, that there is an
empirical dispute among commentators as to whether private property rights will produce a
suboptimal number of new services like spread spectrum, because it would produce too few op-
portunities to use a broad swath of frequencies. Yochai Benkler contends that broad property
rights will result in inefficient sharing of spectrum, on the theory that such uses would cover a
sufficiently large number of licenses that there would be high transaction costs and collective
action problems. Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 362 (1998) (arguing that “[t]here
are collective action problems associated with collecting enough spectrum to sustain a robust
unlicensed operations market” and that “the transaction costs involved in assembling and sub-
letting the required spectrum are likely to be high”). Thomas Hazlett, by contrast, argues that
these problems can easily be overcome, and that failing to recognize broad property rights cre-
ates its own inefficiencies. Hazlett, supra note 27, at 496 (describing Benkler’s assertion “that
free markets will not produce efficient sharing” as “uncompelling”); see also HUBER, supra note
20, at 75 (“Markets find ways of reassembling private pieces into public spaces when that is the
most profitable thing to do. They may take more time than an omniscient central authority, but
finding [such] authority takes even longer.”). An additional consideration is that information
asymmetries between spectrum owners and the government may counsel in favor of broad own-
ership rights. For example, if an incumbent performs its own research and finds that a proposed
use of the spectrum allocated to the incumbent would interfere with its signal, but that the in-
cumbent could avoid such interference by making an inexpensive modification in its own serv-
ice, it would have no incentive to reveal that information to the government (or anyone else) if
it did not share in the returns that the proposed service offered. See Hazlett, supra note 27, at
390 (“[I]ncumbents maximize profit by withholding information, advancing narrow arguments
against entry.”). This might be quite relevant in the spectrum context, because as I noted in Part
I there are a number of situations where a given wireless service will cause of bit of interference,
BENJAMIN 10/28/02 2:07 PM
2002] THE LOGIC OF SCARCITY 87
government is preventing my noninterfering use through its limits on
the use of spectrum, and thereby is wasting spectrum. This highlights
the significance of restrictions on licensees’ use of the spectrum. More
governmental restrictions on licensees’ use of their frequencies
translate into a greater likelihood that frequencies will be wasted.
Does this mean that it is unconstitutional for the government to
single out a particular service for a given slice of spectrum, and to
prohibit the user from providing a different service instead? No. The
concern here involves the government failing to allow all the utiliza-
tion of the spectrum that it could allow. The argument does not ex-
tend to situations in which the utilization allowed is not the highest
and best use. This flows from the gravamen of the First Amendment
claim on which I am focusing. If government restrictions on the use of
spectrum result in a situation where more services could fit on a set of
frequencies (without causing additional interference) than currently
occupy it, a potential user of those frequencies can fairly claim that
the government has needlessly kept some capacity off the market—
akin to prohibiting the use of some printing presses. If the
government approves a single use of a given slice of spectrum that is
not very popular but that fills the spectrum so completely that no
additional service could be added without creating nontrivial
interference, a potential new service provider could not add
nondisruptive voices to the spectrum and thus cannot say that some
of the spectrum is idle. So the FCC could, consistent with the
principle of nonwasting laid out in this Article, offer a license on
but that interference can be avoided through remediation. Allowing spectrum holders to buy
broader property rights would give them an incentive to identify such situations.
As a policy matter, the best idea might be to experiment with different approaches, so
that in some spectrum private ownership rights cover all potential uses and in others they do
not. See Coase, supra note 137, at 33 (proposing, with respect to wireless services, that “what
would be sold, is the right to use a piece of equipment to transmit signals in a particular way”);
Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 58, at 14 (suggesting as good public policy a regime in which
“spectrum would be owned but subject to an easement that any and all users that did not
meaningfully interfere with the owner’s right to the spectrum could not be excluded from using
the spectrum”); Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomor-
row’s Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765, 778–
80 (1998) (proposing an open spectrum access regime under which people would pay for the use
of spectrum for a particular purpose via instantaneous auctions). In any event, even if transac-
tion costs and collective action problems were so great that they hindered an otherwise promis-
ing new service from using the spectrum, it is far from clear that such private actions would be
sufficiently attributable to the government to give rise to the sort of wasting claim that is the
focus of this Article.
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condition that the licensee, for example, broadcast with enough
power to reach a one-hundred-mile radius, even if the licensee would
prefer that it broadcast only with enough power to reach a 10-mile
radius and then use the remaining spectrum for another purpose en-
tirely. And if that one-hundred-mile broadcasting occupied all of the
spectrum such that any additional use would create significant inter-
ference, then the licensee would have no basis for seeking to add a
new use on its frequencies.
There is, though, a bit more to the story. If the government des-
ignated a portion of spectrum for a service so unprofitable that no po-
tential licensee came forward and the spectrum simply sat unused,
then a potential provider of a different service would have a claim
that the government was wasting the spectrum. This is not a fanciful
proposition. As I noted in Part I, some portions of the spectrum have
never found takers; the spectrum at issue could, as a technological
matter, be put to many profitable uses, but the government allowed
only a use that turned out to be sufficiently unpopular (relative to its
cost) that no one wanted to provide the relevant service.260 In such
situations, a potential provider of a different service would have a
strong argument that the spectrum was being wasted.261
So, then, does the discussion in this Article mean that refusing to
allow supplemental services on spectrum is unconstitutional? Not
quite; it is necessary but not sufficient for a claim of underutilization.
260. See supra notes 57–65 and accompanying text.
261. One might imagine that a provider of the authorized service might apply for a license
and use the relevant spectrum, just to prevent those frequencies from being opened up to an-
other use. But few competitors will indefinitely provide an unprofitable service simply to block
a competitor, particularly where there is sufficient supply that the competitor can likely under-
take its business with other spectrum (or with wire); and as soon as the licensee ceased to pro-
vide the service, the offeror of the new service could reinvigorate its claim to the newly fallow
frequencies.
This highlights one of the mistakes in the proceeding that produced digital television. The
Commission spent so long (about ten years) creating the service rules for the digital television
spectrum, and imposed such slight requirements on licensees once it did create the rules, that
that portion of the spectrum may end up being effectively occupied for twenty or more years by
a service that will never be profitable. See, e.g., Jenna Greene, Digital TV a Remote Possibility,
LEGAL TIMES, July 30, 2001, at 1 (noting that most commercial stations are not transmitting
digital signals and that many observers believe that digital broadcasting will not be profitable in
the foreseeable future); Christopher Stern, Mixed Signals: Broadcasters’ Promise of a Digital TV
Age Has Not Been Met, and Now Congress Is Having Second Thoughts About Its Role, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at H1 (noting the low demand for digital broadcast television). For a dis-
cussion of why the National Association of Broadcasters pushed the FCC to designate spectrum
for high definition television (which became digital television), even when it had reason to
doubt the viability of the service, see Hazlett & Spitzer, supra note 69, at 124–29.
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A potential new user of a given set of frequencies would have to show
that its service would create very little interference with other licen-
sees or with the existing service. I have already discussed the re-
quirement that the new use not create additional nontrivial interfer-
ence with other licensees. That danger is the same whether the
frequencies are unused or underused. Either way, there is a danger
that a new use, on unallocated frequencies or frequencies allocated
for another purpose, could interfere with an existing use of another
licensee. But because underused frequencies are, by definition, fre-
quencies that are currently being utilized (or, more accurately, un-
derutilized) for one or more services, there is an additional potential
cost in the form of interference with, or degradation of, an existing
use of the particular license involved.
At first blush, this concern might seem implausible. Why might
an existing licensee allow anything to interfere with its main service?
The answer goes back to the fact that some uses are much more
highly valued than others. If a licensee provides a relatively unpopu-
lar service for which it makes a small profit, and a potential provider
of a different, more popular service offers the licensee a huge amount
of money for each kilohertz it can transfer to the new service, the
economically rational response is to transfer as much spectrum as
possible. If continued holding of the license requires that the licensee
provide its original service, then the licensee will not abandon its
original service but still will have an incentive for it to occupy as little
space as possible, with the maximum amount of interference that the
FCC will permit. Again, this is not fanciful. As I noted in Part I.B, the
government set aside a big swath of spectrum for instructional fixed
television service.262 That service is not very tempting for most
schools, but the FCC allowed schools to lease extra spectral capacity
to MMDS providers. Those providers came calling with plans to offer
wireless broadband services, and they offered hundreds of millions of
dollars for spectrum that had little value for school broadcasting.263
The catch is that schools have a right to this spectrum only if they
broadcast at least twenty hours per week of educational program-
ming.264 Once that standard is met, they can license up to 95 percent of
262. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
263. See Wigfield, supra note 63, at B1 (discussing private companies’ efforts to purchase
spectrum rights from schools with ITFS licenses).
264. 47 C.F.R. § 74.931(c)–(d) (2001).
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their spectrum for other uses.265 Thus schools cannot abandon their
broadcasting service, but they have an incentive to let the truly profit-
able services take center stage—and if their broadcasting suffers, so
be it. And just as the government has an important or substantial in-
terest in preventing a new use from significantly interfering with
services on other frequencies, it has such an interest vis-à-vis interfer-
ence with the existing service on that set of frequencies.266
The only difference between unused and underused spectrum is
that the former is allocated to no one, and the latter already has an
occupant. This distinction is in many ways an artifice: FM buffers
would be “underused spectrum” if the FCC allocated those buffers to
individual licensees but did not let them use it, rather than leaving it
unallocated (and unusable). But the discussion above highlights one
possible impact that this distinction might have: both unused and
underused spectrum entail nearby users of other spectrum assign-
ments who might be affected by the proposed use, but underused
spectrum also entails a current user who might have an incentive to
provide worse service (in order to leave more space for other uses).267
265. Id. § 74.931(d).
266. This may seem to raise an underlying question: Would the rationale put forward in this
Article allow the FCC to prohibit a licensee from allowing the prescribed service to degrade—
or, for that matter, simply abandoning the prescribed service—if the licensee has a more
profitable use waiting in the wings? Is it permissible for the FCC to condition continued holding
of a license on the provision of a service that is so marginal in the first place? This is merely a
new iteration of the question discussed above about preferring one use to another. It may be
bad policy for the FCC to require marginal uses, and it may violate the Constitution for a
variety of reasons, but it does not run afoul of the principle against wasting that is the focus of
this Article. The spectrum is still being occupied, just not by its highest and best use. If the
government decides that it is in the public’s interest to have the spectrum occupied by a
relatively unpopular service, the arguments marshaled in this Article present no obstacle. Note,
though, that if the service is so unprofitable that licensees abandon their spectrum, then wasting
concerns would arise. Indeed, that is no different from a situation where a single permitted use
is so unprofitable that no one offers it in the first place (as was the case, for instance, with many
UHF television allocations, see supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text).
267. To put the point somewhat differently, incumbents who are not affiliated with or re-
ceive funds from a new provider have no incentive to let their service be degraded by the new
service, and in fact have an obvious incentive to detect and report any interference that the new
service might create. Such interference harms their existing service (and creates more competi-
tion), so there is every reason to oppose it. (And, of course, that has been exactly the course of
dealing of current incumbents toward the prospect of new services, such as low power broad-
casting. See supra notes 38, 52–54, 66–71 and accompanying text.) For incumbents who let a new
service onto their spectrum and receive compensation for that permission, by contrast, the in-
centive to detect interference is diminished insofar as the new service is more remunerative than
the existing one. Note that this is just the flip side of the point made above about incumbents’
incentive to reveal ways that interference can be mediated if the incumbents have an economic
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Thus, this suggests the availability of an argument for the government
in the underused spectrum context that would not be available for
unused spectrum—that it wants to prevent alternate uses of the as-
signed spectrum, even if that results in underused spectrum, because
it wants to give licensees an incentive to provide the best possible
service in its primary use. Perhaps the government has an important
or substantial interest in limiting, say, broadcasters to providing digi-
tal television, even if spectrum is underused as a result, because the
government wants broadcasters to make their broadcasts as good as
they can be.
This argument would not justify a blanket prohibition on sup-
plemental services, because some of those other services would create
only trivial interference with the primary use no matter how capa-
cious (and high quality) the primary use was. An example here is
UWB, which involves transmissions at such low power levels that
their interference does not rise above the background noise that is
always present (due to background radiation in the universe and or-
dinary electrical devices unrelated to broadcast television).268 Because
these UWB services would not impact the licensees’ choice of how
much spectrum to devote to its primary use, it is difficult to see how
the government could justify excluding them on the grounds of pro-
viding the wrong incentives to licensees.
As for other services, nothing in the principle against wasting
prevents the FCC from establishing criteria for a licensee’s primary
service that result in the licensee using its entire spectrum for that
primary service.269 So, insofar as the FCC wants to effectively force li-
censees to focus on their primary service, it can do so through the
minima it applies to that service. Significantly, that is how the FCC
structures many of its assignments. The FCC does not require that li-
censees use all their spectrum for the primary service. Rather, the
FCC decides on the signal it wants licensees to send, based on its de-
termination of the level of service that it desires, which in turn reflects
judgments about how big an area should be covered, and perhaps
about the quality of transmission (e.g., television signals with a certain
number of lines per screen). The FCC’s interest in having licensees
occupy all their spectrum is not an end in itself—indeed, the goal
interest in the new services, and incumbents’ concomitant disincentive to reveal such informa-
tion if they will not participate in the surplus created by the new service. See supra note 259.
268. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
269. See supra pp. 87–88.
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should be to avoid having licensees occupy spectrum purely for the
sake of occupying it—but instead is presumably designed to bring bet-
ter service to users. It would be remarkable, and extremely troubling,
if the goal of service requirements were just to force licensees to use
more spectrum. The goal of service requirements that is legitimate
(and is the professed aim) is bringing better service to the people.
That goal can be met directly by service requirements, rather than the
indirect and inefficient proxy of requiring that a licensee use all its
spectrum for its primary service.
But, the FCC might respond, the difference between setting out a
standard that ends up occupying all the spectrum and telling licensees
to devote all their spectrum to their primary service is that the latter
gives the FCC more feedback as to when improvements in the pri-
mary service are possible, because it encourages companies to spend
money improving their service. Such reasoning is unpersuasive,
though, in light of the investment options available to a licensee (or
anyone else, for that matter). A licensee will spend only as much
money on a given service as is justified by the returns on that service.
Once it has invested that money in the relevant service, it will look for
other places to spend its money. Those other places might be services
adjoining the first one, or they might be a completely different enter-
prise. There is no reason to believe that cutting off one of their many
investment options—adding a supplemental service on their spec-
trum—will make them more likely to spend money that they other-
wise would not spend on their primary service. That might be true in
a world where there were only two investment options; prohibiting
one of those options might lead people to invest in the other, because
they had no choice in the matter. But that obviously is not the case
for licensees, who, like all possible investors, have myriad choices
available to them. Simply stated, cutting off spending on secondary
services seems unlikely to divert funds to the primary service.270
270. This is not mere speculation. The experience with spectrum devoted to a single use has
been that companies often invest in their service in such a way that they have unoccupied spec-
trum. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. The fact that more spectrum in their as-
signment is freely available for their use does not lead them to spend more; they have reached
the level of spending that they consider to be justified, so the readily available surfeit does not
induce them to spend more—even when they cannot do anything else with the spectrum. That is
why, after all, so many single-use spectrum assignments (like television broadcasting) have left
room for new services: even though only one service can be provided on that spectrum, broad-
casters transmit at a level that does not occupy all the spectrum.
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It also bears noting that allowing supplemental services would
seem to better serve a governmental goal of receiving feedback about
when the primary service can be improved. One of the most useful
forms of feedback that the government can receive about the avail-
ability of better service is a licensee’s assertion that it has room on its
spectrum for more services. A licensee has no incentive to so indicate
unless it can provide supplemental services on those frequencies.
Whenever a potential user informs the FCC that there are underused
frequencies available for another use, the FCC will know that the li-
censee could devote more of its spectrum to its existing use, and so
the FCC will be able to raise the requirements for the primary serv-
ice.271 Of course, if the FCC always responds by raising the require-
ments so that the primary service occupies the entire spectrum as-
signment, then licensees will not come forward to request new
spectrum in the first place. If so, the FCC will gain less feedback than
it otherwise would—but, significantly, no less feedback than it would
receive by disallowing supplemental uses in the first place.
That said, this discussion suggests one possible situation in which
the government might actually have an important or substantial in-
terest in keeping spectrum underutilized: if the government reasona-
bly feared that a new service on already assigned frequencies would
degrade an existing service, but that the government would not be
able to detect such degradation (or perhaps would have great diffi-
culty doing so), the provider of that existing service would not report
it, and users of that existing service would not report it, then the gov-
ernment might have an important or substantial interest in refusing to
allow the new service on the underused frequencies. In such circum-
stances, a refusal to allow the new service might seem to make some
sense, on the theory that undetected interference might never be
stopped. It would be a variant of the principle that interference would
constitute an important or substantial government interest: here, the
danger would be of unreported interference. This variant, though,
would seem to arise rarely, if ever. The problem is that the likelihood
of all these reasonable fears arising seems quite small. First, the gov-
ernment would have to reasonably fear interference but not be confi-
dent in its fear. If the government knew that the new service would
interfere, then it would have the interest in blocking the new service
271. As I noted above, eliminating the wasting of spectrum via raising service requirements
rather than allowing supplemental services does not run afoul of the principles laid out in this
Article. See supra pp. 85-88.
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discussed in Part V. Second, the government would have to believe
that it could not (or could only at very great cost) detect interfer-
ence.272 This assumption seems implausible, as the government has
enormous resources at hand to identify interference if the govern-
ment so desires. In fact, the government frequently engages in just
this sort of test.273 Third, there would have to be a reason to believe
that the provider of the existing service would prefer to let its primary
service be degraded than to report it, because its revenue from the
aspect of the new service that created the interference was greater
than the cost to its existing service imposed by that interference. This
is possible—and the greater the disparity between the price paid by
the new service and the value of the existing service, the more possi-
ble it would be. But the government would be aware of this incentive
as well, and so a high disparity would put the government on alert,
making it even easier for the government to detect interference (be-
cause it would know to focus on those few situations where the dis-
parity between the value of the existing service and of the new service
was great). Fourth, the government would have to reasonably fear
that users would fail to report the problem. This may be the most im-
plausible of all the assumptions. There is a well documented history
of users complaining to the FCC about all manner of interference
(many that have nothing to do with issues under the FCC’s control),
as there are always some users who are vigilant and are willing to
make noise.274 In sum, it seems sufficiently implausible that the FCC
would not find out about interference that it is hard to imagine a
situation in which the FCC reasonably feared a degradation in service
272. A slightly different possibility is that the government could detect interference but
would be unable to do so as a political matter, either because the FCC chose not to focus on it
or because Congress denied funding for such detection. The argument that this gives rise to an
important or substantial government interest suffers from the same flaw, though, as the en-
trenchment concern discussed in Part V.A: the government would be creating its own interest.
The important or substantial interest would flow from the government’s unwillingness to use
readily available tools. As I discussed above, see supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text,
such an argument fails.
273. See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text. Indeed, in the low power radio context
the government set up a straightforward system in which it would respond to complaints of in-
terference by monitoring low power signals to see the extent to which they in fact interfered.
Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 19208, ¶¶ 58–68 (2000).
274. See, e.g., Meyers, 15 F.C.C.R. 8045, ¶ 3 (2000) (noting “numerous complaints alleging
intentional interference to users on the Memorial Emergency Repeater Association’s
145.470/144.870 MHz amateur radio repeater in Houston”); W. Cities Broad., Inc., 11 F.C.C.R.
16,740, ¶ 25 (1996) (describing complaints by two-way radio users regarding alleged interference
from a nearby FM station).
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of which it would not be aware.275 It is difficult to posit a realistic set
of facts in which the FCC would not be able to invoke the straight-
forward problem of detectable interference, yet would have sufficient
reason to fear that interference would go unnoticed. But if such cir-
cumstances arose, then this form of interference, too, would seem to
qualify as an important or substantial government interest.
What about those for whom investment options are not the
problem, but the absence of capital is? If that is the government’s
concern, it cannot justify limiting these licensees to their primary
service, and instead should take the opposite route. For licensees who
are short of funds, the only sensible position would be to allow sup-
plemental services. Those supplemental services can be an extra
source of income, and thus can help to fund improvements in the
primary service that the licensee provides. If the primary service is
not supplying enough cash for the licensee to provide a high quality
service, then limiting it to that service does nothing to improve quality
or coverage. The only possible quality or coverage improvement
would come with an infusion of capital, and the obvious source of that
capital is supplemental use of the spectrum. And if the licensee is not
inclined to spend those additional funds on the primary service, then
the government is no worse off; it would simply be that the licensee
already was spending exactly as much as it saw fit on its primary
service, and would choose to invest any additional funds elsewhere, so
the licensee would not of its own accord spend more on its primary
service. In fact, even in this situation the government would be better
off by allowing those supplemental services. Now that the previously
cash-poor licensee had more funds, the government could impose
greater service requirements on the licensee. If the licensee were re-
stricted to its primary service, it would have no ability to meet those
275. This fear of interference would not necessarily be limited to underused spectrum. It
could conceivably apply to any situation in which an incumbent (whether the user of the actual
slice that the new service would use or a nearby slice) was, in effect, paid off by the new pro-
vider to keep quiet about interference that the new service created. So, again, if there was a
great disparity between the value of the new service and that of the existing service, the incum-
bent on the nearby spectrum who received a significant payment from the new service might
have an incentive not to report interference, if the payment from the aspect of the new service
that created the interference was greater than the incumbent’s loss due to the interference with
its existing service. But note that this involves all the assumptions laid out in the text plus one
more: that the parties would successfully keep this payment hidden from the FCC, so that it
would not be alerted to just this danger of interference that there was no incentive to detect.
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requirements. The extra money from the supplemental services would
allow it to do so.276
The upshot is that underused spectrum, like unused spectrum,
can be the basis of a First Amendment claim. The government might
reasonably claim that it has an important or substantial interest in
preventing interference not only with other licensees but also with the
services provided by the licensee on whose spectrum the additional
service will appear. If a licensee proposes a use that would trivially in-
terfere with existing uses (either those of other licensees or of the ap-
plying licensee), however, then the First Amendment obligates the
government to allow that use.
2. Giving More Than Enough Spectrum to Private Licensees.
The discussion so far has focused on wasting of the spectrum arising
from government restrictions on it. Would the same concerns arise in
a situation where the government gave more bandwidth to a private
party than it would need for its intended use? That is, would a poten-
tial provider of a new service have a First Amendment claim based on
wasting against the private party? First, as an empirical matter one
would not expect to see such wasting absent government restrictions
on spectrum. If the government does not restrict the licensee’s use of
the spectrum, then the allotment of so much spectrum should not
produce any wasting of the spectrum. Imagine, by way of extreme ex-
ample, that the FCC chose to assign all the spectrum on the FM radio
dial in ten huge chunks of about 2 megahertz each to ten separate li-
censees. Whether or not a given licensee was a radio broadcaster, it
would be in its interest to sell or use all the rights that it was given.
The property here is like any other property. Just as, say, a landowner
who owns a huge parcel of newly valuable land likely will not let it lie
276. Indeed, a major argument in favor of supplemental services has been that they provide
licensees low on funds with the additional money necessary to improve their main service.
When the FCC has been concerned that providers of certain services had the desire but not the
funds to provide first-rate service, it has allowed them to supplement their income from opera-
tions from new services. An example is the ITFS allocation mentioned above. See supra notes
61–65 and 262–66 and accompanying text. One of the reasons that the FCC approved MMDS as
a secondary use was as an infusion of cash to schools, so that they could provide better broad-
casting in the first place. See OFFICE OF ENG’G AND TECH. ET AL., FED. COMMUNICATIONS
COMM’N, SPECTRUM STUDY OF THE 2500–2690 MHZ BAND: THE POTENTIAL FOR
ACCOMMODATING THIRD GENERATION MOBILE SYSTEMS 19, at http://www.fcc.gov/3G/3G_
interim_report.pdf (Nov. 15, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“ITFS licensees are
permitted to lease excess channel capacity to MDS licensees, with the income from those leases
typically helping to underwrite the cost of providing the ITFS service.”).
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fallow, an owner of valuable spectrum likely will make sure to sell
spectrum rights to the highest bidder. It may be that the owner would
reserve some frequencies to itself—treating itself as the highest bid-
der—in the hope that holding on to some frequencies would prove
more profitable in the long run than would an immediate sale. But
the owner would almost certainly use the spectrum, just as the land-
owner with the valuable land would. Indeed, it is more clear that the
spectrum owner would do so. With land, there is some value to
keeping it free of any uses—the value of being able to look at pristine
land, the benefits to the environment of having undeveloped land
rather than concrete, etc. Unused spectrum, though, has no value; you
can’t look at it, can’t smell it, can’t taste it, can’t enjoy it in any way.
Moreover, insofar as the spectrum is scarce,277 the owner of that spec-
trum is all the more likely not to waste this valuable resource. This is
not to say that private ownership of all this spectrum will have dis-
tributional effects that make us happy. Giving control of the spectrum
to a few entities may lead to pabulum on the airwaves.278 My point
here is simply that the spectrum likely would not be wasted.
There have been accusations of spectrum warehousing—that is, a
private party failing to open up its spectrum to other uses even as it
uses the spectrum inefficiently or fails to use it at all. Probably the
clearest case of warehousing arose in the high definition television
(HDTV) context: in the mid-1980s, broadcasters were worried about
an FCC proposal to allocate unused UHF spectrum to land radio
uses. The broadcasters therefore pushed for an HDTV proposal as a
way of keeping this spectrum allocated for television, even though
277. Or, more modestly, insofar as allowing particular uses of spectrum creates value for a
given set of users.
278. In some circumstances monopoly can produce greater diversity in types of program-
ming than multiple ownership would. For demonstrations of this as an economic model, see Pe-
ter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio
Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 206 (1952) (presenting a model that shows how “a series of
competing firms, each striving to maximize its number of listeners, will fail to achieve either the
industry or the social good”); Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices in
Television Markets, 91 Q.J. ECON. 15, 35–36 (1977) (presenting a more generalized model to
illustrate the circumstances under which monopoly will produce greater diversity in program-
ming); and as an empirical reality, see Lisa George, What’s Fit to Print: The Effect of Owner-
ship Concentration on Product Variety in Daily Newspaper Markets, Paper Presented to the
2001 Telecommunication Policy Research Conference, at http://www.arxiv.org/ftp/cs/papers/
0108/0108014.pdf (Aug. 1, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the increase in
total content variety that results from increased ownership concentration in markets for daily
newspapers).
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they had no intention of using that spectrum for years to come.279 But
warehousing is not surprising in situations (like that involving the
UHF spectrum set aside for HDTV) where the licensees cannot put
the spectrum to any other use, and where limits on spectrum flexibil-
ity mean that allocating the spectrum to another use (here, land mo-
bile radio) would preclude a future use of that spectrum for broad-
casting.280 In such situations, there would be no opportunity cost of
keeping the spectrum idle (because the broadcasters would receive no
compensation if the spectrum were put to a different use), and there
would be a significant cost of allowing it to be reallocated (because
then the broadcasters might lose any chance to broadcast over the
spectrum in the future). If there were no governmental limits on spec-
trum, so that spectrum could be freely sold and used for other pur-
poses, then these incentives for warehousing would disappear, and
there would be little reason to expect it.
That said, if the government allowed one licensee to obtain the
rights to so much spectrum that the licensee effectively controlled a
relevant market (imagine that the government gave to one company,
or stood idly by while one company agglomerated, all the spectrum
suitable for satellite transmissions), the company with this monopoly
might have an incentive to maximize its revenues by holding some
spectrum off the market. And if the government were so unwise as to
allow the entire spectrum to be in the hands of a single owner, the
monopolist would then simply be in the position currently occupied
by the government, with the same incentives regarding maximization
of revenue.281 If a private party (or perhaps a few parties) wound up
controlling a market for spectrum in this way, then any resulting non-
allocation of that spectrum might well be attributable to government
279. See JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: THE BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF
TELEVISION 3–27 (1997) (chronicling the interplay between the development and promotion of
HDTV and broadcasters’ efforts to retain their spectrum); Kyle Pope & Mark Robichaux, Hype
Definition: Waiting for HDTV?, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 12, 1997, at A1 (“HDTV had little or noth-
ing to do with consumer demand; it was born out of a power grab by the broadcasting commu-
nity in the 1980s as a way to keep valuable broadcast spectrum from being parceled out to pag-
ing companies and other data communications concerns.”). The original plan for HDTV
morphed into the current allocation for digital television, which may or may not be high defini-
tion. See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 359-60 (“Overall, a system that once started out as
6 megahertz for HDTV (either digital or analog) has become 6 megahertz for a number of
services, one of which will be DTV [digital television]—but perhaps not ‘high definition’ televi-
sion at all.”). On digital television, see supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
280. On the entrenchment that can make the government unwilling to shift spectrum from
one use to another, see supra notes 226–31 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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action and thus subject to the sort of First Amendment scrutiny that
this Article discusses. Such a First Amendment challenge would likely
be unnecessary, however, as the accumulation of spectrum in this way
would probably run afoul of antitrust laws. And once there were
enough licensees to constitute suitable competition for antitrust pur-
poses, none would have the monopolist’s ability to keep some spec-
trum off the market in order to raise the price of the remaining spec-
trum to supracompetitive levels. As with any competitive market, no
rational firm would have reason to constrict supply, because no firm
would have reason to believe that it could capture the higher prices
that the limited supply would produce.
But what if the government allocated spectrum to many different
private parties and allowed them to engage in any noninterfering use
of the spectrum that they chose, and still one or more of those private
parties—without colluding or otherwise violating antitrust laws—
chose not to allocate all of it? That is, what if private parties decided
to waste spectrum on their own, even though they could easily choose
to utilize it? Couldn’t one argue that such private wasting of the spec-
trum raises exactly the sort of First Amendment problems that gov-
ernment wasting raises? The short answer is that one could so argue,
but one would have to rely on arguments beyond those put forward in
this Article. This Article discusses the implications of the current
regulatory regime applicable to spectrum, and in the current scheme
government actions constraining access to communications media
clearly implicate the First Amendment, but private actions con-
straining such access do not. Courts have refrained from finding that
the First Amendment imposes any limit on restrictions imposed by
private actors.282 Nothing in this Article is inconsistent with that un-
282. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986) (hold-
ing that a state utility commission could not constitutionally compel a private utility company to
include in its billing envelopes materials produced by an adverse group); FCC v. WNCN Listen-
ers Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 604 (1981) (rejecting listeners’ challenge to the FCC’s decision not to
review radio stations’ changes in entertainment programming, and instead to rely on market
forces to serve the public interest in diverse entertainment programming); Miami Herald Publ’g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a state statute guaranteeing
political candidates media access to respond to criticism). Interestingly, the main judicial sup-
port for this broader conception of the First Amendment appears in Red Lion, where the Court
invoked “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences.” Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). This lan-
guage suggested that the government had an obligation to ensure such access, and arguably in-
timated that the Court might find that individuals had First Amendment rights against both the
government and private parties. These possibilities never bore fruit however, as the Court has
never held that the First Amendment imposed any affirmative obligations on the government,
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derstanding of the First Amendment. The arguments in this Article
are separate from the argument that wasting applies to private as well
as government actors.
3. Adding Voices Versus Displacing Them. It is important to dis-
tinguish the concern about underutilization from measures that are
designed to enhance some people’s access to the airwaves and/or to
enhance the diversity of voices on the airwaves. Congress and the
FCC have created a number of such regulations over the years. Some
laws give preferential access to speakers with certain kinds of mes-
sages. Right-of-reply regulations (like those at issue in Red Lion)
guarantee access to people who have been personally attacked or
whose political causes have been editorialized against.283 Similarly, a
federal statute provides that if a broadcaster permits a legally quali-
fied candidate for public office to use a broadcast station, it must af-
ford equal opportunities to all legally qualified opponents for the
same office.284 Other laws seek to boost the chances of spectrum li-
censes being owned by people with particular characteristics, with the
stated hope that greater diversity in ownership will lead to greater di-
versity in programming.285 The main groups targeted for benefits un-
der these programs have been racial minorities and, to a lesser extent,
much less that the First Amendment applies to private action. The main case quoting this lan-
guage is WNCN Listeners Guild, and in that case Justice White (the author of Red Lion) re-
jected the argument that this language entitled listeners to make a First Amendment claim
against private programming decisions that limited their listening choices. See 450 U.S. at 604
(stating that, in Red Lion, “we did not imply that the First Amendment grants individual listen-
ers the right to have the Commission review the abandonment of their favorite entertainment
programs”).
283. These personal attack and political editorial rules have had a long and tortuous history.
See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 187–89 (describing this history in detail). In 1980, the
National Association of Broadcasters filed a petition requesting their repeal. In 1996, after re-
peated unsuccessful attempts to prod the FCC to take some sort of action, the Radio-Television
News Directors Association filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for a
writ of mandamus to order the FCC to act on the petition. In 2000, after several judicial opin-
ions requesting FCC action, the FCC still had not resolved the matter. In that year, the D.C.
Circuit, frustrated by the FCC’s failure to respond to its earlier orders regarding the FCC’s de-
fense of those rules, ordered their repeal on these grounds. The court did not reach their consti-
tutionality and it stated that the FCC could still institute a new rulemaking proceeding. Radio-
Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
284. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
285. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (“The policies in question are
(1) a program awarding an enhancement for minority ownership in comparative proceedings for
new licenses, and (2) the minority ‘distress sale’ program, which permits a limited category of
existing radio and television broadcast stations to be transferred only to minority-controlled
firms.”), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226–227 (1995).
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women.286 Recent cases have cast doubt on the constitutionality of
these programs,287 but they have not been eliminated.288 Interestingly,
the most recent statute on spectrum distribution gives favored status
to racial minorities and women, but it also adds small businesses and
rural telephone companies to the list.289 Yet other access laws are not
triggered by any particular message and do not attempt to enhance
the ownership of particular groups, but do give preferential access to
programmers who, it is feared, might otherwise be frozen out by the
owners of transmission capacity. Until fairly recently, a number of
such laws applied to broadcasting. The prime time access rule, for ex-
ample, prevented the major television broadcast networks (at the
time, ABC, CBS, and NBC) from supplying their affiliates in the fifty
largest television markets with more than three hours of program-
ming for use during the four-hour “prime time” time block.290 The
286. See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 101–02 (“The FCC decided that women should
benefit from some of [the advantages enjoyed by racial minorities] as well, and so, in 1978, fe-
male ownership was deemed a ‘plus’ in the comparative hearing process, albeit a smaller plus
than minority ownership would be.”).
287. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (establishing strict scrutiny as the standard for reviewing
federal racial classifications); Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (invalidating, under strict scrutiny, an FCC equal employment opportunity program de-
signed for the benefit of minorities and women); Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 398 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (applying Metro Broadcasting’s intermediate scrutiny and finding an equal protection
violation where the FCC awarded extra credit, based on gender, to a woman seeking permission
to build a radio station).
288. The minority “distress sale” program, which permits only minority-controlled firms to
buy some broadcast stations, remains in place today. See, e.g., Idaho Broad. Consortium, 16
F.C.C.R. 1721, 1721 n.4 (2001) (describing a policy “permit[ting] a licensee whose basic qualifi-
cations have been challenged by the Commission, and whose license is therefore in danger of
being revoked or not renewed, to assign the license to a minority-controlled entity prior to the
commencement of a hearing,” subject to certain conditions); Commission Policy Regarding the
Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 855 (1982) (“We will
henceforth consider . . . authorizing distress sales in transfers to limited partnerships where the
general partner, or partners, owns more than 20 percent of the broadcasting entity and is a
member, or members, of a minority group.”); Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of
Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 983 (1978) (announcing the FCC’s intention to “permit
licensees whose licenses have been designated for revocation hearing . . . but before the hearing
is initiated, to transfer or assign their licenses at a ‘distress sale’ price to applicants with a signifi-
cant minority ownership interest, assuming the proposed assignee or transferee meets [their]
other qualifications”).
289. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D) (1994) (providing that the FCC shall “ensure that small
businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by members of minority groups
and women are given the opportunity to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services,
and, for such purposes, consider the use of tax certificates, bidding preferences, and other pro-
cedures”).
290. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1981), repealed by Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, Sec-
tion 73.658(k) of the Commission’s Rules, 11 F.C.C.R. 546, ¶¶ 3–4 (1995).
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goal of this rule was to ensure that programmers who were not affili-
ated with the networks would have access to one hour of prime time
every night.291 Similarly, FCC regulations placed limits on networks
producing their own programming, in an attempt to ensure that, of
the programming provided by the network, some would be produced
by unaffiliated programmers.292 Interestingly, the FCC has abandoned
most structural regulations of the broadcast industry (including the
two just mentioned293), and most of the currently existing access
regulations of this sort are aimed not at spectrum but instead at
wire—specifically, cable television.294 Prominent among these are the
must-carry rules at issue in Turner,295 leased access rules, which re-
quire that cable operators make some of their channels available to
unaffiliated programmers,296 and channel occupancy limits, which (as
the name suggests) limit the number of cable channels a given opera-
tor can own.297
These measures are usually justified as putting additional voices
on the airwaves. So why don’t the First Amendment arguments ar-
ticulated in this Article support such actions? There are two reasons
why not, either of which is independently sufficient. First, the meas-
ures restrict the actions of private parties. As I noted above, measures
aimed at private parties’ wasting of the spectrum rely on arguments
291. See Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations With Respect
to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, ¶ 26
(1970) (“A principal purpose of our prime time access rule is to make available an hour of top-
rated evening time for competition among present and potential nonnetwork program sources
seeking the custom and favor of broadcasters and advertisers so that the public interest in di-
verse broadcast service may be served.").
292. See Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282, ¶ 3
(1993) (“The FCC originally adopted the financial interest and syndication rules in 1970 to limit
network control over television programming and thereby encourage the development of a di-
versity of programs through diverse and antagonistic sources of program services.”).
293. See Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, Section 73.658(k) of the Commission’s
Rules, 11 F.C.C.R. 546, ¶¶ 1–4 (1995) (repealing the prime time access rule); Evaluation of the
Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282, ¶ 1 (1993) (repealing limits on net-
works producing their own programming).
294. See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 413–539 (discussing the regulation of cable
rates and local franchise authority; the relationships between the rights and obligations of cable
operators, broadcasters and content producers; and various structural rules limiting concentra-
tion in the cable marketplace).
295. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 630–32 (explaining the must-carry rules, which require cable
television operators to transmit the signals of local television stations).
296. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1994).
297. Id. § 533(f)(1)(B) (1994).
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beyond those in this Article.298 Second, access laws are almost always
displacing some voices with other voices and thus do not increase the
net number of voices. The preferred speakers are not replacing dead
air: they are replacing other speakers. This is true for rights of reply
and other rights against individual broadcasters; the station just has
that much less time for its own content. It is true for laws aimed at in-
creasing certain kinds of owners: with a fixed number of licenses, the
ownership battle is a zero-sum game, and each addition of a favored
owner necessarily entails the subtraction of a disfavored owner. And
it is true for laws that prevent owners from showing the programs that
they want (e.g., the prime time access rule, leased access, etc.), as
some programs or stations are replaced by others.299 The First
Amendment imperative to make spectrum available thus does not
provide support for access rules.
This does not mean, though, that access and diversity regulations
are irrelevant to the principle against the wasting of spectrum. The
goals embodied in those regulations highlight the illegitimacy of the
government failing to allow more services on the spectrum. Diversity
and access regulations do not add to the total number of voices on the
spectrum, but reducing unused and underused spectrum does. As
with scarcity, not only do diversity and competition fail to support
government nonlicensing of unused or underused spectrum, but in
fact they undercut such a failure to license. The government’s inter-
ests are at cross-purposes with its actions.
298. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
299. It is worth noting that, in the cable context, these limits could conceivably encourage
cable operators to add channels to their services (so that they can include the stations that are
bumped in favor of the governmentally preferred programming). Unfortunately, it is just as
plausible that the limits would discourage them from adding capacity (if the operators feared
that the government will simply claim some of the added capacity). The possible supply-
enhancing effects of access rules would not apply in the ordinary broadcast context, however, as
broadcasters cannot add capacity (they have only one channel, and there are only twenty-four
hours in each day). Interestingly, access rules for digital broadcasting (if there were such rules)
could conceivably lead to an increase in the supply of digital broadcast channels, because there
the broadcasters can add additional channels (though at a cost of reduced quality of the trans-
mission of each channel). But the degree to which access rules would actually lead to increased
capacity is highly speculative and somewhat attenuated. The clear and immediate effect of the
access rules is to supplant existing speakers with other speakers.
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VII.  ALLOCATION OF UNUSED OR UNDERUTILIZED SPECTRUM
AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATION
The Article thus far has focused on the ways in which govern-
ment might violate the First Amendment by making decisions that
leave spectrum idle. In most cases, the government will not have a
sufficient justification for keeping spectrum unused or underused be-
yond interference, and so government decisions that have this effect
will run afoul of the First Amendment unless they are justified by in-
terference. The lack of a sufficient interest in keeping spectrum off
the market is the angle that challengers to a governmental refusal to
allocate would utilize.
But might the availability of unused spectrum also be relevant to
the constitutional analysis of regulations that do not themselves limit
access to spectrum? It will certainly be relevant to the policy analysis.
Insofar as spectrum is available but not used, an existing licensee can
point to that spectrum as an alternative to government regulation of
its behavior. The licensee could argue that the government’s plan is
not necessary, because there are other ways of achieving the same
goal. One way of illustrating this point is to return to the regulations
discussed immediately above—measures aimed at increasing access to
the airwaves. The motivating concern behind such regulations, and
the justification for them, is that too little spectrum is available to
make our representatives comfortable with leaving licensees unregu-
lated. So the government imposes obligations on licensees that are in-
tended to substitute for, and mimic, a market with a greater supply of
licenses. If we can actually create a greater supply of licenses, though,
then the government can dispense with the substitute.300
This language is fairly similar to the focus in constitutional law
on the availability of less restrictive alternatives, and thus suggests a
constitutional angle.301 The idea is that filling unused spectrum will in
300. This is related to the centrality of scarcity as a justification for many kinds of regula-
tion. If scarcity creates sufficient problems of supply that it justifies a variety of regulations that
seek to counteract those problems, then policies that mitigate that scarcity will help to mitigate
the problems, perhaps more than regulation of existing licensees would. If so, then it would be
hard to justify such regulation in light of the alternative of opening up more spectrum.
301. This can also be understood as raising the question whether the regulation is necessary
to achieve the state’s interest. The Court has sometimes articulated this as an element of height-
ened scrutiny, see, e.g., Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (“In or-
der to justify [differential taxation of magazines based on content], the State must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.”), but it may be that the Court is simply using necessity to encompass the principles that
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some cases be a less restrictive alternative to existing regulation of
spectrum licensees. It is less restrictive as a constitutional matter be-
cause no one is displaced or constrained when the government frees
up more spectrum, so no one’s First Amendment rights are limited.
The possibility of allowing more uses on the spectrum might be in-
voked as an available alternative by licensees who are subject to
regulations designed to mitigate problems created by the paucity of
voices on the spectrum.
For most regulations, however, the possibility of opening up the
spectrum will have little effect on the constitutional analysis. This will
be true for the many regulations that would be subject to scrutiny un-
der the more lenient review of Red Lion: in applying that scrutiny,
courts have generally not looked at the availability of less restrictive
alternatives. The existence of a less restrictive alternative is fatal in
the context of strict scrutiny, and relevant, but not dispositive, in in-
termediate scrutiny;302 but it plays little if any role in the lenient scru-
tiny that Red Lion has been construed as creating.303
A reader might wonder whether the analysis in this Article sug-
gests that more rigorous review should be applied to laws designed to
enhance the diversity of and access to programming carried on the
spectrum. But nothing in the principle against wasting means that di-
versity and access regulations must be subject to more rigorous scru-
tiny. Unlike measures that keep spectrum unused, diversity and ac-
cess regulations are premised on scarcity. As I noted above, these
regulations respond to the concern that there is not enough spectrum
to give voice to a wide variety of speakers.304 The regulations are thus
akin to the government choosing among potential users of the spec-
trum.305 By the same token, diversity and access regulations stand in
sharp contrast to government actions that produce idle spectrum,
which are undercut by concerns about scarcity and accordingly merit
heightened scrutiny. Diversity and access regulations are not inconsis-
tent with scarcity, and so the arguments in this Article would not indi-
cate that they should be subject to heightened scrutiny. As a result,
the availability of adding voices to the spectrum as a less restrictive
regulation must “restrict no more speech than necessary and . . . burden speech no more heavily
than necessary.” Edwards & Berman, supra note 220, at 1533 (suggesting this possibility).
302. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 183–90, 202 and accompanying text on the different ways that Red Lion
can be understood.
304. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
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alternative would be largely irrelevant to the constitutional analysis of
many, and probably most, spectrum regulations.
Communication via wire (like cable and the Internet) has not
been treated as scarce. Thus its regulation has not been subject to le-
nient scrutiny, but instead has been subject to intermediate or strict
scrutiny, depending on whether or not the regulation was content-
based.306 So regulation of these forms of communication might seem
to be good candidates for laws whose constitutionality would be af-
fected by the availability of the less restrictive alternative of opening
up more spectrum. The problem here is that extra voices on the spec-
trum would not seem to constitute an alternative to, say, measures
designed to add new voices on cable programming. The relevance of
the alternative would seem to depend on a court finding that spec-
trum could substitute for wire.307 The matter is not entirely free from
doubt, as the Supreme Court has treated the category of available al-
ternatives as quite broad.308 But it would seem that the possibility of
opening up more spectrum could not truly be an available alternative
if spectrum is not a substitute for wire. Of course, there is reason to
conclude that spectrum is a good substitute for wire; but if a court so
found, then it would probably also conclude that spectrum is not
scarce (precisely because wire is a substitute), and so the scarcity-
based lenient scrutiny of Red Lion would be inapplicable and the re-
gime of spectrum regulation would be undermined.309 For purposes of
this Article, I am accepting the scarcity rationale (and more generally
the current state of spectrum regulation), so a conclusion that de-
306. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
307. On the argument that wire substitutes for spectrum and its significance for purposes of
this Article, see supra notes 203–04.
308. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816–27 (2000) (invali-
dating a cable indecency ban based in part on its finding that a well-advertised option for par-
ents to block indecent programming is a less restrictive alternative); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507–08 (1996) (striking down a ban on liquor price advertising in
light of the availability of less restrictive alternatives such as price controls, increased taxation,
limits on per capita purchases, or educational campaigns); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Con-
sortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 756 (1996) (invalidating restrictions on cable indecency
based in part on its finding that “a so-called ‘V-chip’—a device that will be able automatically to
identify and block sexually explicit or violent programs” would be a less restrictive alternative);
Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erickson, The Jurisprudence of Precision: Contrast Space and Nar-
row Tailoring in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 259 (2001) (discussing the
broad ranges of less restrictive alternatives considered by the Court in applying strict scrutiny);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP.
CT. REV. 141, 148–49 (noting the breadth of less restrictive alternatives that the Court consid-
ered to be equally effective in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
309. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
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pends on the abandonment of scarcity is beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion.
This is a long way of saying that the government permitting more
services on the spectrum as a less restrictive alternative would proba-
bly be at best marginally relevant to most spectrum regulation and to
all nonspectrum (i.e., wire) regulation. In light of the low level of
scrutiny applicable to most forms of spectrum regulation, the consti-
tutionality of most diversity or access regulation applicable to spec-
trum likely will not turn on the existence of a less restrictive alterna-
tive. And although regulations of communication via wire are usually
subject to some form of heightened scrutiny, adding voices to the
spectrum will not be sufficiently viable alternative regulation of wire
to cast doubt on its constitutionality.
I said “most” spectrum regulation in the previous paragraph be-
cause some regulations of communications via spectrum are subject
to heightened scrutiny, and for some of those the possibility of the
government opening up more spectrum quite possibly would consti-
tute a less restrictive alternative. If Congress became sufficiently con-
cerned about the small number of owners of radio or television
broadcasters that it, say, decided to prohibit them from editorializing,
FCC v. League of Women Voters310 indicates that a court would apply
heightened scrutiny and that less restrictive alternatives would be
relevant.311 Adding new voices on the spectrum would seem to re-
spond to this concern about the dearth of owners at least as well as,
and more directly than, a ban on editorializing. The availability of ex-
cess space on the spectrum would therefore weaken the government’s
claim that a ban on editorializing was narrowly tailored to its goal of
limiting the power of a few dominant voices.
310. 468 U.S. 364, 381–84 (1984) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds a statute bar-
ring public broadcasters who received federal funds from editorializing).
311. In League of Women Voters, the Court noted the government’s “substantial interest in
ensuring that the audiences of noncommercial stations will not be led to think that the broad-
caster’s editorials reflect the official view of the government,” id. at 395, but offered the follow-
ing response:
[T]his interest can be fully satisfied by less restrictive means that are readily available.
To address this important concern, Congress could simply require public broadcasting
stations to broadcast a disclaimer every time they editorialize which would state that
the editorial represents only the view of the station’s management and does not in
any way represent the views of the Federal Government or any of the station’s other
sources of funding.
Id.
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The heightened scrutiny need not flow from First Amendment
considerations in order for the filling of unused spectrum to constitute
an alternative that demonstrates an absence of tailoring. Adding
voices to idle spectrum may be a less restrictive alternative in other
heightened scrutiny contexts as well. Most notably, as I mentioned
above, the government has implemented a number of programs over
the years that give preferences in spectrum license assignments to mi-
norities.312 Such programs are subject to strict scrutiny,313 and in ap-
plying the narrow tailoring prong of such scrutiny the Court has in
some cases found that the existence of less restrictive alternatives
would doom the racial classification.314 The relevant government in-
terest in such programs is not to create more minority owners for its
own sake (an impermissible goal), but instead to create a wider range
of programming (a goal that the Court found to be an important gov-
ernment interest in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC315). That is, in-
creasing the number of broadcasters who are racial minorities is
treated as a means to produce more diverse programming. This goal
of greater variety in programming would seem to be satisfied at least
as well by adding new broadcasters as by giving preferences to racial
minorities. Indeed, the main argument in favor of low power radio
was that it would produce a wider variety of programming, with a
huge range of groups adding their voices on the spectrum.316 The mere
312. See supra notes 285–89 and accompanying text.
313. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (establishing strict
scrutiny as the standard for reviewing federal racial classifications).
314. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion) (“[T]he term [‘narrowly tailored’] may be used to require consideration of whether lawful
alternatives and less restrictive means could have been used. Or . . . the classification at issue
must ‘fit’ with greater precision than any alternative means.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51, 55–58 (1973) (noting that a racial classification would be invalid if less
restrictive alternatives existed).
315. 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990). In light of the government’s professed interest in increasing
the diversity of owners of broadcast licenses, it was particularly striking that the government
decided to give a digital television license to each existing broadcaster (and to no one else). See
47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2) (Supp. V 1999) (“The competitive bidding authority granted [here] shall
not apply to licenses . . . issued by the Commission . . . for initial licenses . . . for digital television
service given to existing terrestrial broadcast licensees to replace their analog television service
licenses . . . .”); Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television
Broadcasting Service, 6 F.C.C.R. 7024, ¶ 6 (1991) (“[T]he public interest would best be served
by limiting the pool of initial ATV applicants to existing broadcasters.”). The government man-
aged to double the number of stations that were broadcasting television signals without in-
creasing the diversity of broadcast ownership one iota.
316. See Creation of a Low Power Radio Service, 14 F.C.C.R. 2471, ¶¶ 1, 12 (1999) (dis-
cussing potential diversifying effects from the authorization of new low power radio stations);
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addition of many new broadcasters, and the fact that the construction
and operating costs would be lower for low power radio than for full
power ones, would likely have this result. In addition, the FCC took
actions to enhance this possibility—notably, limiting low power li-
censes to noncommercial entities that do not already own a broadcast
station, newspaper, or cable company and that have headquarters
within their broadcasting community.317 The expected result was (and,
with the smaller number now permitted, to a lesser extent still is) a
profusion of new owners and new programming.318 The significance of
this is that increasing the total number of broadcasters by opening up
unused spectrum would be less restrictive not only for First Amend-
ment but also for Equal Protection purposes, as it need not involve
any racial classification. And, as this discussion suggests, increasing
the supply of broadcasters is likely to be at least as effective in
achieving the government’s permissible goals, and probably more
so.319 Avoiding wasting of the spectrum would thus seem to be a less
Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. to Approve Low Power Radio for Wider Access, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2000, at A1 (same); David Leonhardt, Religious Groups at Odds with G.O.P. on Radio Licenses,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at A1 (“[T]he F.C.C. chairman[] has said that adding hundreds of low
power radio stations is one of his top priorities—a key way to counteract the increasing consoli-
dation of the industry into the hands of a relatively few big profit-minded broadcasters.”).
317. Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, ¶¶ 1, 29–30, 33, 140 (2000).
The prohibition on cross-ownership extends to any entity that “hold[s] an attributable interest
in any other broadcast station or other media subject to [the FCC’s] ownership rules,” id. ¶ 1,
which means that a broadcaster, newspaper, or cable company cannot even be a joint owner of a
low power radio licensee.
318. Id. ¶¶ 4, 15, 163; Section 257 Report to Congress: Identifying and Eliminating Market
Entry Barriers for Entrepreneurs and Other Small Businesses, 15 F.C.C.R. 15,376, ¶¶ 98, 100
(2000).
In fact, if increasing the number of minority owners were considered to be a compelling
government interest, the FCC expected that its low power radio program would achieve that
goal, as well. The FCC noted that, in light of the ownership restrictions and lower costs men-
tioned above, the low power radio program would likely result in more ownership by racial mi-
norities (and women) as well as more diverse programming. See Creation of Low Power Radio
Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 7616-01, ¶ 174 (Feb. 15, 2000):
Because of the predicted lower construction and operational costs of LPFM stations
as opposed to full power facilities, we expect that small entities would be expected to
have few economic obstacles to becoming LPFM licensees. Therefore, this new serv-
ice may serve as a vehicle for small entities and under-represented groups (including
women and minorities) to gain valuable broadcast experience and to add their voices
to their local communities.
Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,208, ¶¶ 76, 78–81 (2000) (discussing
LPFM ownership restrictions and their diversity-enhancing functions).
319. Adding to the supply of licenses would not have exactly the same effects as diversity
regulation would—after all, they are different measures, with different impacts—but the ques-
tion is whether the alternative of increasing supply would be a less restrictive alternative that
would also achieve the government’s compelling purpose. See Volokh, supra note 308, at 149
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restrictive alternative to measures that grant preferences in license as-
signments based on race.
CONCLUSION
There are two particularly salient features of the regulatory re-
gime governing spectrum. First, the federal government has claimed
control of the spectrum, such that anyone who wants to use it must
obtain a license from the government. Congress decided to assert that
it and only it could control the entire spectrum, and by statute it effec-
tuated this plan.320 The government has therefore chosen to interpose
itself in the use of spectrum. It has created a chokepoint, with its ap-
proval necessary for anyone to use this resource. There was nothing
ineluctable about this choice; the government could have chosen to
allow private ownership of some or all of the spectrum, but it decided
otherwise. The government thus created, and placed itself in the posi-
tion of controlling, a requirement for a certain form of communica-
tion.
Second, the prevailing rationale supporting government regula-
tion of the spectrum is that the spectrum is not only subject to inter-
ference but also is scarce in a way that distinguishes it from other
forms of communication. These two points are related. The regula-
tory regime that scarcity is understood to justify—and that the Su-
preme Court has held it to justify—encompasses not only the gov-
ernment choosing among applicants for a given license, but also its
underlying control of the spectrum. Scarcity, however, does not justify
government actions that limit access to the spectrum; scarcity under-
cuts such actions. The rationale for government action, and for leni-
ent review of that action, is absent when the government keeps spec-
trum unused or underused.
The significance of these features is that government actions lim-
iting access to spectrum are subject to heightened First Amendment
scrutiny, and in most cases the only interest that would justify a re-
fusal to allocate is nontrivial interference. This may sound strange to
some, but it reflects the basic principle that governmental creation of
(arguing that in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Court identified a number of less re-
strictive alternatives that resulted in the invalidation of the statute under strict scrutiny even
though they were less effective than the challenged statute in achieving the government’s pur-
pose).
320. See supra note 1.
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a limit on communication raises the specter of exactly the sort of
abridgement of speech that the First Amendment should prevent.
